The Quality of Democracy in Indonesia and Russia

A Path-Shaping Analysis of Two Fourth Wave Democracies

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Honours in Asian Studies at the University of Sydney.

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2006

This thesis is my own original work. To the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text.

Signed …………………………………….

16 October 2006

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Abstract

This thesis uses a path-shaping approach to comparatively examine key areas of democratisation in two ‘fourth wave’ democracies, Indonesia and Russia. It argues that the process of democratisation in these ex-authoritarian states has been influenced and often constrained (although not determined), by legacies of the previous regime. The study makes a case for the adoption of flexible, open-ended definitions of democracy and democratisation that acknowledge the role this ‘historical baggage’ plays in political development. It seeks to abandon the dichotomy established in previous studies of democratisation between procedural and substantive facets of governance, and demonstrates the importance of taking both into account in discussions of democratic ‘quality’.

The thesis undertakes a comparative analysis of the difficulties encountered by Indonesia and Russia as a result of their authoritarian histories. It focuses on the continuing influence of pre-transition elites, the development of party politics and the implementation of political decentralisation in order to demonstrate how political development is shaped by practices and norms inculcated into elites and civilians under authoritarian governance. The thesis shows that democratisation does not follow a single, pre-determined pattern or unfold in a predictable, linear fashion. In doing so, it establishes the importance of flexible understandings of democracy that do not attempt to periodise democratisation or delineate fixed ‘criteria’ for recognising when the process has ended or ‘consolidated’.

Acknowledgements

To my supervisor Michele Ford, for demanding nothing less than the best – ASAP, for her (brutal) honesty, and for helping me be the best writer I can be; to the other members of the A-team (Lydia and Eve) for all their support, suggestions and feedback throughout the year, and for the final proofread; to Mum and Dad, for putting up with me; to Andrew for being my personal cheerleader across the border; to my friends who wonder if I'm still alive….

Thanks to you all, for each in your own way making this year that little bit easier, more enjoyable and rewarding than it would have been without you.

Dedicated to the boys who got the bad honours karma – Clive, Ken and James.

There is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer than to introduce a new system of things: for he who introduces it has all those who profit from the old system as his enemies and he has only lukewarm allies in all those who might profit from the new system.

(Machiavelli, *The Prince*, VI)

…the democratic process does not, and cannot, exist as a disembodied entity detached from historical conditions and historically conditioned human beings. Its possibilities and its limits are highly dependent on existing and emergent social structures and consciousness.

(Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*)

Introduction

Political transition has long interested historical and political commentators concerned with examining both the reasons behind, and the factors contributing to changes in regime type. Academic attention in the last two decades has particularly centred on those nation-states that have made the transition from non-democratic to democratic systems of governance (see for example, Balcerowicz 2002; Cornia and Popov 2001; Hancock and Logue 2000; Pridham 1995). A by-product of the focus on democratic transition has been a growth in studies on the *process* of democratisation – not just the 'hows' and 'whys' of transitions to democracy, but the 'whithers' – that is, the factors contributing to the endurance or decline of recently democratised nation-states, and the processes involved in democratic consolidation (for example, Henders 2004; Linz and Stepan 1996a; Potter 1997: 1-37).

Nation-states democratise for different reasons, and democratic transitions are the products of a unique combination of political, social and economic factors specific to the transitioning country. However, some commentators have successfully drawn parallels between a range of states in studies that go some way toward explaining the reasons why democracies stabilise and endure, or fail to do so and begin to decay (such as Diamond et al. 1997; Hancock and Logue 2000; Linz and Stepan 1996a).

While this thesis is inspired and anchored in such studies, it is concerned primarily with examining common difficulties encountered in the *implementation* and *realisation* of democracy in post-authoritarian states, and in particular how these difficulties are connected to legacies of the pre-transition, non-democratic government. The contention that 'history matters' in studies of democratisation informs the focus of this study. Lingering elements of the pre-transition regime inhibit the 'deepening' of democracy – that is, the successful institutionalisation and diffusion of democratic

practices, ideas and norms. In recognition of this, the comparative analysis on which this thesis is based uses a structural-historical framework, specifically employing a 'path-shaping' approach.[1] The thesis is structured as a comparative study of the democratisation of Russia and Indonesia, two geographically distant, culturally and historically divergent "Fourth Wave" democracies.[2] It focuses primarily on how successful and sustained democratisation in both states has been hindered by certain continuities with the pre-transition political system, and examines how non-democratic outcomes can occur in spite of the existence of democratic political institutions.

Adam Przeworski has noted that 'a minimalist conception of democracy does not alleviate the need for thinking about institutional design. In the end, the 'quality of democracy'…does matter for its very survival' (Przeworski 1999). As Chapter One explains, studies that class political systems as democratic based on the existence of certain institutions (such as free, fair, competitive elections, an independent judiciary and so on)[3] often ignore or fail to underscore the importance of democratic 'quality'. In this thesis, the 'quality' of Russia and Indonesia's political systems is examined through the assessment of the democratic or non-democratic outcomes and political realities that are produced by democratic institutions and/or policies designed to promote democratic norms and practices.

Russia and Indonesia came to be categorised as democratic (or at least *democratising*) states following the disintegration of authoritarian governance and the successful execution of competitive elections at the national level. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia emerged as an independent nation-state, and became nominally democratic following the

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[1] The 'path-shaping' approach is borrowed from Klaus Nielsen, Bob Jessop and Jerzy Hausner (1995: 3-44) and will be further elaborated upon in Chapter One.
[2] The model of four "waves" of democratisation, which is borrowed from Renske Doorenspleet (2005), is discussed further in Chapter One.
[3] That is, the 'minimalist' definitions of democracy referred to by Przeworski (1999).

election of Boris Yeltsin to the Presidency.[4] Yeltsin was democratically elected again in 1996[5] and his appointed successor, Vladmir Putin, achieved success at the polls in 2001 and again in 2004.[6] Russia's political transition has been viewed as 'depressingly normal' (Shleifer and Treisman 2004: 20-32) for a middle-income, democratising state (Shleifer 2005) and its political system has been described as re-centralising, 'neo-authoritarian' (Berezovsky 2004: 36-7; Lucas 2006) and 'bureaucratic authoritarian' (Shevtsova 2005: 229-253). It has been labelled a 'guided democracy' (Brown 2001: 35-41) and a 'militocracy' (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003: 289-306). This is indicative not only of the lack of consensus regarding Russia's political system, but more broadly regarding what constitutes a democratic state. As will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter One, much of this inconsistency stems from the conflict between 'institutionalist' (or proceduralist) and substantive definitions of democracy. That is, commentators differ over the extent to which they view the mere existence of democratic political institutions and procedures as constituting democracy, and to what degree they believe these institutions must be bolstered by more substantive elements (such as rights, political choice and responsiveness) for real, existing democracy to be in effect.

Commentary on Indonesia's transition from authoritarianism is similarly characterised by a range of evaluations of the *kind* of democracy that currently exists in the state. While Indonesia does not suffer from accusations of neo-authoritarianism like Russia, it has been classified as a 'predatory' (Robison 2002: 92-113) or 'patrimonial' (Webber 2006: 396-420) democracy; a democracy without effective government (McLeod 2005: 367-

[4] For a description of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's emergence as an independent state, and Yeltsin's presidency, see, for example Miller (1993) and Gill (2000).
[5] The democratic nature of the 1995-1996 Duma and Presidential elections are still widely debated due to government manipulation of the media and the illegal amount of funding generated for Yeltsin's re-election campaign. See McFaul (1997) for a thorough analysis of the 1995-6 election cycle.
[6] For a variety of perspectives on Putin's presidency, see Baev (2004: 3-13); Colton (2005b: 103-118); Politkovskaya (2004); Sakwa (2005: 1-17); Trenin (2005: 1-11).

86; Törnquist 2006: 227-55), and as simultaneously exhibiting successful political reform and a lack of substantive democratic characteristics (Aspinall 2005a: 117-56). Authoritarianism came to an end in Indonesia in 1998 following the resignation of President Suharto and the dismantling of his New Order regime.[7] The country began its transition to democracy in 1999 when Indonesians elected their legislative representatives to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), resulting in the replacement of interim president BJ Habibie with the MPR's chosen presidential candidate, Abdurrahman Wahid (later replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2001 following his impeachment).[8] In 2004 Indonesians participated in their first direct presidential election, choosing Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the second round of voting.[9] However, like Russia, commentators continue to disagree over whether or not Indonesia has completed its transition, if its democracy is in the process of being consolidated, or if it has reached equilibrium as a 'something else' (Hadiz 2003: 591-611, 2004b: 615-36) occupying the space between democracy and authoritarianism (Webber 2006: 396-420).

By comparing an ex-Soviet state with a Southeast Asian country, it is demonstrated that comparative studies of transition democracies need not involve nation-states in the same geographic region, or those whose political systems have direct implications for one another.[10] While commentators occasionally refer to Russia and Indonesia in passing to highlight similarities – for example, between the prevalence of patrimonialism or non-state forms

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[7] For a thorough account and analysis of the end of the New Order and Indonesia's democratic transition, see Aspinall (2005b) and O'Rourke (2002). Also see Case (2002) for summary of Habibie's presidency, Indonesia's first post-transition elections and Wahid's presidency.

[8] See Robison and Hadiz (2004) for a detailed study of Indonesian politics, including the Wahid and Megawati presidencies, since transition until 2004.

[9] Aspinall (2005b); Takashi (2005: 25-39) and Tomsa (2005) provide comprehensive accounts of the 2004 presidential elections.

[10] Many of the seminal volumes on democratic transition produced in the last decade focus on particular geographic regions, particularly Latin America and post-communist Europe and Eurasia. See for example Balcerowicz (2002); Dillon and Wykoff (2002); Linz and Stepan (1996a).

of violence – these parallels are not drawn out to any great depth (see for example Hadiz 2003: 591-611; Robison and Hadiz 2004; Törnquist 2002: 547-569; Volkov 1999: 741-54; Wilson 2006: 265-97). However the different ways in which Russia and Indonesia have grappled with the ongoing task of democratisation – specifically the challenge of ensuring the effective functioning or 'quality' of democratic institutions – speak more generally to the experience of post-authoritarian democratisation globally. No democratic transition successfully sweeps away all elements of the former regime and immediately replaces them with entirely novel personnel and institutions. All new democracies must build, to some extent, upon the political frameworks that preceded them, augmenting and reconstituting different elements to achieve democratic outcomes. In this sense, Russia and Indonesia's efforts to implement democratisation are emblematic of the challenges faced by all new democracies, even if the specifics of particular countries are inevitably unique.

While the specificities surrounding Russia and Indonesia's transition from authoritarian to democratic governance may differ, they may both be classified as 'fourth wave' democracies, a model of global democratic transitions that is discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. The grouping of democratic transitions into 'waves' is considered in relation to the minimalist, procedural definition of democracy that this categorisation denotes. Path-shaping, the theoretical framework used to approach this comparative study, and its place within transition literature, is also described. It is argued that an approach for examining democratisation that underscores the importance of history, without being deterministic, is necessary to understand the difficulties democratising states have in instilling democratic norms and practices, in spite of the existence of democratic institutions. Further, the need for open-ended, fluid definitions of democracy and democratisation is asserted, to enable examinations of the 'detours' that states make as part of the democratising path.

Chapter Two examines the various effects of elite continuity between autocratic and democratic Russia and Indonesia, before discussing the impact it has had upon the development of truly representative and pluralistic party politics in both states. It is argued that the cultivation of responsive political parties and politicians has been stunted by legacies of elite make-up in government and the continuation of 'informal' political relations outside of newly-created democratic institutions. By comparing this process in Indonesia and Russia, it is demonstrated that democratic tools and institutions can be exploited to overcome the continued influence of aspects of the pre-democratic regime. However, both states present examples of the difficulty and unwillingness of key political actors to pursue such objectives at the risk of political advantage.

The third chapter continues the path-shaping, comparative analysis used in Chapter Two, by further narrowing the analytical lens to examine sub-national political organisation in Russia and Indonesia. The centralised regimes of the Soviet Union and New Order Indonesia are described with special reference to the patrimonial political practices that emerged at regional and local levels. The respective policies of federalism and 'broad autonomy' in contemporary Russia and Indonesia are then discussed and compared as governmental strategies designed to promote democracy and eradicate non-democratic practices. Finally, the chapter examines how successful federalism and 'broad autonomy' have been at promoting democratic procedures and norms at the regional and local level via democratic political institutions. It is demonstrated that the endurance of non-democratic habits and mentalities dating from the pre-transition regime have retarded the process of implementing effective local and regional democratic governance. Instead, it is argued that non-democratic relations and procedures have been able to re-emerge or re-constitute themselves in a new, decentralised context, coopting institutions and impeding their democratic function.

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to present a thorough analysis of *all* aspects of democratisation that have been affected and constrained by historical legacies of Soviet and New Order governance, its articulation of a path-shaping framework provides a new prism through which post-authoritarian democratisation can be considered. The development of competitive, representative party politics and the decentralisation of political and economic powers are key elements of any state's democratisation, and are intimately related to the installation of democratic institutions. The comparative analysis of Russia and Indonesia's experiences in these areas demonstrates the utility of a path-shaping approach, and its potential to illuminate the unlikely relationship in democratising nation-states between democratic institutions and less-than-democratic outcomes.

Chapter One

A Path-Shaping Approach to Democratic Transitions

The title of this thesis refers to Russia and Indonesia as ‘fourth wave’ democracies, a categorisation that simultaneously alludes to and critiques Samuel Huntington’s seminal work *The Third Wave* (1991). Huntington’s study posited a model of three global ‘waves’ of democratisation occurring since 1828, with a wave defined as:

> … a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also usually involves liberalisation or partial democratisation in political systems that do not become fully democratic (Huntington 1991).[11]

Huntington sought to explain and account for an apparently growing trend towards democratisation worldwide, and for a historical tendency for transitions to and away from democracy to be clustered within a particular time period. This is not to say that transitions to democratic governance did not occur outside of the three waves, or that transitions away from democracy did not occur during a wave; rather, that particular phases of history can be identified in which transitions to democracy proportionally outweigh those to non-democratic regimes. While scholars have classed Russia and Indonesia’s

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[11] The three waves defined by Huntington occurred 1828-1926 (followed by a ‘reverse wave’ 1922-1942); 1943-1962 (followed by a second reverse wave 1958-1975), and 1974 to at least 1991. Huntington’s analysis ended in 1991, and at that point he was unsure whether the third wave was reaching its end or beginning to reverse (Huntington 1991).

transitions as part of the third wave,[12] more recent commentary has proposed a fourth wave of democratisation, both building upon Huntington's work and re-configuring it according to different criteria. Renske Doorenspleet's (2005) study has elaborated such a model, rectifying inconsistencies within Huntington's criteria for classifying democracies. Doorenspleet's model posits four waves of democratisation, the first of which occurred between 1893 and 1924, followed by a reverse wave 1924-1944. The second wave took place 1944-1957 and was followed by what Doorenspleet labels an 'Intermezzo', where neither transitions to nor those away from democracy outweighed one another. The final two waves identified by Doorenspleet occurred 1976-1989, and 1989 until at least 2001, at which point her analysis ended.

The grouping of democratic transitions into identifiable waves depends upon a minimalist definition of democracy, which Huntington and Doorenspleet base on the work of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert A. Dahl.[13] For a political system to be democratic, in Huntington's view, it must have both *political contestation* and *participation* (Huntington 1991). A central part of Doorenspleet's (2005) critique of Huntington's study rests on his inconsistent application of these criteria.[14] Consequently, she elaborates and explicitly defines the minimal measures of contestation and participation required for formal democracy:

> *Democracy* is a type of political regime in which (1) there exist institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies at the national level, and there are institutionalised constraints on

[12] For example Diamond and Plattner (2001a) group all post-communist transitions into the third wave, and Uhlin (1997) assessed Indonesia's pre-transition, growing pro-democracy movement as part of the third wave. See also Carothers (2002: 5-21).
[13] See for example Schumpeter (1945) and Dahl (1971; 1989).
[14] For example, Huntington classifies the United States of America until 1965 and Switzerland until 1971 as *undemocratic* because of their exclusion of southern African-Americans and women respectively (see Huntington 1991), yet he later classifies each as part of the first wave of democratisation which began in 1828 and concluded in 1926 (Huntington 1991).

> the exercise of power by the executive (*competition*); and (2) there exists inclusive suffrage or the right of participation in selection of national leaders and policies (*inclusiveness/participation*) (Doorenspleet 2005).

Formalist definitions of democracy like those employed by Huntington and Doorenspleet are a useful starting point from which democratic *substance* can be measured. While accepting the minimalist, procedural nature of such a categorisation insofar as the use of the term 'fourth wave' implies, this thesis seeks to engage with debates over the nature, extent and 'quality' of democracy in Indonesia and Russia by discussing both procedural and substantive aspects of democracy and democratisation using a 'path-shaping' approach. The path-shaping model, and its place within the broader 'schools' of transition theory, is outlined below. This chapter then discusses the reasons why procedural definitions of democracy are inadequate in themselves for studies of democratisation, and why it is necessary to take more substantive factors into account. It argues that substantive and procedural analyses of democracy cannot be separated into two distinct entities; that the study of one requires consideration of the other. This in turn is used to posit a model for understanding democracy and democratisation that does not ascribe to any one, unbending definition of those terms. Finally, the task of examining democratic 'quality' is discussed in relation to the connection between procedural and substantive aspects of democratisation. It is argued that democratic procedures do not automatically engender substantive outcomes, and thus that a consideration of 'quality' is necessary for the examination of ex-authoritarian, fourth wave democracies, in conjunction with understanding of democratisation as an open-ended, non-linear process.

Explaining Regime Change and 'Paths' of Transition

The transition literature that has emerged in the past two decades has presented a number of different theoretical approaches for the study of regime change. The modernisation approach to democratisation, for example, stresses the need for certain social and economic prerequisites in a state for a successful transition to occur. That is, a country's level of socio-economic development is asserted to correlate with its potential to democratise successfully, with higher development denoting better chances for the attainment of democracy (Doorenspleet 2005; Potter 1997: 1-37). A mixture of social and economic theory based on the ideas of American economist John Maynard Keynes, combined with a new post-war, bi-polar world order, influenced this model in which all industrial societies were seen to be moving towards the same, desirable destination (Preston 1996).[15] As Gilman (2003) notes, modernisation theory presented an

> … implied development narrative that helped fill the cognitive gap for social scientists struggling to understand what development might mean for countries utterly different from the United States or Europe.

While modernisation approaches were popular primarily in the post-World War II context, the conception of modernisation as a linear, irreversible, and teleological process with liberal democracy and capitalism its endpoint can be seen to have strongly influenced later studies of democratisation and consolidation, particularly those noted below which set out three- or four-step journeys to transition or consolidation.[16] Dependency or world system

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[15] Some of the most well-known modernisation theorists include Seymour Martin Lipset (1960; 1963), Lucian Pye (1961) and Gabriel Almond (1950; 1956).
[16] Modernisation theory was influential in practice also. Suharto's five year plans for economic development were heavily influenced by the ideas of Walt Rostow (1960), whose model of five stages of economic growth delineates the steps needed for a 'traditional' society to develop into a 'modern' society.

approaches to transition emerged in response to the decline in popularity of modernisation theory, and replaced the focus on measures of socio-economic development with assessments of a state's 'historical position in the worldwide political-economic system' (Doorenspleet 2005).[17] Dependency, classed as an unequal relationship between two countries, was used to represent the connection between capitalist or 'developed' countries and 'underdeveloped' states, with a focus on the impact of imperialism and neo-colonialism on the socio-economic condition of 'underdeveloped' countries (Ghosh 2001). Dependency theory did not assume that all industrialising countries would follow the same path, becoming increasingly alike, and did not posit one model of 'modernity' (the United States according to modernists) (Gilman 2003). However these ideas, like those presented in Wallerstein's (1974; 1980; 1989) model of core, semi-periphery and periphery states and Braudel's (1984) model of world economies, have a deterministic foundation that assumes democratic transition to be possible only in particular countries. This implies that democratic transition and democratisation must always present the same pattern or characteristics regardless of the specificities of a particular nation-state. As Gilman (2003) notes, modernist and dependency or world systems theory share a love of the 'metanarrative' – that is, both constructed models 'that claimed not only to explain how everyone had gotten to where they were, but also to provide a framework for predicting the future'.

Transition approaches to regime change that emerged from the late 1960s took the idea of an established 'path' of democratic transition one step further. Dankwart Rustow's (1970: 337-63) model, which effectively created the transition school, divided regime change into four key stages through which a transitioning state was assumed to pass chronologically: a stage of

[17] Dependency theory originally stemmed from Marxist ideas, represented by the idea of capitalist developed countries exploiting the weaker 'less developed countries'. However as the theory developed it made significant departures from the ideas of classical Marxism (Ghosh 2001; Leys 1996).

national unity, followed by an *inconclusive political struggle* that moves to a *decision* phase, finally followed by a stage of *habituation*. Rustow's four-step transition was later adopted by democracy theorists to develop a three-stage model culminating in 'consolidation' – the equivalent of 'habituation'. Consolidation has been broadly defined by a number of commentators as existing when elections and their adjoining freedoms are institutionalised – that is, when democratic norms and procedures are broadly accepted by elites and citizens alike as constituting 'the only game in town' (Linz and Stepan 1996b: 14-33).[18] It is conceived of as the final stage of the three-step process of regime change and democratisation, which begins with regime breakdown (often the result of a period of 'opening' or limited political liberalisation), followed by democratic transition (what is also referred to as *breakthrough* – the collapse of the regime and emergence of a new, democratic system) (Carothers 2002: 5-21; Gill 2000). In this way a chronology of democratisation has been established in transition literature, and often the creation of new institutions is used as a measure of where a state is located in this linear progression (Schedler 2001a: 1-22). The transition approach does not assume democratisation to be the automatic outcome of modernisation and economic development (unlike the modernisation and dependency or world system schools), however it still assumes a sharp division between transition and consolidation 'stages' (Potter 1997: 1-37) which has teleological implications. While more contemporary transition theorists such as Linz and Stepan (1996a) no longer assume all transitions from authoritarian rule to constitute transitions to democracy, the continued emphasis on necessary criteria for consolidation nevertheless implies a recognisable endpoint of democratisation.

Early approaches to democratic transition and democratisation in the historical-structural school shared an interest in power structures within states, and their contribution to regime change. Power structures were

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[18] See for example, Chull Shin (1994: 135-70); Gill (2000); O'Donnell (O'Donnell 2001: 113-130); Schedler (2001a: 1-22); Carothers (Carothers 2002: 5-21).

understood to limit and shape the agency of groups and individuals, which in turn influenced how able and likely citizens were to push for democratisation. These early theories focused not on the agency of elites or civic groups themselves, but on how power structures and networks *constrained* the political options available to them (Doorenspleet 2005). This involved a consideration of a nation-state's history and processes of historical change. The way economic, social and political structures transform over time is examined in order to assess how their evolution limits, or presents openings for, political change (Potter 1997: 1-37). However, theorists differ on exactly how much they believe historical legacies influence the path of democratisation. As Hausner et al. note (1995: 3-44) within historical-structural approaches there is a 'continuum of possible positions'. At one extreme are those who view political transition as constituting a complete removal and rejection of the old system and its replacement with entirely new institutions or structures. At the other end of the spectrum are historically determinist approaches which assume that a developmental path is 'locked in' and irreversible once begun.

Path-dependent approaches examine structural and institutional legacies of the pre-democratic regime and their impact on the post-transition, democratising government, describing the process of democratisation as being highly dependent 'on recombining old elements as much as, if not more than… on introducing wholly new social forms' (Hausner, Jessop, and Nielsen 1995: 3-44). Page (2006: 87-115) notes that more recently, 'path dependence has become a popular conveyor of the looser idea that history matters'. Path-dependent approaches assert that historical legacies dictate the direction of the democratic path and can never be overcome. Mahoney (2001: 111-141), for example, asserts that key decisions of elites at what he calls 'critical junctures' in history are responsible for later outcomes in the process of political development. Historical decisions produce institutional patterns that become self-perpetuating over time, and thus some aspects of political

development can be predicted. This kind of approach to the study of transition and democratisation leans strongly toward historical determinism, and does not allow for unexpected developments that could disrupt the process of regime change or democratisation *after* a ‘critical juncture’ has occurred. The assumption that a nation-state is set on one, unchangeable and linear path by key historical events and/or decisions, and thus that this path will follow a ‘predictable’ course, implies that all democratising states will follow, to some extent, similar patterns of development. It is problematic to argue that a state’s political trajectory is predictable, as this suggests it will follow a ‘route’ that is recognisable, implying that a precedent for its development has been set elsewhere. This ignores the contextual nature of political transition and democratisation, and in effect condemns nation-states that have made a wrong turn in democratic progress to a less-than-democratic future, while assuming that countries exhibiting enviable democratic attributes will not suffer any setbacks to their democratic quality. History has shown time and again that political systems do not always ‘stay the course’ of democratisation, and that those which do rarely follow a singular, linear course, let alone the course mapped out for them by political commentators.

Consequently this thesis adopts a historical-structural approach henceforth referred to as ‘path-shaping’, a term borrowed from Hausner et al. (1995: 3-44). While path-*dependency* focuses on one, historically-established path of democratisation that cannot be significantly disrupted or re-directed by external or internal forces, path-*shaping* acknowledges that there is no single, linear trajectory for democratisation. Legacies of the pre-transition regime are considered important in shaping, and often constraining, different aspects of democratisation, but are not viewed as solely determining how democratisation unfolds. Where limitations exist, groups or elites can act to overcome them – however, their willingness and capacity to do so may be limited by the continued influence of certain pre-transition practices or mentalities (Hausner, Jessop, and Nielsen 1995: 3-44). This approach does

not presume, as Mahoney's (2001: 111-141) does, to be able to predict certain outcomes in the process of democratisation, but rather highlights the uncertain, non-linear and ongoing nature of political 'paths', while highlighting the influence of a state's particular 'historical baggage'(Whitehead 2002).[19] The need for this more flexible conception of democratisation is reflected in transition theorists' recent propensity to develop new naming categories for countries that have failed to progress in the linear fashion their models predict. These 'grey area', or 'qualified democracies' include (but are not limited to) semi-democracies, pseudo-democracies, façade democracies, illiberal democracies, and so on (Carothers 2002: 5-21). As Carothers (2002: 5-21) has noted, these 'grey-zone' sub-categories of democracy are manifestations of attempts 'to apply the transition paradigm to the very countries whose political evolution is calling that paradigm into question'.

The thesis is premised on the assumption that the lack of consensus in academic understandings of democracy, transition and consolidation is not a manifestation of 'conceptual incompetence', but of political reality (Schedler 2001a: 1-22).[20] That is, democratisation is an inherently unpredictable process, which moves not only forwards but backwards, sideways and diagonally at a changing pace. Acknowledgement of these political 'detours' (Whitehead 2002) treats equally aspects of democratisation traditionally viewed as *usual* and *probable* and those that are *possible* and *unexpected* (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). It uses the path-shaping approach as a lens through which different aspects of democratisation, notably difficulties

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[19] Commentators such as Alexander (2001: 249-70) warn against the use of path-dependent explanations in all instances when certain phenomena persist or history seems to have particular importance, asserting that this risks 'theory-stretching'. However, a path-shaping approach fills an important gap in existing transition approaches that privilege the process of institution-building in democratising states, and disregard 'the underlying conditions in transitional countries – their economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up [and] sociocultrual traditions' (Carothers 2002: 5-21) as factors in the outcomes of democratisation. A path-shaping approach underscores the reality that history does matter, without deeming it the single factor determining outcomes in the process of democratisation or assuming that political trajectories are pre-ordained.
[20] This idea is also put forward by Whitehead (2002).

encountered in implementing democratic norms and practices, can be discussed and considered. Borrowing from the ideas of Whitehead (2002), discussions of democracy in this thesis are premised on an understanding of the term as 'a long-term and somewhat open-ended outcome, not just a feasible equilibrium but as a socially desirable and imaginary future'. This approach rejects purely formalist approaches to democracy and underscores the importance of substantive aspects, but does not attempt to provide a 'checklist' of substantive and procedural democratic necessities.[21] Consequently democratisation is equally conceived as a fluid notion, a 'process of moving towards this not entirely fixed future state… 'open-ended' in the sense that it always remains open to further reconsideration and revision in the light of experience' (Whitehead 2002).

This, however, does not mean that 'anything goes' – it is possible to utilise a definition of democracy that is 'floating but anchored' – that is, anchored in minimal, procedural definitions with a 'floating' area of contestation and conjecture (Whitehead 2002). The open-ended and ongoing nature of democratisation negates the need for use of the term 'consolidation', which suggests that democratisation has an identifiable endpoint, and ignores the fact that even so-called 'established' democracies (like North America and Australia), can and should continually work to improve the quality of their political systems, as they can and do suffer from regular setbacks to democratic quality despite being categorised as 'consolidated' (Diamond 1999: 29-39). As O'Donnell (2001: 113-130) has noted, even if the rules of the democratic game have been successfully instituted in a regime, 'the

[21] Some of the elements deemed essential for 'real' democracy by substantive approaches include: freedom of belief, expression, organisation, protest, and other civil liberties; a rule of law under which all citizens are treated equally; a politically independent and neutral judiciary and other institutions ensuring accountability; checks on abuses of power between different levels of government; an open, pluralistic civil society and free mass media, and a civilian-controlled military (Diamond and Plattner 2001a). All these aspects of governance are important and integral to the effective functioning of a democratic political system. However, as Diamond and Plattner admit, each of these elements represents 'a continuum, and it is hard to say exactly when a regime has sufficient freedom, pluralism, lawfulness, accountability, and institutional strength to be considered a liberal democracy' (Diamond and Plattner 2001a).

games played ‘inside’ democratic institutions [can be] different from the ones dictated by their formal rules’ – that is, actual behaviour does not always reflect its institutional context.

Defining democratic ‘quality’

The ‘global resurgence’ of democracy in the 1990s has been replaced in the new millennium by what Diamond and Plattner (2001a) call a ‘global *divergence’* of democracy – that is, electoral democracies increasingly differ ‘not only in the nature of their institutional structures, but in the *quality* and *depth* of their democracy’(Diamond and Plattner 2001a). Procedural, minimalist definitions of democracy – like Dahl’s (1971) *polyarchies*, in which competitive elections and universal suffrage are sufficient to class a political system as democratic – are useful for describing a basic foundation for the establishment of democracy, but taken alone are inadequate for *measuring* democracy (Gill 2000). Dahl (1998) has since revised and extended his definition of polyarchies, stressing the need for constitutionally-provided *political equality*, listing six institutions that are mandatory for the existence of democracy, and stressing a number of necessary prerequisites for the instalment of democracy.[22] However, attempts such as this to strip back a contested concept to a finite list of necessary practices and political structures still imply that ‘democracy’ and ‘democratisation’ can be essentialised, and will, to some extent, proceed in the same manner in different contexts. Likewise, the emphasis placed, for example, by Schmitter and Karl (1996: 49-62) on necessary procedures of governmental decision-making for democratisation, fails to address the importance of outcomes and the

[22] Dahl’s (1998) six mandatory institutions for democracy are elected officials; free, fair and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship. The necessary prerequisites are control of military and police by elected officials; democratic beliefs and political culture, and no strong foreign control that is hostile to democracy (Dahl 1998).

institutionalisation of democratic norms and values within society as a whole (Whitehead 2002). In doing so, they often also fail to recognise the continuing influence of a democratising state's pre-transition history, focusing instead on state-crafting and institution-building, without paying adequate attention to the old structures that new, democratic institutions must be built on or crafted around.

As political commentary has shifted its focus from procedural definitions and 'groupings' of democracies to a greater concern with more substantive aspects of democratisation, the idea and theory of democratic 'consolidation' has become increasingly accepted and widely discussed. However, just as any attempt to establish a 'cut-off point' that separates democracies from non-democracies will always be arbitrary because of the myriad understandings of democracy (O'Donnell 2001: 113-130), so too is the establishment of consensus on the point at which a democracy is consolidated virtually impossible (see Gill 2000; Schedler 2001b: 149-164). For this reason, some commentators have defended minimalist, procedural definitions of democracy, warning that substantive understandings, in denoting such a variety of meanings, risk transforming 'democracy' into a term that means everything and thus nothing at all (Dahl 1989). Understandings of democracy are contentious because the term simultaneously denotes an ideal system, a principle, and an actual system of governance. However, Törnquist (2002: 547-569, emphasis in original) argues that:

> Substantial democracy should not be regarded as a Utopia, it 'only' implies that the conventional rules of the game are both fair *and* applied to significant areas and issues, and that all the players are both granted political equality and have an actual capacity to take part and win.

If democracy and democratisation are understood as flexible notions, denoting an ongoing, multidirectional and multifaceted process that is open-

ended, the direction or course in which democratisation is moving assumes great significance. The democratic trajectory is important both in terms of how a state's 'historical baggage' affects the political path taken at any moment in time, and in terms of measuring or assessing democratic 'quality' or 'depth'.[23] Diamond and Morlino (2005: ix-xliii) define a 'quality democracy' as:

> … one that provides its citizens a high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular control over public policies and policymakers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions.

They list eight dimensions of 'quality', in which democracies vary: the rule of law; participation; competition; vertical and horizontal accountability; respect for civil and political freedoms; progressive implementation of greater political, economic and social equality, and responsiveness (Diamond and Morlino 2005: ix-xliii).[24] This thesis, in its comparative analysis of the democratic systems of Russia and Indonesia, does not presume to make any definitive judgement on how 'high' the quality of those systems is. However it is concerned with discussing the elements that constitute quality, particularly the relationship between key political institutions and procedures, their character and functioning, and the democratic or non-democratic nature of political outcomes. The cases of Russia and Indonesia demonstrate that where democratic institutions fail to produce entirely democratic outcomes, legacies of certain pre-transition practices and/or policies are often contributing factors to this failure to improve democratic quality.

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[23] Discussions of democratic quality or depth are to be differentiated from assessments of democratic *performance*, which often rests on exclusively procedural criteria. See, for example Lijphart (1999) and Roller (2005). However, some recent works on performance do take intro account substantive as well as institutional aspects, such as Brunell's (2005) study of post-communist states.

[24] For more thorough discussions of some of the aspects of 'quality' identified by Diamond and Morlino, see O'Donnell (2005: 3-17) on the rule of law, Beetham (2005: 32-46) on civil and political freedoms, and Bingham Powell, Jr. (2005: 62-76) on responsiveness.

Plattner (2005: 77-81) has noted that there are a number of problems and difficulties involved with attempts to assess the substance, or quality of democracy, stemming from different understandings of quality, which can be assessed in terms of 'democratic-ness', as well as in terms of effective governance.[25] However, the difficulties associated with assessing democratic 'quality' do not negate the need to examine it. The fluid, open-ended understanding of democratisation employed in this thesis is premised on the assumption that no perceived level of democratic attainment renders the discussion of democratisation obsolete. All democracies have the potential to enhance or undermine the quality of their political systems, and the unpredictability of this process is illustrated particularly in recently transitioned, ex-authoritarian states like Indonesia and Russia. Various legacies of authoritarian governance often act to obstruct efforts at or the potential for enhancing procedural and substantive elements of democracy. Thus the path-shaping analysis of Indonesia and Russia's democratisation demonstrates how discussions of quality can illuminate relationships between institutions, procedures and outcomes that purely procedural or substantive analyses may obscure.

Conclusion

The plethora of works that seek to define and categorise democracy, democratisation and consolidation are invaluable in their contribution of discrete criteria – both procedural and substantive – by which political systems can be studied and assessed in relation to democratic ideals. However, as the comparative discussion of elements of Russia's and Indonesia's democratisation undertaken in this thesis demonstrates, democracy and democratisation can be conceived in, and indeed benefit from,

[25] For a thorough discussion of the problems associated with 'quality-based' assessments of democracy, see Plattner (2005: 77-81).

a more flexible frame of analysis. The unlikely relationships between nominally democratic institutions and procedures and non-democratic outcomes that are discussed in the following chapters demonstrate that rigid understandings of democracy, and the linear, teleological periodisation of democratisation does not always 'fit' with the social and political realities of democratising states. This will be demonstrated in the discussion of elite continuity and party politics in Indonesia and Russia in Chapter Two, and in Chapter Three's examination of the implementation and outcomes of decentralisation in both countries. Both chapters show how the persistent influence of practices and mentalities dating from the pre-transition, authoritarian regime have shaped, in varying ways, the paths those aspects of democratisation have taken as new and old forces continue to be influenced by the 'old way' of living and interacting in a new, democratic context.

Chapter Two

Elite Continuity and the Development of Party Politics

Recent studies that examine the state of democracy in Indonesia and Russia are largely founded on a common assumption that the country in question has made a transition from authoritarianism to electoral democracy and is in the midst of efforts to consolidate the democratic system. As explained in the previous chapter, this thesis consciously refrains from referring to democratic 'consolidation' in the case of Indonesia or Russia, because the term assumes a consensus about the meaning of 'democracy' and 'consolidation' that does not exist, and furthermore implies that the process of democratisation has a recognisable endpoint. This chapter and the next demonstrate the usefulness of frameworks for studying democratisation and transition such as those posited by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Schedler (2001a: 1-22), Alexander (2002a: 1145-1170) and Whitehead (2002) that de-emphasise consolidation and highlight instead the 'institutionalised uncertainty' of political transitions – that is, the impossibility of positing a universally accepted telos of democratisation, and the way in which such an approach ignores the multi-layered complexity of political change at both institutional and substantive levels.

This chapter examines procedural elements of the formal political systems of Indonesia and Russia that are integral to their democratic character, with specific reference to the continuity of pre-transition elites within the new democratic system and the development of pluralistic party politics. It refrains from referring exclusively to democratic 'institutions', as this raises the problem of arguments pertaining to the relationship between formal political institutions and democratic consolidation.[26] Instead, the areas

[26] For a discussion of these arguments, see Alexander (2002b)

of democratic development discussed include both procedural and substantive elements of democracy, highlighting the difficulty of considering these aspects independently of one another. The chapter focuses on the ways in which the development of these elements of democratisation has been constrained due to legacies of the pre-democratic past, and instances in which these constraints have been overcome or reinforced. This comparative, path-shaping analysis of the relative progress that Indonesia and Russia have made in two key areas of democratisation illustrates the importance that elite politics, party structure and grassroots politics have for the development of both procedural and substantive aspects of a democratic system, as well as the crucial role that individual and group agency play in fostering their development in spite of historical limitations. By considering the development of formal democratic procedures and institutions in relation to their substantive implications and outcomes, it demonstrates that the instalment of democratic institutions does not necessarily engender substantive democratic realities. This further highlights the uncertainty inherent in post-transition democratisation, and hence the difficulty of speaking about democratic consolidation in the case of either Indonesia or Russia.

The Continuity and Discontinuity of Pre-Transition Elites

The political transition in Russia in 1991-2 and Indonesia in 1998-9 – both transitions from authoritarian systems of governance to minimalist (that is, electoral) democracies – involved significant dismantling of pre-transition political structures. However, the transformation of their authoritarian systems was not initially paralleled by significant changes in personnel. The immediate aftermath of democratic transition in both cases was characterised by a remarkable continuity in the various kinds of elites (political, military and security, and business) that had been central to the functioning of the pre-

transition regime, despite the establishment of formally democratic institutions.

Pluralist democracy and competitive elections were re-introduced in Indonesia in 1999.[27] The transition from centralised autocracy to electoral democracy was aided by key transformations of the political apparatus, including changes in the composition of parliament, measures to establish civilian control over the security forces, the first of a number of laws on decentralisation, the formation of independent commissions to promote transparency and accountability and discourage corruption, freedom of the press, the establishment of a commercial court, and reductions in government control of the judiciary (Mishra 2002: 1-19). In spite of these markers of democratisation, commentators have asserted the importance of recognising that 'a compromise between authoritarian and democratic power took place' (Hara 2001: 307-326). The development of new institutions and the transformation of old ones did not see the disappearance of New Order elites from the bureaucracy, judiciary, military or the business world, and nor did it see a significant re-distribution of their powers (Webber 2006: 396-420). Commentators such as Hara (2001: 307-326) and Anwar (2001: 3-16) view the accommodation of elites as a necessary part of the transition process, arguing that certain pre-transition groups' and individuals' continuing political and/or economic power is required for the implementation of reform. However more recently other commentators such as Hadiz (2003: 591-611), Aspinall (2005a: 117-56), Tomsa (2005) and Törnquist (2006: 227-55) have asserted that the continuity of New Order elites was less a process of *accommodation* on behalf of Indonesia's democrats, and more a *cooptation* of the democratic system by pre-transition elites, who have monopolised power to create what Törnquist labels an 'oligarchic democracy' that has sidelined the key participants of *reformasi* who originally fought for democratisation.

[27] Indonesia's first experience with pluralist democracy was as a newly independent nation under President Sukarno in the 1950s, and lasted until the introduction of 'guided democracy' in 1959.

Russia's transition to democratic politics following the disintegration of the Soviet Union was also marked by the difficulty of removing pre-transition elites who continued to wield significant political and/or economic power. Unlike Indonesia, there was no mass pro-democracy uprising demanding an end to autocratic rule and the resignation of corrupt government employees. The Russian public was broadly unhappy with the performance of Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union, but this was primarily *because* of attempts at political reform and liberalisation (which caused great hardship), rather than dissatisfaction with the pace of reform. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of Russia as a democratising, federal state, was more the product of political manoeuvring within what had been the Soviet political apparatus, and power struggles between those supportive of Gorbachev and those opposed to his leadership (see Gill and Markwick 2000; Miller 1993). Thus the political apparatus that constituted the 'new' Russia was essentially what it inherited as a former Soviet state, and this included many of the people who staffed government bodies under Soviet rule. Kryshtanovskaya and White (2005: 200-222) note how the pre-transition practice of life employment for political elites resulted in their accumulation of significant political capital which was used to resist attempts to remove them from their positions of power and/or deprive them of their privileges post-transition. Rigby (2001: 1-14) has likewise noted the significance of continuity of elite leadership in Russia's regions and republics, where many governors managed to harness accumulated political capital to retain their previously state-appointed positions in the first regional elections. As is described in more detail in the following chapter, regional leaders, particularly those of ethnic minority populations, were especially well-placed to ensure elite continuity, as the Yeltsin administration granted them large measures of autonomy to govern their regions as they saw fit, enabling local elites to build significant social,

political and economic power that greatly enhanced their bargaining position with the central government (see Slider 2005: 168-185).

Yet while Russia and Indonesia's democratic transitions were constrained by the continued influence of pre-transition political elites, the respective presidencies of Boris Yeltsin in Russia and Abdurrahman Wahid in Indonesia provide examples where the individual agency of new elites could be used to contest the restraints imposed by their nations' political histories. Russia's first elected President, Boris Yeltsin (in spite of being a product of the Soviet system himself), undertook mass recruitment of new political personnel and enforced the early retirement of many officials from the old system (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005: 200-222).[28] In the early years of transition, Yeltsin embodied the republican push to displace remnants of communist power, demonstrated in path-breaking decisions such as the temporary banning of the Communist Party (CPSU) and expropriation of its assets (Gill and Markwick 2000). Similarly, Indonesia's first elected post-New Order president, Abdurrahman Wahid, deliberately avoided accommodation of former elites within his government and constructed a cabinet that strengthened his own party while sidelining the New Order's party of power, Golkar (Liddle 2001: 208-220; Robison 2002: 92-113).

However the extent to which Yeltsin's and Wahid's political agency could counter the continued influence of the former regime (and the extent to which they were willing to challenge certain legacies) was limited, with each encountering significant difficulties in attempts to distance themselves from the political elite of the pre-transition regime. Wahid's attempts to form a government without accommodating old elites earned him a wide-reaching hostility that combined with other ill-judged political moves, erratic

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[28] Under Yeltsin the 'retirement' of elites did not always represent the stripping of their power and certainly not of their privileges. The 'political capital' that Kryshtanovskaya and White (2005: 200-222) speak of ensured that Soviet-era elite, even if removed from their political office, retained the benefits of their former position (also a tradition in the Soviet era to avoid creating a discontented social group that could potentially destabilise the regime) and were installed in 'ex-elite' zones such as trade unions or government bodies .

behaviour and ill-health, ultimately led to his impeachment and replacement by Megawati Sukarnoputri, who 'recognised that no democratic government could rule without accommodating the old interests' (Robison 2002: 92-113). Yeltsin, on the other hand, found that the early retirement of former elites, combined with a high turnover of new officials soon created a 'cadre famine' – a shortage of experienced politicians to occupy positions within his administration. Consequently he was forced to depend on some of the Soviet elites whom he had excorporated, creating a 'reserve' system in which cadres were 'stored' temporarily in state businesses and public foundations until such time as their services were once again required (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005: 200-222). Further, Yeltsin discovered that even when he appointed his own political elites (for example in the first years of his presidency when he appointed regional governors), loyalty to democratic reform was not guaranteed. Many members of this 'new' elite (unbeknown to Yeltsin) had supported the coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 and later took part in the October 1993 uprising against Yeltsin within the Russian parliament (Stoner-Weiss 2006: 104-118). Thus by the end of the 1990s in Russia, the speed with which old elites had been permanently excorporated at the beginning of the decade had slowed and even reversed, with the result that it became 'very difficult to force unwelcome politicians out of a prominent role in national life' (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005: 200-222).

The reversal of early attempts to remove old elites from the halls of power in Russia is paralleled to a certain extent in Indonesia under the presidency of Megawati. Even though establishment of civilian rule over and significant reductions in the power of the military were key elements of Indonesia's democratisation project, Megawati cultivated ties with elements of the New Order military-political elite to ensure her own advantage during Wahid's presidency (Robison 2002: 92-113), and while president she avoided pushing the issue of military reform (Misol 2006: 1-136). This demonstrates that the agency of new democratic elites can be used to reinforce the

influence of hangover elements of the old regime as well as to dismantle them. Megawati is widely perceived as having abandoned the *reformasi* movement in the aftermath of its success, instead responding positively to the overtures of old elites, who pragmatically acknowledged the necessity of compromise with the moderate opposition in order to maintain some powers and privileges (Törnquist 2006: 227-55). Yeltsin too abandoned the leaders of the anti-Communist, democratic opposition that had aided his political popularity and rise to power in newly transitioned Russia. While he did not always replace them with reinstated Soviet *politicians*, he cultivated a core support group of Soviet elites of another kind – what Gill and Markwick (2000) label the '*partkhoznomenklature*' – former Communist Party elites who had presided over the economic reform of the Gorbachev administration, and 'against whom the democrats had railed bitterly'.

Like Megawati, Yeltsin found his political interests were best served by cultivating good relations with a powerful security apparatus dating from the pre-transition regime. Legislative measures in 1993 and 1994 dissolved the Ministry of Defence and established presidential control over the ministries of defence and internal affairs as well as the security and intelligence agencies. The extraordinarily powerful Soviet KGB continued its operations with little change apart from that of its title, becoming the FSK (Federal Counter Intelligence Service) and later the FSB (Federal Security Bureau), which was accorded even greater powers in surveillance and related intelligence activities (Gill and Markwick 2000). Both Megawati and Yeltsin utilised their own, personal security forces for political protection. While Megawati's PDI-P paramilitary wing occupied a grey area outside of the official security apparatus,[29] Yeltsin's Presidential Security Service (PSB)

[29] While the creation of paramilitary groups attached to political parties did not represent a continuation of New Order security apparatus elites *per se*, it stemmed from the precedent set by the Suharto administration which normalised the practice of harnessing 'illegitimate' forms of violence in the service of the state and/or political parties. Further discussion of the legacy of politically-affiliated militia groups in post-New Order Indonesia is contained in

comprised part of the army's Main Security Directorate (GUO) (Gill and Markwick 2000). However both represented a significant undermining of official attempts at reducing the pre-transition powers of the security apparatus as well as the continuation of a political mentality that views coercion as a necessary tool of governance.

Both Megawati and Yeltsin found that their ability to govern their transitioning states effectively – that is, without excessive contestation – was constrained by powerful elements of the pre-transition regime and the enduring trend of using violence for political ends. Rather than pursue a governing style that turned its back on every aspect of pre-democratic modes of authority and risk social and political instability, both leaders found it in their best interests to accommodate old elites of the politico-military complex. As Robison (2002: 92-113) has noted, some level of accommodation is probably unavoidable in newly democratising states – however, it nevertheless raises questions about the price of accommodation and the extent to which reform can be successfully implemented when new democratic institutions are 'colonised' by old, powerful interests.

Indonesia's current political make-up demonstrates how legislative measures can be used to relatively successfully eliminate old elites from the parliament and bureaucracy; however, it also reveals how pre-transition elites can reconstitute themselves so as to continue to participate in politics, and how 'informal' members of the old elite have been able to influence the state via unofficial channels. Russia's experiences under incumbent president Vladimir Putin highlight how a lack of desire on the part of state leaders to enforce a break with the pre-democratic past can result in a creeping resurgence of aspects of the old regime, and that the creation of democratic institutions are not enough to encourage democratisation in themselves, because they can be hijacked by political elites to serve non-democratic purposes.

Chapter Three. See also International Crisis Group (2003: 1-35) ;King (2003), and Wilson (2006: 265-97).

Much of the Suharto-era political and military elite that initially dominated Indonesia's political system under interim president Habibie has been gradually replaced under presidents Wahid, Megawati and incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In 1999, the military and police could appoint 38 members of the 500-seat House of Representatives (DPR). All seats are now filled by election, as are those in the 128-member upper house, the Regional Representative Council (DPD) that was created in 2004 to replace a group of *appointed* regional and group representatives (Qodari 2005: 73-87). The security apparatus' *dwifungsi* (dual function) mandate was removed in 1999,[30] and the phasing out of parliamentary positions for military officials is now complete. Active members of the military can no longer occupy positions in the legislatures or civilian bureaucracy (Webber 2006: 396-420) and civil servants and military officers are banned from membership of political parties (Bima Arya Sugiarto 2006; Webber 2006: 396-420). In September 2004 a new law on the TNI promised measures to end military involvement in business practices, with the government to assume control of military businesses by 2009 (Misol 2006: 1-136).

However legislative measures designed to negate the influence of New Order elites and elite groups within democratic Indonesia have not been entirely successful. Webber (2006: 396-420) has noted that the principal, historical sources of the military's political influence – its 'territorial structure, its control of the intelligence apparatus and elite combat units, and its proven past capacity to foment domestic conflicts to undermine governments – remain intact'. Meanwhile, most of those who participated in the *reformasi* movement have been marginalised (Törnquist 2006: 227-55), with ex-ABRI officials and New Order political elites reconstituting themselves as representatives of the *reformasi* ideals. Commentators such as

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[30] The *dwifungsi* or 'dual function' specified a two-fold role for the military. It was responsible both for national defence and for performing a 'positive socio-political role'. This effectively subordinated civilian staff to the military in the New Order bureaucracy. Underlying this was a conception of the military as the nation's saviour and unifier, and as the driving force behind its people and economy (Crouch 2001: 173-84; Liddle 1985: 68-90).

Aspinall (2005a: 117-56) Tomsa (2005) and Törnquist (2006: 227-55) describe 2004's direct presidential elections as heralding a return of 'the old elite dressed up in conservative populism and returned to dominance' (Aspinall 2005a: 117-56) under SBY, himself a ex-ABRI general (albeit a reform-mined one) and his vice-president Jusuf Kalla, an embodiment of the business entrepreneurial class that existed in symbiotic relation with the New Order regime.[31]

Indonesia's experience with elite continuity illustrates how democratic elites can use the political tools at their disposal to limit and obstruct the influence that pre-transition military and political elites can exert on the present administration. In this way, individuals and new elite groups can often counteract powerful hangover elements of the pre-transition regime. However, many commentators[32] acknowledge that some individuals and groups of the New Order regime have been able to retain, reconstitute and sometimes extend their authority in democratic Indonesia both through official and/or informal channels. The continuity of Soviet elite individuals and groups within the Putin administration in Russia, however, highlights how the kind of progress Indonesia has achieved in eliminating elite continuity through democratic politics can just as easily be reversed by a head of state unwilling to persist with efforts at eradicating the influence of the pre-transition government.

It has been noted that while elites of the Soviet area seemed to be largely eliminated under Yeltsin's presidency (which was characterised by arbitrary hirings and dismissals) had merely 'gone into hiding'. Under Putin they have found a political climate favourable to their re-emergence and to the restoration of at least some of their powers (Yakovlev and Primakov 2004: 44-8). Yet Putin came to power largely free of any debts to elite groups

[31] SBY was also surrounded in the 2004 elections by a number of bureaucrats, ex-military officers and Golkar politicians with strong connections to the New Order, such as Rachmat Witelar (Golkar member in 1980s and 1990s) and TB Silalahi (ex-officer and minister of the New Order government) (Aspinall 2005a: 117-56).
[32] Such as Hadiz (2003: 591-611); Aspinall (2005a: 117-56), and Webber (2006: 396-420).

and thus presumably with little need to accommodate or pander to their interests. This was because he was Yeltsin's named successor, had enjoyed high approval ratings prior to his election (largely thanks to his tough stance on Chechnya), was elected without having to endure a second round vote (securing 52.9% of the vote) and thus could claim that he had secured a popular mandate to rule on behalf of the Russian people (Robinson 2002). However, like Yeltsin, Putin found that his initial attempts to detach himself from former political colleagues soon resulted in a 'cadre famine', and the primacy of elite interests within the administration was gradually restored. The continued use of Yeltsin's Soviet-modelled 'reservation' system to 'store' retired senior officials in the lower and upper houses, has resulted in a Federation Council filled with elderly senators dating from the Brezhnev administration (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005: 200-222). [33] Putin had only a small pool from which staff could be drawn, and this combined with the fragmented nature of Russia's political class and the necessity of maintaining elite support for his leadership, meant that constant negotiation and compromise with old elites and their installation in key administrative posts was necessary (Shevtsova 2005: 229-253). Like Megawati, Putin pragmatically accommodated elites of the pre-transition regime in order to cultivate the stable power base necessary for the achievement of his political goals.

Himself an ex-KGB officer and hence a middle-ranking member of the Soviet *nomenklatura*, Putin embodies and sets a precedent for the growing trend of security personnel entering politics. The various policies outlined below that have facilitated the growth of the proportion of security officers within the political elite demonstrate how Russia's current leader has

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[33] Leonid Brezhnev ruled the Soviet Union as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 1964-1982 and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (head of state) 1960-1964 and 1977-1982. His rule oversaw the stagnation of the Soviet state and the ageing and impaired capacity of much of the government administration, with Brezhnev himself dying in office. He was succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev, who instigated the drastic political and economic reform that ultimately led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

consciously pursued political outcomes that undermine democratic norms like civilian governance and political transparency and accountability. As in New Order Indonesia, the military and security services of the Soviet Union were central supports of the regime. However in the absence of an officially mandated role like that provided for the ABRI in politics, the Soviet Union's military did not participate directly in the business of governance (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003: 289-306).[34] This has changed under the Putin administration, which has installed increasing numbers of 'uniformed bureaucrats' in government (Baev 2004: 3-13; Lynch 2005b: 141-61), undertaking within a formally democratic institutional framework exactly what Indonesia is attempting to reverse in order to strengthen their democratic institutions.

While the mass recruitment of staff with military-security backgrounds has been in part a response to the limited pool of appropriate candidates – a hangover consequence of Soviet and immediately post-Soviet governance – it has occurred alongside concentrated programmes expanding the influence and increasing the number of military and security agencies (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003: 289-306). Thus 'by the 2000 presidential election, being an unrepentant career KGB officer had become a political asset instead of a liability' (Waller 2004: 333-355). Under the Soviet regime, the armed forces and state security bodies were organised according to a model of 'vertical subordination', under which they were structured regionally so as to permeate every level of society (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003: 289-306). Under Putin this structure has been reinforced by the introduction of presidential representation in federal districts, granting the central government a high level of oversight and influence at all levels of administration, through a military and security-dominated staff

[34] Kryshtanovskaya and White (2003: 289-306) note, for example, that military personnel were very rarely appointed to high-ranking government positions under the Soviet Union, and had little representation in the parliament and Communist Party's Central Committee. Additionally, civilian bureaucrats and party officials were often placed in charge of military and security institutions, including the KGB.

(Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003: 289-306).[35] Indonesia's military too continues to have a territorially-organised structure that reaches down to the smallest administrative units, and many commentators single this out as one area in which reform is urgently needed to aid further democratisation (See for example Crouch 2001: 173-84; Webber 2006: 396-420).

While a significant level of elite continuity can be observed in the democratic transitions of both Indonesia and Russia, as time passes political and military-security elites with direct links to the pre-transition administration will age and retire, and thus naturally decline in number. This, however, does not mean that existing institutions will instead be increasingly populated with staff directly linked to the democracy movement. Just as significant for the democratisation project is the emerging phenomena of 'elite politics' or 'elite democracy', in which the political process is monopolised by political (and/or business elites and/or elites with security credentials), undermining democratic norms that promote high levels of public consultation and participation. Key to successful and significant democratisation is the level of accountability of elites to their supporters. As Gill (2006: 58-77) has noted, 'If the elite is insulated from its putative supporters and is able to ignore their wishes at will, democratic pressures upon them will be blunted and the likelihood of a democratic outcome accordingly reduced'. It is in this context that the development of a pluralistic, competitive party system in Indonesia and Russia is examined.

[35] From 2001 the president appointed heads of seven new federal districts that encompassed regional divisions. The president's representative has up to ten deputies, as well as a staff of approximately 150. This constitutes a new, elite group superior to elected regional representative, which has come to be dominated by people with security backgrounds. Kryshtanovskaya and White (2003: 289-306) note that of the seven presidential appointees in 2002, five were generals, while 70% of their deputies were senior officers in the military or security services. The introduction of presidential appointees and the new federal districts in discussed further in Chapter Three.

The Party System & Grassroots Political Organisation/Participation

Both Indonesia and Russia have authoritarian histories in which the autonomous organisation of civil society groups was largely prevented by a coercive state apparatus, or else severely constrained by state oversight and intervention. In both states, the pre-transition government only permitted the organisation of bodies directly linked to the regime.[36] Most commentators agree that civil society was virtually non-existent under the Soviet Union, save for mass organisations that were controlled by the Communist Party apparatus. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was the only legally permitted political party, and while citizens could vote for their regional representatives, they turned out only to place a vote registering approval or disapproval for a single candidate put forward by the central government (Löwenhardt 1998: 1-8). In New Order Indonesia, from 1971 political activities other than those conducted by the state's political vehicle, Golkar, were banned. Only Golkar was permitted to organise and mobilise support at a grassroots level (Antlöv 2003: 193-214). Pre-transition political life in Indonesia was not stifled to the extent it was in Soviet Russia: Indonesia had nine opposition parties until 1973, when all were required to join one of two new parties, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) for Muslim parties and the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI) for nationalist and Christian parties (Robison 1986). However, the existence of an opposition was rendered virtually obsolete by the state's official policy of turning the population into a 'floating mass' – that is, apart from voting for candidates from approved parties every five years, Indonesians could not take part in any non-Golkar political activities. Consequently PPP and PDI were not permitted

[36] For a thorough analysis of civil society in the Soviet Union, see for example Evans (2005: 96-113) and Evans (2006: 28-54). For civil society in New Order Indonesia, see Aspinall (2005b) and Uhlin (1997).

to establish permanent offices in rural areas, effectively preventing any grassroots mobilisation of support (Robison 1986). In this way, the New Order succeeded in suppressing the vibrant political and civic life that had existed in the early years of President Sukarno's leadership, and the organisations through which it had been channelled.

Like the mass organisations of the Soviet state, the New Order apparatus permitted 'functional groups' such as trade unions and youth organisations, but transformed them into instruments of the state, preventing their independent organisation. This co-optation and repression of civil society under a centralised, authoritarian state, resulted in what Lane (2004: 1-21) has labelled a thorough '*dis-organisation*' of society in Indonesia. The legacy of a 'dis-organised' society has fundamentally shaped the nature of post-transition state-civil society relations in Indonesia, and consequently affected the healthy functioning of pluralistic, competitive party politics. A large number of protest and activist groups emerged and organised during the period of revolution referred to as *reformasi* that culminated in the resignation of President Suharto and instigated the process of transition to democratic politics. Student-led and labour movements played a particularly strong role in the protests that contributed to Suharto's fall and that pushed interim President Habibie to forge ahead with democratic reforms (Aspinall 1999: 1-31). The last few years of Suharto's rule also saw the emergence of vibrant intellectual, media and NGO communities that played an instrumental role in the *reformasi* movement (Anwar 2001: 3-16). In contrast, Russia has no real democratic history, and the tsarist rule that preceded the establishment of a Communist state – while providing some room for autonomous, associational activities – never produced more that what has been classified as a 'nascent' civil society (Conroy 2005: 11-27). There was thus little activity to dis-organise in Soviet Russia; over sixty years of state repression meant that there were few pre-existing structures to be revived, and civil society had to virtually start from scratch when space began to open for independent

organisation in the late 1980s (Evans 2006: 28-54).[37] This has had enduring effects on the development of party politics in democratic Russia, contributing to inexperienced and self-interested politicians forming parties without coherent policy platforms, and an apathetic population with low expectations of party responsiveness and representation (see for example White and McAllister 2004: 81-97).

The symbiotic link between effective democratic governance and the existence of a pluralistic, competitive and representative party system is underscored by many commentators who discuss democratisation. Stoner-Weiss (2006: 104-118) for example, lists the ways in which political parties are essential in mediating popular interests through state politics:

> Parties serve as conduits through which political persuasion and influence can flow between civil society and the state, and also between political actors in the capital and their provincial counterparts. Parties can promote coherence in policy platforms across even the largest nation-states. In short, parties can solve problems of collective action by knitting the polity together, as well as by aggregating interests into agendas among which voters can choose. Parties create webs of reciprocity between national and local officials, while extending accountability for policy creation and implementation beyond one man or the narrow interests of his cronies.

The development of a competitive, pluralistic party system is an important task for any newly democratising state, if it is to pursue the goal of all democracies – rule by the people through democratic institutions staffed by elected representatives. The legacy of decades of governance by a small group of elites, with next to no consultation or negotiation with civil society;

[37] Under Gorbachev's *glasnost* (opening) policy, controls on civil society were relaxed and significant freedom of speech and press was permitted. Interest groups emerged and flourished at this time in the form of legal 'informal' groups, and while they were largely free to organise and mobilise support, they had little dialogue with or access to the political elite, and thus had a limited impact upon government policy (Evans 2006: 28-54). Interestingly, the brief period of *keterbukaan* (openness) in late-New Order Indonesia was modelled on *glasnost*. However while Gorbachev never reversed the process of *glasnost*, Suharto ended *keterbukaan* when it began to present too much of a challenge to the centralised state. This perhaps partly explains why the New Order came to an end amidst such public outcry and protest, while the Soviet Union disintegrated comparatively quietly and peacefully.

non- or semi-competitive elections, and patrimonial, opaque decision making, has proved a stumbling block in the cultivation of a healthy – that is, truly pluralistic – party system in Indonesia and Russia. However, the comparison of the development of a party system in Indonesia and Russia demonstrates that while the legacies of authoritarian rule may provide significant constraints to successful party politics, it is often the actions of political elites, particularly the head of state, and the steps they take to either legitimate or undermine the party system, that are crucial to its continued development.[38]

In the immediate aftermath of Suharto's resignation, at least 140 political parties emerged, of which forty-eight qualified to participate in the June 1999 general elections (Anwar 2001: 3-16). However the emergence of strong parties that represented popular interests was hindered by immense organisational fragmentation, a direct result of their inability to organise under the New Order. This, coupled with decades of rule by one party centred around one leader, meant that many emergent political parties in post-Suharto Indonesia believed they required a charismatic figure to head their party if they wished to have any popular success (Anwar 2001: 3-16; Aspinall 2005b). Thus parties often came to form around particular personalities, at the expense of the development of coherent policy platforms and mobilisation of grassroots support. The ultimate manifestation of this organisational incapacity and preference for personalised rule was the electoral success of parties that were permitted to organise to some extent under the pre-transition regime.[39] While these leaders and their parties represented a reformist and ostensibly pro-democratic opposition, they were moderate, 'risk-averse', and willing to compromise with and accommodate the entrenched interests and

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[38] Gel'man (2005b: 5-30), for example, argues the assumption that free elections will result in a party system that serves only as a reflection of the public's interests, is unconvincing.

[39] Electoral success was achieved by a reconstituted form of the New Order's ruling party, Golkar (headed initially by Habibie); Megawati's PDI-P (an offshoot of the PDI opposition party allowed under the New Order); Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB) – the political arm of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), a Muslim organisation permitted to organise under the New Order, and Amien Rais' National Mandate Party, the political arm of Muhammadiyah, which represented 'modernist' Muslims under Suharto.

personnel of the New Order administration (Robison and Hadiz 2004). Coupled with the appointed positions in parliament for the military, the outcome of Indonesia's first truly competitive elections in four decades demonstrated that 'although now touted as a democracy, Indonesia was still run by the elite, for the elite' (O'Rourke 2002). Ultimately the elite dominance of parties and politics means that rather than always reflecting popular interests, a party system has it's 'own logic of development that does not depend on mass values and precepts, and as a result… the masses have only as much political significance as the elites allow' (Gel'man 2005b: 5-30).

Early party politics in transitional Russia under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin demonstrated remarkably similar tendencies. Emerging parties initially faced not only the problems of 'starting from scratch' after decades of repression, but also the problem of having no real elections to contest (aside from the presidential election of 1991, which Yeltsin won with party support, but without belonging to any party himself) in the first two years after communism.[40] As Brown (1998: 9-30) has noted, without the goal of elections, parties possess little incentive to organise effectively and to mobilise popular support. When nation-wide multiparty elections were held in 1993, there were few political organisations with nationwide networks, let alone with organisational structures independent of the state. This was a consequence of Soviet rule, under which the CPSU was the only party permitted to compete in Russian elections (Hale 2006). However thirteen parties nominated candidates for the State Duma, with eight of these meeting the five percent threshold for seats in the Duma under proportional

[40] Gorbachev did carry out the Soviet Union's first competitive elections for the national parliament (Congress of Peoples Deputies) in 1989, but at this stage there was little organised opposition, and parliament was largely staffed by single-member district elections and appointees of organisations controlled by the CPSU. As Russia did not yet exist as a sovereign state, these elections do not constitute part of its post-transition politics. Neither do competitive elections to Russia's legislature in 1990, as it was at this stage just one of 15 'union republics'. However, as no parliamentary elections were held again until 1993 after the institution of a new constitution, there was a three-year overlap in officials elected under the Soviet administration serving newly independent and democratising Russia (Hale 2006).

representation (Colton 2005a: 173-206). As in Indonesia, scholars have noted that these emerging party formations predominantly relied upon the personal reputation of key members or on patrimonial connections to state structures that endured from the Soviet administration for 'political capital', rather than on the cultivation of grassroots support among the population. The reputation and connections of particular politicians were often symbiotic, with reputations being gained through state service of some kind in preceding years being used to encourage other state-linked politicians to join their parties (Hale 2006).

While both Indonesia and Russia have been constrained in the development of a strong and effective party system by the legacy of authoritarian rule that repressed political activities not associated with the state, Russia's parties have been confronted with the additional problem of successive presidents who undermine the legitimacy and necessity of party politics by refusing to belong to a party themselves. Russia's first two presidents – Yeltsin and Putin – 'were elected and re-elected as nominees of non-partisan umbrella groups and refused to sponsor or join parties' (Colton 2005a: 173-206). This has been compounded by the increasing concentration of state powers in the office of the president. The 'superpresidential' system is characterised by informal political decision-making based on personal connections and access to the president and/or his supporters within the administration (Gel'man 2005a: 226-46). The role and significance of parties – as a means by which the plural interests of the population can be represented within state decision-making bodies – has been progressively constrained in Russia as politics increasingly becomes a 'zero-sum' game. The growing strength of the presidential office and the expanding number of presidentially-appointed positions within the state apparatus has resulted, according to some commentators, in the 'capture' of democratic institutions by the state (Gel'man 2005b: 5-30). A significant consequence of this has been the declining importance of parliamentary representation for opposition

groups. As in Indonesia, many parties in Russia have emerged primarily as vehicles to aid a particular politician's electoral chances or to maintain a politicians' existing position of power. As representation in the State Duma has failed to present real opportunities for influencing politics, opposition parties have increasingly been perceived as useful mainly as vehicles for contesting *presidential* elections (Hale 2006). The result has been a gradual shrinking and cooptation of oppositional forces in Russian politics and the phenomena of 'parties of power' that do not represent the interests of civil society, instead supporting various vested interests of the state and bureaucracy (Knox et al. 2006: 3-14). This is problematic for the healthy functioning of party competition, as it often results in a high turnover of parties, consequently reducing the opportunity for policy development, and efforts at mobilising grassroots support, and thus lowering the extent to which a particular party can be considered representative of the interests of civil society groups. In Russia this problem is reinforced by the creation of parties from above to bolster a president's chances of re-election,[41] without the president or presidential candidate actually belonging to those parties. The result of the growing dominance of Kremlin-sanctioned parities of power has resulted in the sidelining of truly oppositional politics (the 2003 Duma elections saw, for the first time, the failure of liberal democratic parties to achieve the five percent threshold for gaining seats in parliament) (Shevtsova

[41] Yeltsin utilised parties of power in the 1991 election in the form of Democratic Russia. The 1993 Duma elections saw the emergence of two state-affiliated parties – Russia's Choice (comprising members of Democratic Russia, which had ceased to exist), and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord – which appealed to very different constituencies while both supporting Yeltsin. The 1995-6 Duma and presidential elections saw Yeltsin attempt to garner support from both the centre-right and centre-left through the formation of Our Home is Russia and the Agrarian Party of Russia – both led by men supportive of the president. Putin too has utilised parties of power to secure his election in 2001 (via the Unity party, formed only three months prior to the election, and a number of smaller pro-Kremlin parties such as the Liberal Democratic Party) (Shevtsova 2005: 239) and re-election in 2004 (through the support of United Russia – the product of a merger of Unity and Fatherland-All Russia in 2001 – and Rodina, founded in 2003) (Knox, Lentini et. al. 2006: 7-8).

2005: 229-253).[42] Political parties are faced with the choice of either agreeing to a 'forced consensus' with representatives of the political status quo who dominate debates and decisions (Knox, Lentini, and Williams 2006: 3-14), or face marginalisation and total loss of influence – what Gel'man (2005b: 5-30) views as a choice between being incorporated 'into power' and thus ceasing to represent an opposition, or being sidelined on the periphery of the political process, thus losing the status of a political actor.

The development of functioning party politics in both Russia and Indonesia has been limited by the legacy of pre-transition disorganisation of civil society and the lack of pre-existing national political organisations independent of the state. However, Indonesia's most recent legislative and presidential elections in 2004 demonstrated that while the structure and goals of parties are often detrimental to the strengthening of party competition, party politics have most certainly become 'the only game in town', with voters able to punish parties that had disappointed them, to register their unwillingness to support a return to a more authoritarian state, and to reward parties that had pleased them (Aspinall 2005a: 117-56; Qodari 2005: 73-87; Webber 2006: 396-420).[43] Despite this, in both countries it has been asserted that parties and the politicians that head them provide voters with 'unrepresentative and unresponsive' choices, as the parties are 'dominated by money politics and powerful vested interests' and do not provide opportunities for public consultation and participation (Törnquist 2006: 227-

[42] The successful sidelining of truly oppositional politics in Russia has also been achieved via the threatening independent political actors, such as those involved in successful business ventures, with repressive measures. This has been most clearly demonstrated by the arrest and gaoling of oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky who funded a liberal democratic party (Shevtsova 2005: 244).

[43] In the 2004 elections, the declining showings of the PDI-P and Golkar, as well as of major Islamic parties PPP, PBR (Reform Star Party) and PAN demonstrated voter dissatisfaction with the performance of these parties. The failure of the new Care for the Nation Functional Party, PKPB, headed by a loyalist New Order general, Hartono, with Suharto's daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana as its presidential candidate, demonstrated the unpopularity of a neo-authoritarian party-platform. Voters, however, rewarded parties that had impressed them, such as SBY's Partai Demokrat, PD, with its modernising, reformist agenda, and the Prosperous Justice Party, PKS, with its anti-corruption, social welfarist platform (Aspinall 2005a: 117-56; Qodari 2005: 73-87; Webber 2006: 396-420).

55). This problem is reinforced by the tendency for new, organised political initiatives to emerge *locally* – that is in response to local issues or grievances (Lane 2004: 1-21). The recent introduction of extensive administrative decentralisation (discussed further in the following chapter) is likely to aggravate this situation as local leaders seek to maintain their own positions of power, decreasing the likelihood of the development of grassroots-based political movements with *national* ideological appeal (aside from Islamic parties).

Both Indonesia and Russia's most recent legislative and presidential elections have demonstrated that the successful operation of democratic institutions – specifically free, pluralistic electoral competition – can have substantive outcomes that are less than democratic. The reformist, liberal rhetoric of parties can, and often does, mask the capturing of democratic institutions by elements of the pre-transition regime who have reconstituted themselves as democrats. Further, the execution of free and fair elections can involve parties with identical policy platforms and links to the state apparatus that in reality, offer voters little genuine choice. The continued influence of pre-transition elites in the new democratic system, and more significantly the continuation of pre-transition political *tactics* and conceptions of power – that is, the continuation of patrimonial politics, informal decision-making mechanisms and money politics – has shaped Indonesia's and Russia's democratic path. The Russian case demonstrates how the actions and policy initiatives of elites – particularly the president – can further constrain the democratic trajectory, closing off potential avenues for further democratisation. This has occurred through the replacement of elected positions with presidentially-appointed positions in state organs, the co-optation of the judiciary to pursue the sidelining of potential political opponents, and the strengthening of presidential power to the extent that civilian oversight and representation all but disappears. Indonesia, which made the transition to electoral democracy later than Russia, has not had

heads of state that hold themselves above party politics, who view themselves as personally able to represent the interests of an immense and diverse population. Indonesia's party politics, while certainly less than ideally representative or pluralistic, are still characterised by the 'uncertainty' of electoral outcomes intrinsic to democratic politics. Policy initiatives pursued under both Russia's post-transition presidents, on the other hand, have fostered a political system that is increasingly characterised by high levels of certainty – that is, predictability – of electoral outcomes, that does not reflect truly competitive, representative party politics.

This is not to say, however, that Russia is 'stuck' on a path that is leading away from pluralistic, representative party politics and thus towards an increasingly undemocratic political system, or that Indonesia's party system will inevitably mature and grow more representative and responsive. Russia's democratisation in the areas of elite constitution and party politics has certainly been constrained by the legacy of suppression of non-state political activity under Soviet governance. However successive heads of state have actively encouraged a climate that is limited by this 'historical baggage', by recruiting pre-transition elites to fill public positions instead of actively training new recruits, and failing to set an example encouraging party formation and the development of strong policy-orientated platforms. The creation of institutions of democratic governance provided an opportunity for Russia's political 'path' to move in the direction of democratic 'deepening'. However the actions and policies of Presidents Yeltsin and Putin and the self-interested behaviour of political elites has diverted Russian politics to a kind of quagmire in which movement is presently neither forwards nor backwards, but more 'sideways' – that is, democratic institutions, norms and procedures are neither being removed nor strengthened. Future administrations possess the tools to shape Russia's political path in a way that undermines negative historical legacies – especially considering the 'superpresidential' powers

which could be used to pursue goals conducive to the enhancement of democratisation.

Indonesia, according to the criteria set out by Linz and Stepan (1996a; 1996b: 14-33), would be categorised by some commentators as a ‘consolidated’, or at least ‘consolidating’ democracy. The operation and constitution of the party system demonstrate that democratic institutions and procedural norms have become accepted as ‘the only game in town’. Successive presidents have used their political agency to set an example favouring the development of party politics, if not for the cultivation of strong policy platforms, and thus have used their political agency to reduce the influence that pre-transition political legacies have on contemporary governance. However, Indonesia may in the future prove O’Donnell’s (2001: 113-130) assertion that the games played ‘inside’ democratic institutions are not always those dictated by their formal rules – that is, while democratic, competitive party politics may be firmly established as the official channel for political debate, opposition and decision-making, these processes are not always carried out in a democratic manner, often due to the legacies of non-democratic modes of behaviour and interaction institutionalised under the previous regime (as is discussed further in Chapter Three). The increasingly popular Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), for example, illustrates the potential for the emergence of parties that follow democratic procedures and utilise democratic political tools to pursue goals that may not be entirely democratic. Webber (2006: 396-420) has noted that if the Yudhoyono government fails, especially in the sphere of combating corruption, there is potential for Islamist PKS (for whom fighting corruption is a central policy objective) to exert more influence on governance in Indonesia, which may result in a ‘cleaner’ government, but also in one less supportive of individual freedoms and rights (as PKS seeks to introduce elements of Islamic law to Indonesia).

Conclusion

The continuities and discontinuities of pre-transition elites described in this chapter, and the successes and failures of the development of viable party systems in Russia and Indonesia demonstrate the ways in which democratisation can take 'detours', and illustrates how democratic political systems can contain unlikely fusions of democratic institutions and non-democratic procedures and outcomes. This necessitates an approach that does not define democracy as consisting of a finite number of institutions and/or substantive elements. As this chapter has shown, the path of democratisation is not uni-directional. The cases of Indonesia and Russia demonstrate the usefulness of an open-ended, flexible understanding of democracy that does not posit a pre-ordained endpoint of democratisation. While this chapter has focused on the way pre-transition suppression of non-state political activity has affected the make-up of political elites and the quality and composition of political parties, Chapter Three examines how modes of behaviour and interaction cultivated under the pre-democratic regime have influenced the implementation and outcomes of political decentralisation. Thus while this chapter has examined the establishment of democratic 'games', the next chapter narrows the path-shaping approach to study the 'rules' by which those games are played at the regional level, and their democratic 'quality'.

Chapter Three

Sub-National Political Organisation: Challenges, Changes and Political Realities

Whereas the path-shaping analysis in the previous chapter highlighted the often contradictory relationship between the existence of party politics and democratic representation and non-democratic (that is, non-representative, non-responsive) outcomes in recently-transitioned states, this chapter narrows the path-shaping lens to examine the relationship between democratic procedures/institutions and outcomes at the level of regional and local political organisation. By examining the different ways in which organisational structures and practices of the pre-transition state have influenced the functioning of sub-national democratic institutions, and discussing the democratic quality of political and social outcomes, it highlights the uncertainty and unpredictability inherent in democratisation, and indeed in established democratic institutions, and the role that pre-transition legacies play in fostering this uncertainty and unpredictability.

Indonesia's and Russia's different frameworks for implementing decentralisation are examined in this chapter both as examples of regional political organisation designed ostensibly to promote and enhance democratic norms and behaviour, and as instances in which the presence of democratic institutions has not ensured entirely democratic political and social realities. This chapter first discusses the pre-transition territorial organisation of politics and society in Russia and Indonesia in order to account for the introduction of the particular models of regional political organisation that were adopted in the post-transition context. It then examines the respective policies of 'broad autonomy' in Indonesia and federalism in Russia. Finally, it considers the way in which problems of the pre-transition state – namely

corruption, crime and violence – have been affected by the new forms of regional political organisation in order to assess the place of democracy in this new, decentralised context.

This chapter argues that while the devolution of governing powers to sub-national levels theoretically favours democratisation, the legacy of non-democratic relations between political elites and those they represent retard the process, resulting in non-democratic outcomes including widespread corruption and dependence on extra-state forms of coercion.[44] This, like the paradoxical relationship between competitive party politics and a lack of representation and responsiveness outlined in the previous chapter, is broadly representative of the problems faced by democratising, formerly autocratic nation-states. It further demonstrates of the need for an open-ended, flexible understanding of democracy that underscores the uncertain and unpredictable nature of democratisation, and which pays adequate attention to the role history plays in this process.

Regional Political Organisation in Pre-transition Indonesia and Russia

The New Order has been described as a 'capitalist dictatorship', in which society was organised via corporatist structures. All forms of political and social organisation were either repressed outright or coopted into state-sanctioned bodies, with no formal political expression or activity permitted outside the official apparatus (Liddle 1985: 68-90; Robison 2002: 92-113).[45]

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[44] In multiethnic states of Russia and Indonesia's geographic scope it is problematic to generalise about regional and localised practices, as well as of the quality of rights and institutions at those levels. However, the level of corruption and its symbiotic relationship with predatory politics and extra-state forms of violence in both states is extensive enough and sufficiently ingrained to warrant the drawing of links between it and current democratic failures at the sub-national level.

[45] Indeed, the extent of political centralisation that existed in Indonesia under the New Order regime was recognised and publicly acknowledged by the president himself. Suharto described his vision for the New Order government in 1967 as 'nothing less than an ordering

Soviet Russia, a ‘communist dictatorship’, encompassed a number of similar aspects of political organisation. Like New Order Indonesia, the Soviet regime envisioned the state’s role as involving the ordering and regulating of all aspects of citizens’ lives. As indicated in the previous chapter, both Soviet Russia and New Order Indonesia permitted their citizens to hold membership of a variety of civil society organisations – but only those organised and run by the state. In both cases, the only legally permitted political organisation and mobilisation at the grassroots level was through the ruling party – Golkar and the CPSU respectively (Antlöv 2003: 193-214; DiFranceisco and Gitelman 1984: 603-21). One key difference was that in Indonesia two other parties did exist, for which Indonesians could theoretically vote every five years, even if they could have no involvement with those parties beyond polling day (Liddle 1985: 68-90). Russia was a one-party state, with elections existing only to facilitate the installation of different CPSU candidates (Löwenhardt 1998: 1-8).

Both the Soviet government and the New Order regime successfully infiltrated and dominated all spheres of public and private life. In Indonesia this was achieved via an extensive bureaucracy present at every level of society. It represented the largest employer in every city, town and village and as such held the keys to vital social services including health, education and financial services. In this way the state became a virtually inescapable daily reality for the Indonesian people (Liddle 1985: 68-90).[46] In Soviet Russia social and political life was controlled via Communist Party structures and the bureaucracy, with the system largely directed from above (DiFranceisco and Gitelman 1984: 603-21). The bureaucratisation of society was also a tool used to reduce the risk of ethnic dissent within both the Soviet

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of the entire life of the people, nation and state’ (translation of an official transcript in Bourchier and Hadiz 2003)

[46] It is important to note that the nature of New Order interference and involvement varied from region to region, as Suharto’s development-driven policies treated provinces differently according to their perceived level of economic and social development and ethnic makeup. For an overview of these policies, see for example Vickers (2001: 72-84).

Union and Indonesia. The Soviet Union's designated 'ethnic homelands' were governed by party and state officials drawn from the indigenous ethnic group. In this way local elites came to depend upon the centre for their position and its associated privileges, and thus were less likely to coalesce into oppositional forces (Roeder 1991: 196-232). Political leadership at the local and regional level worked similarly in Indonesia, with a complex web of alliances linking state personnel (comprising both political and military elites), local families with links to the political and business worlds, and commercial interests. Such networks constituted

> a system of predatory power relations… focusing around a corps of power holders within the state apparatus itself who stood as gatekeepers to the allocation of the monopolies and contracts that constituted the currency of economic life in Indonesia (Robison 2002: 92-113).

This, combined with a national ideology that defined the role of the state as guarding the 'common good' from elements within society seeking to undermine it (such as dissenting ethnic and religious groups) effectively kept oppositional forces at bay for the majority of Suharto's rule (Crouch 1979: 571-587; Liddle 1985: 68-90; Murray Li 2000: 149-179).

Paradoxically, both these highly centralised, bureaucratised states possessed constitutional provisions for some decentralisation of governmental authority to sub-national levels. Indonesia's 1945 constitution declares the devolution of more decision-making autonomy to its regional units as a national goal.[47] Sulistiyanto and Erb (2005: 1-17) assert that in practice,

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[47] Early efforts at decentralisation under President Sukarno were unsuccessful because of the state's weakness and inability to effectively implement its policies. Despite the highly centralised nature of Suharto's New Order, decentralisation policies were pursued. The local government law of 1974 defined provinces and districts as 'autonomous', and created elected councils to facilitate bottom-up decision-making. However in reality, regional governance was a top-down process in which central development directives were implemented under strict surveillance. The village law of 1979, ostensibly to strengthen governance at the village level, made all village administrations uniform, which in reality enhanced central control of local politics (Schulte Nordholt 2004: 29-50; Sulistiyanto and Erb 2005: 1-17).

however, rather than promoting regional governmental difference, decentralisation measures pursued under the New Order actually 'worked to create a uniformity of bureaucracy that undermined much of the diversity of local political systems and any earlier claim to local control'. In this way decentralisation policies resulted in the tightening of central control at the local and regional levels, rather than in the promotion of sub-national governance. Similarly, the constitution of the Soviet Union included federal principles that were not upheld in practice. True federalism involves the decentralisation of decision-making powers to regional units and provides for the greater autonomy of 'concentrated minority cultural, ethnic and/or religious populations' – neither of which constituted the political realities of the Soviet Union until just prior to transition (Hahn 2005: 148-167; see also Melvin 2005: 203-227).[48]

However, the highly centralised, bureaucratised nature of the Soviet Union and New Order Indonesia did not completely remove opportunities for decision-making autonomy among local and regional political elites, or for individual citizens to seek to influence the implementation of policy within their locale. The corruption and rent-seeking activity that was part and parcel of these authoritarian regimes meant that personal gain or benefit could be pursued both within and outside of official, state sanctioned channels, via highly situational and personalised transactions between elites and citizens. These kinds of interactions however, constituted a manipulation of state norms and practices rather than any systematised, state-delivered program for regional autonomy or public involvement in the political process (see, for

[48] The Soviet Union was organised according to principles of 'ethnoterritorial federalism', which divided state territory into four 'tiers' of national territorial units, each granted a different degree of autonomy. The top of this four-level hierarchy was occupied by fifteen Union Republics (what are today's Soviet successor states, including Russia), which were constitutionally designated as sovereign, and thus were endowed with a wide range of powers including the right to enter into foreign relations, control of production and administration in their territory, and the right to secede from the Union. However in practice, the highly centralised nature of Communist Party and ministerial control meant that any kind of autonomy was severely constrained (Brubaker 1994: 47-78). This regional political organisation of territorial units is characterised by what have been referred to as 'the constitutional fictions of sovereignty, statehood and autonomy' (Brubaker 1994: 47-78).

example DiFranceisco and Gitelman 1984: 603-21; Hidayat 2005: 54-74; Rose 1998). The institutionalisation of such informal, extra-state transactions in both countries has left a legacy of political behaviour at regional and local levels of governance that has affected the successful implementation and functioning of democratic norms and practices.

‘Broad Autonomy’ and Federalism: Contemporary Political Organisation and the Place of Democracy

The benefits of political and economic decentralisation – whether in the form of Indonesia’s ‘broad autonomy’ measures or Russia’s asymmetrical federalism – have long been promoted by commentators as a crucial element of any state’s successful democratisation. The link between democracy and decentralisation has been made by ‘neo-institutionalist’ political theorists, who assert the importance of certain institutional prerequisites for successful democratisation – such as a competitive party system, freedom of the press and institutionalised accountability mechanisms (Hadiz 2004a: 697-718). The World Bank’s development agenda has been influential in promoting an understanding of ‘good democratic governance’ as stemming from decentralisation, specifically from the crafting of local organisations to ensure participation, the development of civil society and the growth of social capital (Harriss et al. 2004: 1-28). However other commentators remain sceptical about the relationship between decentralisation and democracy. They view the process of decentralisation as sometimes encouraging corrupt and patrimonial political practices, the development of ‘uncivil’ sections of society and the territorial organisation of security services – all phenomena that work against the democratisation process. Decentralisation is still viewed as a potential political ‘good’ however, it is acknowledged that when it is implemented through weak institutions by weak government, more space is

opened up for political and administrative abuses of power and the rise of divisive religious and ethnic sentiments (Törnquist 2006: 227-55).

Both Russia and Indonesia continue to suffer from many of the problems that 'broad autonomy' and federalist governance were expected to solve, such as endemic and widespread corruption, horizontal and vertical ethno-local conflicts, lack of responsiveness of political representatives and deficiencies in feelings of political agency within the populace. Both countries demonstrate, to varying degrees, that the mere existence of democratic institutions at the regional (as well as national) level is inadequate – there is also a need for those institutions to function effectively, with openness and accountability. This in turn requires the representatives of those institutions to be responsive to public opinion, which further necessitates a constituency that is educated, mobilised and organised.

During the period of *reformasi* in Indonesia, decentralisation comprised an important part of the reform agenda that was proposed by pro-democracy activists (Sulistiyanto and Erb 2005: 1-17). Supporters of decentralisation and democracy equated centralised governance with the old authoritarian regime, and viewed decentralisation as a necessary process by which space for direct civic participation in public life could be made (Törnquist 2006: 227-55). Decentralisation of some policy-making and policy-implementing powers was viewed as an avenue by which reassertion of local and regional identities that were repressed under authoritarian governance could be channelled. This was considered crucial to strengthening institutions of civil society from the bottom-up, a key process in the democratisation of society (Morrell 2001: 437-449). It was hoped that decentralisation would provide a solution to the problems of demands for autonomy and the threat of secession in multi-ethnic states, through the involvement of local communities in decision-making via representative governing structures. Further, the granting of more control over development and resources – issues that often spark conflicts between the centre and the

periphery – was expected to remedy some local and regional grievances (Hadiz 2004a: 697-718). Political elites worked to implement decentralisation under a unitary state, a model they believed could provide all the potential benefits of a federal model[49] without the risks they associated with federalism, specifically national disintegration stemming from the definition of sub-national units in ethnic terms.[50]

Just as Indonesia opted to retain its unitary form with the addition of measures that would enact political and economic decentralisation, independent Russia chose to retain its federal system, with the addition of legislation that would actually enact the principles of federalism enshrined within the constitution. Federalism is a political ideology founded on the creation of several 'layers' of governance that incorporate a combination of

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[49] Federalism was believed to offer Indonesia with a number remedies to the problems presented by its multi-ethnic, dispersed population. Potential benefits asserted to stem from a federal system were: the reduction of feelings of alienation and deprivation towards the centre via fiscal decentralisation; the end of the corruption, collusion and nepotism that centralised rule had produced; a check on the centre's ability to exploit the regions and thus on imbalances of revenue between the centre and regions; space for regions to manage their own affairs according to their own values, cultures and customary laws, and the strengthening of pluralism and of belief that ethnic/cultural/religious identities are protected by the state (Sukma 2003: 64-74). More generally, democracy theorists such as Stepan (1999: 19-34) assert that federalism is the best model for countries with ethnic and linguistic diversity because federalism allows for 'cultural diversity, a robust capacity for socioeconomic development, and a general standard of equality among their citizens'. However, he notes that the greatest risk presented by a federal system is that of ethnic nationalists being provided with the opportunity to mobilise.

[50] The fear of territorial disintegration weighed heavily on the collective Indonesian consciousness (Sukma 2003: 64-74) due to the secessionist movements that emerged when Indonesia obtained its independence from colonial rule. Indeed, Armstrong (2004: 783-808) notes that 'The one common theme running through all official policy over fifty years has been a concern, bordering on an obsession, with maintaining the unity of the country'. Stepan (1999: 19-34) asserts that in a meeting he attended of Indonesian political, military, religious and intellectual leaders following Suharto's resignation, the majority of participants 'rejected federalism out of hand', not wanting a repeat of the secessionist conflicts that emerged following the end of Dutch colonial rule. Bertrand (2004) asserts that 'secessionist movements were seen as the worst threat to the unity of the nation and the integrity of the state. These issues were particularly sensitive, given Indonesia's past history of challenges to the concept of nation and to the state'. These issues were made even more sensitive following the 'loss' of East Timor in 1999, which 'continues to haunt Indonesia, affecting attitudes toward Aceh and Papua… and perpetuating fears for territorial integrity' (International Crisis Group 2006: 1-15). Indeed, Armstrong (2004: 783-808) notes that West Papua is widely viewed 'as the fruit of their last, victorious struggle against their former colonial masters' and as such the idea of acceding to its demands for independence are particularly ill-received.

shared rule and regional autonomy. This organisational model is believed to provide avenues for inter-regional and inter-group communication, to delay rash decisions or actions by regional or sub-regional units, and to offer an institutional framework for the negotiation of consensus and compromise between the centre and periphery – 'in short, federalism provides for a decision-making process that underlines the relevance of territorially-based loyalties' (Charlton 1986). Federal political systems are thus asserted to promote democracy because they aid in the protection of individual rights against the central government through institutions such as a bicameral legislature, in which one house is elected on the basis of state population, and the other represents sub-national territorial units equally. When territorial units are granted the same powers (powers that were previously retained by the centre), the federal system is *symmetrical*; when, as is the case in Russia, different powers are devolved from the centre to different regions depending on the specific needs or demands of that unit, the federalism in operation is *asymmetrical* (Stepan 1999: 19-34).[51] Thus both Indonesia and Russia have begun to implement, as part of their democratisation, different forms of decentralisation in order to promote democratic governance from the bottom-up.

Decentralisation began in Indonesia under the country's first post-Suharto leader, interim president Habibie. Regional autonomy laws (22/1999 and 25/1999) were drafted in 1999 and implemented under the Wahid administration in January 2001. These laws devolved decision-making power to Indonesia's 300-plus *kabupaten* (regencies) and *kota* (municipal) units, and introduced laws to safeguard the rights of regions to receive fairer allocations of profits over resources in their jurisdictions (Hadiz 2005: 37-53; Sulistiyanto and Erb 2005: 1-17).[52] The goal was to increase the economic

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[51] In this way we may also conceive of Indonesia's decentralisation as asymmetrical, due to the 'special autonomy' granted to Aceh and Papua.
[52] The initial focus on increasing the autonomy and powers at the regency and municipal level, rather than those of provincial units, was a feature designed to enhance territorial integrity by restricting the potential for provinces to mobilise in opposition to the centre.

performance of territorial units by reducing the regulatory role of the central state. Policy-makers worked from the logic that regional conflict with the centre is most commonly the product of poverty and lack of economic development, and thus focused primarily on economic change with the goal of improving stability and maintaining territorial integrity (Kingsbury 2003; Sukma 2003: 64-74).

Regional units were given the authority to manage their own affairs in fields such as urban services, non-tertiary education, public health, environmental management, planning and local government. Foreign policy, defence, fiscal and monetary policies, religious affairs and the judiciary remained under federal jurisdiction (Hadiz 2004a: 697-718). Local parliament was granted the right to elect regional government executives (such as governors, mayors and heads of regencies) in order to reduce the control of the centre. Executives at the district level became accountable only to their respective local parliaments (by whom they were elected), not to central or provincial government as under the New Order, and could no longer be dismissed by the Minister of Home Affairs. The local legislature at the district level (the DPRD) was granted greater power and authority than provincial parliament, however the powers of regional governments were also enhanced, although they remained subordinate to the legislature (Choi 2004: 280-301; Kingsbury 2003; Sukma 2003: 64-74; Webber 2006: 396-420). [53]

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[53] The DPRD was granted the right to: elect district heads or mayors (*bupati* or *walikota*) and deputies; elect members of the MPR; remove district heads; draft and pass laws; draft the district budget; exercise control over district executives, and provide its views on international agreements that might affect interests in its constituency to the central government. Regional governments became responsible for the implementation of development programmes, especially in the areas of public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, communications, industry and trade, investment, environmental and land use issues, cooperative and labour matters (Sukma 2003: 64-74). These measures were later amended however, by the 2004 Regional Autonomy Law, which was enacted to ensure regions are allocated a fairer share of the wealth they contribute to the national treasury. The law maintains central government authority over defence, security, foreign policy, economic, judicial and religious affairs. However the powers of provincial governments in a number of other areas have been enhanced (see Hotland 2006: May 26).

Russia's eighty-nine provincial units were inherited from Soviet times with only minor alterations, and are divided into *oblasts* (provinces/regions), *krais* (territories) and *okrugs* (republics, autonomous regions and autonomous districts) (Melvin 2005: 203-227). There are 21 republics (each named according to their dominant non-Russian ethnic group), 55 oblasts and krais, including the 'special-status' cites of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and 11 autonomies (Stoner-Weiss 2004: 130-172). Following transition from Soviet rule, power and control over resources was redistributed from the centre to the level of these regional units (Baev 2001: 23-43).[54] Like Indonesia, in the aftermath of transition Russia suffered from a variety of ethnic and cultural conflicts that threatened territorial integrity. President Yeltsin's response was an ad-hoc, treaty-based approach to individual conflicts centred on bargaining with regional leaders,[55] which ultimately undermined the centre's ability to successfully intervene in regional politics and resulted in the emergence of many regional leaders as powerful actors on the national political scene.[56] Forty-two of Russia's eighty-nine constituent units signed bilateral agreements and treaties with the centre establishing special rights and privileges (Stoner-Weiss 2004: 130-172).

Since his assumption of leadership in 2000, President Putin has worked both to undo the contractually-based federalism established under

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[54] The Russian Constitution is ambiguous about the status of these different territorial entities – they are equal in principle, yet the constitution also includes articles that give some units special privileges. *Okrugs* benefit most from these special privileges, being permitted to promulgate their own constitution, whereas *krais* and *oblasts* are allowed only charters. A number of *okrugs* have individual agreements with the centre dictating control over natural resources, tax advantages and their ability to engage in foreign relations (Obydenkova 2004).

[55] Initially the heads of provinces and regions were directly appointed by Yeltsin, while the ethnically-based republics and autonomous regions were allowed to leave their incumbent executives in office. Popular election of regional governors and republican presidents began to be introduced in early 1993; however democratic elections were suspended following the armed confrontation between Yeltsin and the federal parliament in December that year. It was only from 1995 that regional elections became standard practice, beginning in Russia's regions and provinces and soon extending to the republics and autonomous regions (Rigby 2001).

[56] For a more detailed description of the way in which centre-regional political relationships were structured under the Yeltsin presidency, see for example Baev (2001: 23-43); Rigby (2001: 1-14); Hahn (2005: 148-167); Melvin; Slider (2005: 168-185), and Hale (2006).

Yeltsin and to foster an alliance between his administration and the 'regional barons' while simultaneously moving to weaken their political and economic power (Stoner-Weiss 2004: 130-172). Central to Putin's vision of federalism has been the re-institution of a strong, centralised state – what he has termed 'the power vertical' characterised by a 'dictatorship of law' – in which legislative uniformity throughout the Russian state is a central goal (Lynch 2005a). Putin's federal reforms have redesigned the institutional framework by which sub-national politics is conducted, as well as increasing presidential powers to interfere in regional and local governance.[57] In this way, Putin has used his political capital as president to weaken the influence of pre-transition legacies that undermined the democratic character of regional politics. However, he has replaced a system that was conducive to the constraining effects of pre-transition regional organisation with a framework that lessens opportunities for the deepening of democracy at the sub-national level by reducing the scope for autonomy and increasing avenues for central interference, while leaving in place (and strengthening) an increasingly unrepresentative system of political representation.

Both Russia and Indonesia have faced the challenge of implementing political democratisation while attempting to prevent territorial disintegration, promote national unity and foster economic progress in a way that did not undermine those democratic norms. In Indonesia this has been pursued via a

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[57] Putin's main reforms include the creation of seven 'super-districts' that overlay Russia's eighty-nine regional divisions, each headed by a presidentially-appointed 'superprefect' (Lynch 2005a). The 'superprefects' are primarily charged with overseeing constitutional uniformity between the centre and regions in their districts. The upper house of the Federal Assembly, the Federation Council, has been reformed, with governors and chairs of regional assemblies no longer allowed to sit on the Council. They have been replaced by 'delegates' chosen by regional assemblies and chief executives (Melvin 2005: 203-227; Ross 2004: 155-175). Putin also created a new State Council by presidential decree (which thus may equally be dissolved by decree). The State Council is something of a 'consolation prize' for regional executives for their removal from the Federation Council, as it provides an avenue for access to the President and for potentially influencing the formation of policy. However the Council has no legislative powers and is essentially consultative. The Putin administration has also introduced new presidential powers to dismiss regional governors and dissolve regional assemblies should they be deemed to be acting in violation of the federal constitution (Ross 2004: 155-175).

unitary state model and a program of political and fiscal decentralisation or 'broad autonomy', with special measures introduced for 'problem regions' such as Aceh and Papua. In Russia, an initial programme of negotiated bilateral treaties and asymmetrical federalism is gradually being replaced by a new, more centralised federative system designed to gradually eliminate the special concessions granted under the Yeltsin presidency and to allow for regional autonomy that does not violate constitutional norms. The decentralised political model in Indonesia and the current federative framework of Russia are both ostensibly designed to promote democracy: in Indonesia via the fostering of local participation through the empowerment of sub-national representative institutions, and in Russia through the breaking of political monopolies held by 'regional barons' that undermine political pluralism and competition at the local and regional level. However the political realities of local and regional governance in both states are often less than democratic. The following section examines the way in which pre-transition modes of interaction between citizens and political elites have affected the healthy functioning of democratic institutions at the regional and local level and the institutionalisation of democratic norms and ideas within both society at large and in elite circles.

The Regionalisation of Corruption

When the outcomes of political and economic decentralisation in Indonesia and Russia are examined, it becomes evident that developmental models linking decentralisation with successful democratisation do not always apply. While decentralisation theoretically represents a model for political organisation diametrically opposed to the pre-democratic centralised state, it can create similar political and social realities. Schulte Nordholt (2004: 29-50) argues that the results of decentralisation in post-authoritarian states have been disappointing, and in the case of Indonesia that:

> Decentralisation does not necessarily result in democratisation, good governance and the strengthening of civil society at the regional level. Instead we witness a decentralisation of corruption, collusion and political violence that once belonged to the centralised regime… and is now moulded in existing patrimonial patterns at the regional level.

The pre-transition regimes of both Russia and Indonesia were characterised by widespread, firmly entrenched patrimonial practices. Under highly centralised, authoritarian governance, the use of personal and particularistic ties were often the only means by which ordinary citizens could seek to influence politics in some way – mainly in the sphere of policy implementation by local political elites, rather than in policy formation. It also presented an avenue for political elites to extract economic benefits to augment often-meagre state wages. Syarif Hidayat's (2005: 54-74) study of local governance in West Java in Indonesia in 1996, and Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman's (1984: 603-21) study of 'covert participation' under Soviet governance, for example, clearly demonstrate how personal connections and 'money politics' were generally the only means by which citizens could seek some form of participation in politics, if only for individual gain.[58] DiFranceisco and Gitelman (1984: 603-21, emphasis

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[58] Hidayat's fieldwork demonstrates how individuals – albeit predominantly local political elites – could act with some autonomy via their ability to 'creatively' interpret centrally-promulgated legislation. They were aided in this by their knowledge of local problems and alliances with particular groups within society, which were used to mobilise public support, and which in turn assisted them in their overtures to the central political elites to whom they possessed individual connections. While Hidyat focuses in his research on the ability of local political elites to exert political agency for economic gain, he highlights the importance of links with societal groups, and thus implies that ordinary citizens too possessed some leverage in their interactions with local political elites. Support of local elites was not given without some form of compensation – be it help with a problem affecting a particular societal group or individual, personal recompense. DiFranceisco and Gitelman's study of 'covert participation' in the Soviet Union focuses on the citizen as a client cultivating relationships with the local administrators and bureaucrats responsible for the implementation of policy. They describe how Soviet citizens exploited *blat* (pull), *sviazy* (connections), or bribery – the use of which varied according to an individuals socio-economic status, family and friendship circles, occupation and so on – to achieve particular outcomes that personally benefited them in some way.

added) describe this process as constituting a 'third dimension' between high and low politics:

> where policy *making* is not the issue but policy *implementation* is. Here politics become individualised and privatised. People do not seek to promote or retard policies that will affect large groups, but only to have policies applied to themselves in the most beneficial way possible.

These forms of clientelistic interactions commonly occur in states when citizens have low levels of confidence in the state's ability to provide particular services, or their ability to obtain services offered by the state. This is what Rose (1998) labels an 'antimodern society', in which a multitude of formal organisations or institutions that represent important state functions exist, but fail to operate as they should – that is, impersonally, predictably, and in harmony with the rule of law. Citizens (as clients) utilise the 'pull' and 'connections' at their disposal either to exploit the operation of existing institutions or to bypass them entirely.

Civilians and elites alike in Russia and Indonesia became accustomed to these informal political, social and economic interactions under long periods of authoritarian rule. In the new context of democratisation, as both states have struggled to establish new institutions and norms and to provide social goods, the old mechanisms for pursuing private interests have not simply disappeared. High poverty and unemployment levels in both countries further reduce feelings that government is providing the political and social benefits required, and consequently individuals seek to meet their needs outside of, or via manipulation of, the system. This process has re-activated or reinvigorated regional corruption, and has caused the increasing regionalisation – that is sectarianism or particularism – of politics. This often works to undermine pursuit of national political goals that are linked to the broader project of democratisation, which perpetuates the weak state that is at the root of its cause (Moran 2001: 379-393).

Indonesia and Russia share a number of problems stemming from a weak state and rule of law that are exacerbated or reinforced by political and economic decentralisation, such as a lack of central oversight and control over protection, taxation and law enforcement in the regions and the cooptation of democratic and capitalist institutions by criminal networks (Volkov 1999: 741-54; Wilson 2006: 265-97). The process of democratisation necessarily engenders a disintegration of previously centralised political groupings, but this often results in power struggles between competing groups, including the Presidency, military, ex-authoritarian elites and criminal groups, which in turn fosters the development (or continuation of) 'black politics' – political and administrative interactions that occur 'behind' the cover of democracy, and which come to be more significant than the formal democratic process (Moran 2001: 379-393).

Where previously corruption and money politics were more systematised and institutionalised, they have now assumed increasingly 'anarchical' and chaotic forms due to the 'diffusing' effect of decentralisation (Webber 2006: 396-420). In the pre-transition governments of both states, regional executives had established themselves as strong leaders with significant support bases via the use of patrimonial practices (Davidson 2005: 170-190; Lynch 2005a). This has negatively affected the successful functioning of newly-installed democratic institutions and the promotion of representative and responsive governance through devolution of key governing powers to regional and local levels. In Russia, commentators have pointed out how old systems of patron-client relationships have re-constituted themselves, describing the country as a 'neopatrimonial state within the framework of a façade democracy' (Lynch 2005a). Likewise the 'broad autonomy' laws in Indonesia have decentralised corrupt practices that were previously dominated by the central government, thus ensuring that such problems are more difficult to manage and eradicate in their new, diffuse and

unstructured forms. Thus old problems have re-emerged in a new, decentralised and democratic context, when the potential and will for central oversight and intervention is reduced (Farid 2006: 269-285; Hadiz 2004a: 697-718; Robison and Hadiz 2004).[59]

In his study on democratic transitions and corruption, Moran (2001: 379-393) notes that because democratisation by nature increases political competition, as well as the incentives for political groups and individuals to obtain or retain power, it is common for political elites to circumvent official channels in the pursuit of their goals. That is, the development of party politics inevitably results in struggles for power, particularly at the local and regional level, and the lengths to which elites will go to ensure political success increase proportionately with the incentives that holding office promises. In the context of economic as well as political decentralisation, opportunities to profit from regional and local political leadership have risen dramatically, which in turn has increased the appeal of non-democratic, extra-state methods for pursuing electoral success at the sub-national level. Indonesia's former Minister for Regional Autonomy, Ryaas Rasyid, has himself pointed out that 'money politics' has been closely attached to almost all gubernatorial and regent/mayoral elections since 1999, yet no allegations have been proven and no allegedly corrupt politicians have been prosecuted (Choi 2004: 280-301). This indicates the pervasiveness of corrupt practices and the inability or unwillingness to pursue legal action via the appropriate institutions. Indeed, Choi (2004: 280-301) asserts that political 'horse-trading' and practices like vote-selling have become characteristic of local

[59] In federal states like Russia and decentralising unitary states like Indonesia there are to main forms of centre-periphery political relations – *decentralisation*, where there is a hierarchy of power stemming from the central government that diffuses as it spreads down to lower levels of government – and *noncentralisation*, where regional political powers are both devolved *and* constitutionally guaranteed, with elections of regional bodies bestowing them with the legitimacy to act autonomously (Ross 2004: 155-175). However Russia and Indonesia appear to sit uncomfortably in a grey area outside of successful decentralisation or noncentralisation – instead, relations between the centre and the regions, and indeed between regions, are primarily governed by money politics and patrimonialism, rather than by the norms enshrined in each state's respective constitution.

elections, resulting in the regular election of candidates from minority parties competing against large, established parties.

In Russia, the ‘money politics’ of regional and local elections and politics is primarily influenced by the role of Financial-Industrial Groups (FIGs), which emerged at both the regional and national level largely thanks to the power and resources they gained under the Yeltsin administration.[60] Throughout the 1990s, FIGs indirectly influenced politics at the regional level, using their financial capital to promote parties and candidates that would represent their interests (Hale 2006).[61] They now have their own regional political machines or ‘party substitutes’ that are far more powerful than regular political parties thanks to their vast financial resources and their ability to exchange these with political elites in return for the representation of their interests in the Duma. Regional governors too have successfully developed powerful political machines that challenge the formal political parties contesting legislative elections.[62] Thus parties in Russia have not emerged as the only structures able to provide political benefits to candidates, and governmental-hopefuls can turn to these ‘party substitutes’. This has significantly undermined the institutionalisation of party politics at the regional level, and has acted as an obstacle to the instillation of democratic ‘rules of the game’ among both the populace and their representatives.

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[60] Particularly via the infamous ‘loans-for-shares’ scheme that granted control of natural resources, major banking enterprises and controlling interests in most major mass media outlets to a handful of powerful business interests (Hale 2006).

[61] FIGs directly financed election campaigns, arranged biased media coverage of political candidates, and also ‘bought’ many Duma candidates, governors and other bureaucrats following electoral success. Since 1999, FIGs have moved to influence politics more directly, advancing their own sets of independent parliamentary candidates running in single-member district races, and funding their own people to contest regional governorships (Hale 2006)

[62] Regional governments both benefited from the ‘loans for shares’ scheme through the purchasing of important shares of key regional enterprises, and from their ability to have some say in who could obtain the shares that were sold, which was exploited to increase the degree to which their own extended networks could gain control of certain companies. Under the Yeltsin administration, regional authorities also gained control over key institutions channeling state subsides, such as regional pension funds and banks, which could be used to convince sectors of the population to vote for preferred candidates (Hale 2006).

In Indonesia, decentralisation has raised the stakes in power struggles during elections for *bupati* (regent) posts. The enhancement of the 'significance of the local' has often resulted in local and regional politics becoming increasingly dominated by ethno-centric arguments about *putra daerah* (native son) leadership, which often mask localised competitions over power (Davidson 2005: 170-190). In this way, much of the population has failed to benefit from new democratic freedoms as they have been forced to choose between a range of patrons, bosses and ethnic and religious networks that have coopted local and regional political institutions (Törnquist 2002: 547-569).[63] Similarly, in Russia the creation of powerful regional political machines under the Yeltsin administration resulted in a number of sub-national governments challenging the central government and using ethnic claims 'to legitimate what might otherwise be seen as cronyism or sometimes autocratisation' (Hale 2006). In many other regions, the process of privatisation in post-transition Russia consolidated 'strong, narrow, and particularistic socioeconomic interests' who sought to take over regional governments through the cooptation of officials, in order to preserve gains made early in transition (Stoner-Weiss 2004: 130-172). In doing so they prevented the emergence of political forces favouring the development of a central state strong enough to regulate and prevent rent-seeking activity. It is important to note that Putin's recent federal reforms have pursued solutions to

[63] It is important to note that while many ethno-local skirmishes in Indonesia have been exploited for use in political power-struggles, a number date from pre-existing separatist sentiment or religious-based grievances that were a direct product of New Order policies. Various policies pursued by the Suharto administration simultaneously caused and repressed grievances, and redefined conflicts in different ways. For example, Suharto's favouring of Muslim groups in the latter part of his rule is responsible for the rising tensions that have emerged between Christians and Muslims in areas such as Maluku and Flores since the late 1990s. Likewise, the narrow vision of the Indonesian nation adopted and promoted by the New Order administration marginalised and excluded particular groups that conceived of themselves as separate nations, reinforcing discontent that the ABRI managed to contain until the late 1990s – notably those in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya (see Bertrand 2004). While the path-shaping nature of the eruption of ethnic violence in post-New Order Indonesia is a related and extremely important issue in any study of democratisation, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. Bertrand (2004) provides an interesting analysis of ethno-religious conflict in Indonesia that utilises a framework of analysis heavily influenced by path dependency.

the above problems, yet have met with little success. Stoner-Weiss (2004: 130-172) has noted that Putin has not been able to break leaders of regional resistance, and has suffered a number of legal and political defeats that have left intact regional political structures that developed in the 1990s. Likewise, Lynch asserts that 'for every action Putin has taken, there has often been a countervailing reaction or constraint on the extent of federal-executive authority (Lynch 2005a)'.[64] Measures aimed at re-establishing federal oversight of sub-national governance, uniform enforcement of the constitution and the rule of law promise to aid in the implementation of democratisation, and are arguably what Indonesia may need in the near future if truly competitive, representative party politics are to be preserved and further developed.[65] However, just like regional and local political institutions, such measures have the potential to be abused. Putin has not used his recentralising reforms to prevent, for example, the violation of citizens' democratic rights by local officials, to ensure a free press or honest and fair elections (Slider 2005: 168-185). Instead, they have been used to facilitate increased central interference in local politics to skew election results, making use of political bargaining and a 'carrot-and-stick' approach that is in direct opposition to the use of democratic institutions for the pursuance of political interests.[66] Thus the Putin administration has failed to grasp opportunities to

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[64] For example, while Putin has able to end the practice of regional governors sitting in the Federal Assembly, governors won the right to extend their terms of office, which heightened their ability to reinforce local power bases and maintain independent sources of capital (Lynch 2005a). Further, his introduction of federal appointees has not automatically ensured increased central oversight of regional politics. These officials have the potential to be co-opted by regional elites, 'creating yet another layer of bureaucracy between the president and the regions' (Ross 2004: 155-175).

[65] Indeed, this may already be occurring. The chairman of the Association of Indonesian Provincial Administrations (APPSI), Sutiyoso (who is also governor of Jakarta), has been reported to have accused the SBY government of introducing new legislation (such as regulations pertaining to authority over public services and Presidential Decree No. 10/2006 on the National Land Agency regulating provincial acquisition of government land) that undermines the 2004 Regional Autonomy Law and is 'more in the spirit of centralisation' (Sutiyoso quoted in Hotland 2006: May 26).

[66] For example, through the cooptation and appeasement of regional leaders through the granting of positions in the top leadership council of United Russia (a pro-Kremlin party) (Slider 2005: 168-185).

overcome the legacies of overly-powerful regional units and the prevalence of corruption and collusion in sub-national governance, and to guide Russia's political path in the direction of deepening democratisation.

Thus the difficulties encountered in the development of democratic party politics described in Chapter Two can be observed to stem from political interactions at the sub-national level, which continue to be informed by corrupt, patrimonial relationships and dealings learned and institutionalised under the pre-democratic, authoritarian regime. There is a paradoxical interplay between democratic institutions and non-democratic outcomes and practices in Russia and Indonesia that necessitates a flexible and non-teleological understanding of democratisation. While processes of political and fiscal decentralisation theoretically improve opportunities for responsive, representative government and thus for the enhancement of democratic quality, the cases of Indonesia and Russia demonstrate that a combination of non-democratic legacies and a lack of new policies focused on undermining the influence of those legacies, can negate the democratic benefits of decentralisation, and encourage non-democratic norms and practices instead.

The Decentralisation of Crime and Violence

In Russia, criminal groups were 'ironically… the only form of organised nonstate society that existed until the late Soviet period' (Shelley 2006: 95-109).[67] By the 1970s groups had grown large and sophisticated enough to merge with the shadow economy, and in the 1980s this role was extended as criminal units began to seek influence in the political sphere (Shelley 2006: 95-109). In Indonesia, organised crime groups also emerged under the pre-transition regime. Civilian militias have existed in Indonesia since the days of

[67] Criminal groups originated under Stalin, when criminal gangs had a steady supply of homeless children and convicts to recruit from the millions incarcerated in camps (Shelley 2006: 95-109).

Dutch colonialism (International Crisis Group 2003: 1-35). However, they became part of official state practice under Suharto, with violence, repression and sponsoring of paramilitary forces as federal policy dating from the massacres of 1965 and 1966 (Törnquist 2002: 547-569). This was achieved primarily through the cooptation and politicising of civilian and youth organisations, which became 'fronts for criminal gangs, as proxies by the state apparatus' (Wilson 2006: 265-97). These organised crime groupings and private militia groups did not simply disappear at the end of authoritarian rule. In Indonesia's case, they simply lost the unifying effect of the centralised state and fragmented as they began to compete with one another (Wilson 2006: 265-97). In Russia organised crime groups expanded and proliferated with the emergence of capitalism and an extremely corruptible politico-business nexus (Lynch 2005a; Shelley 2006: 95-109), evolving from 'thugs for hire' trading in violence and bootleg vodka to sophisticated organs present at every level of state organisation, and in every sector of the business world (Lynch 2005a). In Indonesia, the mobilisation of civilian militias or private armies to protect political parties has become common practice (King 2003), as has the use of private security forces by business leaders to 'negotiate' industrial relations disputes and the hiring of thugs (*preman*) from local indigenous communities by local and regional elites to achieve political and economic ends via intimidation and violence (Warouw 2006: 193-207).

The high level of corrupt, patrimonial relations in both Russia and Indonesia has an often-symbiotic relationship with the currency of violence and crime, which, like political corruption, has been 're-valued' or reconstituted in the context of decentralisation and democratisation. Organised crime requires corruption to survive, and as Shelley (2006: 95-109) has noted the level of corruption in Russia 'is so significant that it is possible to speak of a political-criminal nexus in which the criminals and government have merged'. While the links between politicians and criminal groups in Indonesia may be less systematic than in Russia, there is nevertheless an

undeniable connection between the corruption of local and regional politicians and corruption of the military, as well as connections between politics and non-state groups 'trading in violence', and between those groups and the military.

In Indonesia the link between patrimonialism, crime and violence at the sub-national level is intimately connected with the army's territorial organisational structure, which has gone unchanged since Suharto's leadership (aside from the official separation of the army and police force).[68] Territorial deployment of the army parallels civilian government administration right down to the local level, and this has provided military units, as well as individual soldiers, with opportunities to advance their economic interests via the threat of coercive power (Misol 2006: 1-136). This is a direct legacy of practices fostered under the New Order, when the army bolstered its meagre income through involvement in business (both legal and illegal), army-owned 'charitable foundations' and various localised forms of racketeering (Kingsbury 2003). The military continues to possess diverse economic interests in the fishery, forestry and mining sectors and many ex-officers have pursued regional or local political careers (often to preserve their economic interests) (Rinakit 2005: 75-86). Further, large companies regularly pay significant sums of protection money to the armed forces. Schulte Nordholt argues that decentralisation has been economically beneficial for the army (and the police, though to a lesser extent), because it has resulted in more money being channelled from the centre to the regional level. The offering of paid protection is a profitable enterprise, especially

[68] While the territorial deployment of the TNI has not changed, there have been a number of important institutional reforms that have successfully removed the military from politics. This is an important example of how legislative tools can be used to overcome aspects of historical legacies that would otherwise hinder democratisation. For a thorough analysis of the success of these 'first generation' military reforms, see Mietzner (2006). However Mietzner does point to the legacies of territorial deployment and involvement of the military in business activities as major obstacles in the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces, an important aspect of democratisation.

when the army 'can create a lot of insecurity if this offer is refused' (Schulte Nordholt 2004: 29-50).

The Russian military is also deployed on a territorial basis, but has since Soviet times has operated on the principle of 'ex-territoriality', with a system of cadre rotation ensuring that soldiers are taken away from the region in which they were drafted and mixed with different units. However, while the principle of ex-territoriality still exists, it has become too expensive to implement, and officers since transition have served in the one unit for ten years or more, developing strong local loyalties. Further, soldiers in contemporary Russia are more likely to be drafted locally, resulting in strong 'native communities' within army units (Baev 2001: 23-43). While little has been written of this phenomenon as yet, it is likely that this regionalisation of army loyalties, combined with the power, business and criminal connections of regional and local political executives, will inevitably result in the involvement of security personnel in sub-national networks of corruption, especially if the army continues to suffer from political neglect and resource shortages. Indeed, Baev (2001: 23-43) asserts that the armed forces are as thoroughly corrupt as the rest of Russian society, and that relations between business, criminal, political and military elites are 'gradually reaching the state of a merger', similar to the predatory relations that characterise contemporary Indonesia.

As Robison and Hadiz (2004) have noted, both the post-Soviet Russian army and the Indonesian military have an interest in preserving the old institutions of predatory capitalism, as extra-budgetary funding is crucial to both the augmenting of insufficient budgetary allocations and for the maintenance of pre-transition privileges. Corrupt regional leaders do have interests that require 'protection' – however as yet they have preferred to co-opt non-military power structures and law-enforcement (Baev 2001: 23-43). Law enforcement bodies – including the police, secret police and prosecutors – have become involved in the 'protection' that corrupt local leaders require

for their shadow businesses, vote-buying and auctioning, and interactions with organised crime (Baev 2001: 23-43; Taylor 2006: 193-213). Decentralisation policies have been particularly effective at transforming and reinvigorating this pre-existing aspect of patrimonialism and corruption.

In both countries the decentralised nature of local and regional governance has enhanced the role that extra-state criminal and security organisations can play in political, economic and social life at the sub-national level. While Russian criminals operate at the national and even trans-national level, the corrupt nature of party machine politics at the local and regional levels has provided opportunities not just to garner public support but to become directly involved in politics (Shelley 2006: 95-109).[69] Indonesia too has seen the advent of *preman* leaders entering into politics, particularly at the sub-national level. In August 2003 Pemuda Pancasila, one of the countries' most infamous militia groups dating from the New Order era, formally registered its own political party, the Pancasila Patriot Party, in order to compete officially with its traditional patron, Golkar.[70] Schulte Nordholt has suggested that Indonesia and Russia increasingly resemble one another, with Indonesia following the Russian example where 'criminal networks and thugs trafficking in violence have played a pivotal role in the making of… capitalism and have hijacked new political and economic structures' (quoted in Wilson 2006: 265-97). In both countries the increasing regionalisation and privatisation of violence undermines the state's claim to enforce the rule of law and challenges public confidence in state institutions at all levels. However, it is also the legacy and continuing perpetuation of

[69] Criminals have been elected to local and regional office, crime groups have financed political campaigns, and representatives have been 'bought' to represent the interests of crime groups within government. Further, they have been able to successfully present themselves as community philanthropists, providing financial assistance for church, education and social welfare programs (Shelley 2006: 95-109).

[70] While it was unsuccessful in the April 2004 elections, it has set a precedent for other vigilante groups becoming involved in politics. For example, the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (FBR) is planning to nominate a candidate for the 2007 governorship elections in Jakarta and in recent elections for regional heads, *satgas* (paramilitary wings of political parties), *preman* groups and organised crime figures have both funded successful candidates and fielded their own (Wilson 2006: 265-97).

patrimonial, predatory politico-business relations characterised by exchanges of violence in a decentralised context that reinforces the weakness of the state, propagating and institutionalising norms that contradict those constituting the democratic ‘rules of the game’.

Conclusion

The examination of the implementation of political and economic decentralisation in Indonesia and Russia in this chapter illustrates the often contradictory relationship in democratising states between institutions and outcomes. Invoking the ‘anchored but floating’ (Whitehead 2002) conception of democracy advocated in Chapter One, the implementation of decentralisation involves the creation of institutions that ‘anchor’ democratisation in political structures. However, the path-shaping approach used to compare decentralisation in Indonesia and Russia demonstrates that the ‘floating’, or substantive aspects of democracy that should theoretically be encouraged by sub-national elections and decision-making autonomy can be co-opted or hijacked by predatory interests and practices, resulting in non-democratic outcomes. This in turn hinders the further deepening and enhancement of democratic quality, sending democratisation in a different direction, or contributing to an indefinite immobility. Just as the colonisation of new democratic institutions and parties by pre-transition elites described in Chapter Two can impede the intended functioning of those institutions, so too does the continued favouring of corrupt, rent-seeking behaviour and the currency of extra state violence retard the operation of local and regional political structures that should encourage responsive, representative governance. Likewise, the legacy of authoritarian governance characterised by personalised rule and suppression of non-state political activity has hindered the creation of strong, viable party systems and further increased ‘fallback’ onto non-democratic, patrimonial modes of interaction in politics.

However in both cases, the very creation of democratic institutions governed by equally democratic ‘rules’ demonstrates the agency that political elites have to pursue the deepening of democratic character. There is, however, a problem of ‘follow-through’ on both the part of those operating and overseeing these institutions, and those interacting with them. The ‘historical baggage’ that ex-authoritarian states carry will influence continued democratisation only as much as it is allowed. As Putin’s recent federal reforms demonstrate, political elites can pursue policy platforms that are accommodating of or conducive to the pervasiveness of historical influences. However, the varying performance of different parties in Indonesia’s 2004 elections show that political actors may equally pursue policies and tactics that encourage the institutionalisation of democratic norms and hence close off avenues for the continued ability of pre-transition legacies to shape the path of democratisation. Thus the experiences of recently-transitioned nation-states like Indonesia and Russia demonstrate that the deepening of democratic political systems is influenced, but not determined by, the experience of long-lasting authoritarian rule. The way in which historical legacies are permitted to flourish in some contexts, and are rendered ineffective in others, illustrates the inconsistent and uneven nature of democratisation, and thus the problems associated with attempts to fit the process to a pre-determined timeframe measured by key indices of development.

Conclusion

Attempts to formulate and apply theory on democratic transition and democratisation are sometimes hindered by the inconsistencies of political and social realities. While models of political development provide useful starting points for the study of democratisation, the experiences of individual nation states inevitably produce different outcomes. There can be no 'one size fits all' framework for assessing democracy, unless it is one which includes, as part of its theory, understandings of political change that are inherently fluid, contestable and open to reconsideration. This thesis has demonstrated the possibility of using open-ended, 'anchored but floating' (Whitehead 2002) definitions of democracy and democratisation in comparative political studies. It has used a derivative of structural-historical transition theory – a path-shaping approach – to demonstrate the impossibility of examining the 'anchored' aspects of democracy (that is, procedural, institutional aspects) without consideration of 'floating' elements (that is, substantive outcomes and ideals).

This comparative study of aspects of Indonesian and Russian democratisation has demonstrated that new democracies encounter a number of common difficulties in the achievement of democratic outcomes, stemming from their recent histories as authoritarian states. The problem of elite continuity discussed in Chapter Two illustrates the problems faced by ex-authoritarian democracies in distancing their administrations from their non-democratic precursors. It is not argued that the 'colonisation' of new institutions with old elites is inevitable or impossible to overcome; indeed, the efforts of Presidents Wahid and Yeltsin to rid their administrations of the influence of pre-transition elites show how political actors can use the democratic tools and institutions available to them to attempt to remedy historical legacies. However, as this section of Chapter Two also

demonstrated, the extent to which such efforts can achieve enduring success is constrained by historical legacies of power relations – that is, some accommodation of pre-transition elites is usually necessary to ensure political stability and advantage. This is emblematic of the broader theme running through this thesis – the often unpredictable way in which aspects of the pre-transition regime and new democratic institutions intersect and produce political and social outcomes.

As is suggested in the first chapter, the uncertainty of outcomes produced in democratising states renders deterministic models of political development vulnerable to practical failure, evidenced for example in the plethora of new 'naming categories' for non-uniform models of democratisation such as 'quasi', 'semi' 'façade' and 'illiberal' democracies (Carothers 2002: 5-21). The decentralisation of corruption, crime and violence discussed in Chapter Three illustrates problems associated with procedural, formalist models of democracy, and with seeking to identify 'stages' of democratisation such as 'transition' and 'consolidation'. While developmental theories promote political and economic decentralisation as a necessary process for ensuring democratic governance at all levels of administration – governance that is responsive to and representative of civic interests – the examples of Indonesia and Russia show that the mere construction of structures for sub-national democratic government do not engender democratic outcomes. As Chapter Three has shown, a 'democratic' policy like decentralisation can in fact create space for the emergence (or re-constitution) of non-democratic groups, norms and practices. Examples such as these are broadly representative of the way a democratising state's 'authoritarian baggage' can retard the process of democratisation; of how the process of democratisation does not always move in a linear fashion. Thus to posit an 'end point' of 'consolidation' which should be universally recognisable is problematic. This is not to say that democracies do not become more stable and predictable over time. However, it underscores the

fact that democratisation should be a continuous part of state-building, no matter how 'established' or 'stable' a political system is. Indeed, if democratisation is no longer pursued as a necessary state goal, the quality of that democracy is likely to begin to decline.

The examination of the respective party systems of Indonesia and Russia undertaken in Chapter Two further illustrates these ideas. The prevalence of personality-based parties with weak policy platforms, and in Russia the sidelining of parties with liberal-democratic agendas, demonstrates that opportunities for competition and the principle of pluralism do not ensure truly competitive and pluralistic (that is, democratic) outcomes. No new democracy can 'start from scratch' and build a new political system without regard for the regime that preceded it. New institutions transform and overlay old ones, and old practices are not easily abandoned. As the discussion of re-emerged patrimonial politics in Indonesia and Russia in Chapter Three shows, there is a need for policy programmes in democratising states to pursue more than just the building of democratic institutions and structures. Yet the example of federal reforms introduced in Russia under the Putin administration to increase federal supervision of regional autonomy and ostensibly to strengthen constitutionalism, demonstrates that political agency can be used in ways that are *not* conducive to the promotion of democracy – even if the tools used to create new policy are structurally democratic.

This thesis may appear pessimistic about the successful implementation of democracy in post-authoritarian states in general, and particularly in Indonesia and Russia. The many areas in which Indonesia and Russia have made more definitive progress in democratising have not been discussed because it is the intent of this study to highlight areas where democratisation has been difficult or problematic due to pervasive historical legacies. Democratisation in Indonesia particularly, despite the shortcomings outlined in this thesis, has progressed at an unprecedented pace considering its relatively recent transition from authoritarian rule (Aspinall 2005a: 117-

56; Webber 2006: 396-420). Russia, a comparatively 'older' democracy, offers a less positive example. However, at the very least, according to some commentators, Russia cannot be said to have *reversed* democratic gains made since transition, if it has not pursued the improvement of 'deepening' of the quality of its democracy.[71]

What all this illustrates is the need for understanding democracy and democratisation in a fluid and open-ended, rather than rigid and deterministic way, and for underscoring the importance of historical legacies in influencing the non-linear, unpredictable course of a nation-state's democratic path. In practical terms, there is a need for a 'third way' in governance of post-authoritarian, democratising countries, 'that aims at substantial democratisation by promoting a citizen's actual capacity to make use of and further improve judicial, civil and democratic rights as well as institutional channels' (Törnquist 2002: 547-569). This kind of governmental approach would take into account the inconsistencies that have grown between democratic institutions and outcomes as a consequence of legacies of authoritarian governance, and could potentially address the gap between democratic tools and real, existing freedoms and representation that currently exists in Russia and Indonesia. This thesis has sought to highlight a number of areas where this 'gap' is evident in contemporary Indonesia and Russia, and in doing so to illustrate the limitations of strictly procedural or substantive approaches to understanding democratisation, and consequently to argue the need for more flexible frameworks that fuse elements of both. If understandings of democratisation that depict a forward-moving, teleological process, with progress measured by fixed democratic requisites, are moderated to take into account the possibility of 'detours' on the democratic path, and to discard the idea of a universally-recognisable endpoint of

[71] This view is put forward by Ross (2003: 29-47); Shleifer and Treisman (2004: 20-32); Colton (2005b: 103-118); Schleifer (2005), and Gill (2006: 58-77). There are a number of commentators who would disagree, such as Yakovlev and Primakov (2004: 44-8); Berezovsky (2004: 36-7; 2005: 59-61); Shevtsova (2005: 229-253) and Lucas (2006).

democratisation, then qualifiers like ‘quasi’ ‘illiberal’ ‘semi’ or ‘façade’ to preface descriptions of democratising nation-states will no longer be needed. Instead, analysis can focus on the variation and complexity of democratisation, and the way in which differently democratic systems may experience reversals in democratic achievements, stabilise, or deepen in quality.

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