


*Joining the GAP: Australia  
and the Dialogue on Global  
Action to Prevent War*

Lynda-ann Blanchard

CPACS Working Paper No. 04/1  
March 2004



**The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies**



**The University of Sydney**

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## Abbreviations

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ADF	Australian Defence Force
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CPACS	Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Australia
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia
ECCP	European Centre for Conflict Resolution
GA	General Assembly, United Nations
GAPW	Global Action to Prevent War Program
MAPW	Medical Association for the Prevention of War
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation Europe
RRF	Rapid Response Force
RSO	Regional Security Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

For more information on the **International** Global Action to Prevent War program, please see the website <http://www.globalactionpw.org/>

For more information on Global Action to Prevent War – **Australia**, please see <http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/cpacs/gapw.htm>

"A shrinking world does not necessarily mean a more secure world. In a profound sense we are experiencing the 'globalisation of insecurity'. In the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century the United Nations took the lead in facilitating and promoting conferences, covenants, agreements and conventions that might better respond to the multiple challenges of modernity. But notions of comprehensive and human security are more easily stated than applied. The failure of the great powers to allow the UN system to take effective remedial, let alone preventative, action in such humanitarian emergencies as Rwanda and Somalia is a salutary reminder of the gap that still exists between the Westphalian system of governance and notions of human governance."

**Joseph Camilleri (et al) co-editor, *Global Change, Peace and Security*, 2003.**

"Expressions of non-violence contribute to peace with justice, in personal relationships, in dialogue across cultures and in international affairs. The claim derives from my belief that the practice of non-violence results in the freedoms to realise people's potential for creativity which has an empowering effect on every group and culture."

**Stuart Rees, *Passion for Peace*, Australia: UNSW Press; 2003:156-157.**

## Abstract

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The *Global Action to Prevent War* (GAPW) project is a comprehensive, phased set of political, military and social processes projected for the next three to four decades. GAPW calls for the establishment of a United Nations system capable of preventing war, genocide and other deadly conflict. It also calls for the mobilisation of an international consortium of civil society organisations to support this objective. The major contributions of GAPW are two-fold. First, it offers a vision of a world without war and a specific, concrete program for achieving that goal. Secondly, the design of the program is rooted in the present evolving international system. It builds on existing institutional developments and utilises civil society organisations to provide a sequence of elements in a program that can be implemented in set stages.

This working paper aims to initiate dialogue about GAPW in an Australian context. It provides an overview of the *Global Action to Prevent War* project, highlighting its bases in the language of non-violence, engagement of the UN and collaboration with civil society. In addressing the GAPW priorities over the next five years, it is important to frame questions within an Australian context. This paper attempts to tease out starting points for discussion in this regard. Specific analyses of notions of peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping; and the role of regional security and civil society organisations form the detailed discussion of this working paper. Since the Canberra Commission report was released, just as the current government was taking office, there has been little public voice on disarmament issues in Australia. Regional neighbours however - from Thailand to Japan - are sustaining a public voice. This working paper reviews Australia's past commitment to global non-violence and concludes that initiating a dialogue around *Global Action to Prevent War* may re-ignite past enthusiasm.

An earlier draft of this working paper formed the basis for discussion during the inaugural meeting of the *Global Action to Prevent War* group on 4 December 2003, at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney. A short summary of this discussion is included in appendix 1 to this working paper, as well as a further outline of GAPW priorities for the Australian network based on these discussions, by Professor Joe Camilleri, in appendix 2. An article by Dr Sue Wareham, the President of the Medical Association for the Prevention of War, on Human Rights and Nuclear Weapons has also been added to the paper in appendix 3.

## I. Summary of GAPW aims, objectives, history – identification of organisation and players involved.

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### Introduction

*GLOBAL ACTION TO PREVENT WAR* is an international program for moving towards a world in which deadly conflict is rare, brief, and small in scale— an aspiration for working toward the abolition of war. The means for doing this already exist, through the international United Nations System and in collaboration with Civil Society Organisations. *Global Action to Prevent War* provides a reasonable timeline for a thoughtfully integrated program for successive advances in key components of the agenda, including early warning and prevention of armed conflict; non-violent means of conflict resolution; peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding; transparency and other confidence-building measures; disarmament; and the implementation of criminal law regarding genocide and crimes against humanity.

The *Global Action to Prevent War* program is a coalition-building platform for individuals, civil society groups, and governments everywhere. Some components of the project, such as cuts in conventional and nuclear arms or multinational action against aggression and genocide, concern mainly governments and civil society working in combination. Other components, such as those dealing with non-violent conflict resolution and peace education, can be implemented separately by individuals and state and local communities as well as national organisations. (See Appendix 4 for a detailed summary and overview of the stages and phases of GAPW).

GAPW is aiming for worldwide membership, and currently includes participation from:

Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Belgium Brazil Cameroon Canada Colombia Czech Republic Denmark Ecuador Fiji Islands France Germany Ghana Great Britain Greece Iceland India Indonesia Iran Ireland Israel Italy Japan Kenya Lebanon Liberia Mexico Nepal Netherlands New Zealand Nicaragua Nigeria Northern Ireland Norway Pakistan Philippines Poland Republic of Georgia Russia South Africa South Korea Spain Sri Lanka Sweden Switzerland Thailand Togo United States of America Yugoslavia Zambia

*Global Action to Prevent War* hopes to establish name recognition in a way roughly equivalent to that of leading environmental and human rights programs. A key form of action in the first stage is to establish working groups that actively promote specific components of the *Global Action to Prevent War* program or, if effective networks for specific components already exist, to promote and support their efforts.

## **The Philosophy, Language and Practice of GAPW**

In an article published in *Rutgers Law Review* (Winter, 2000) Saul Mendlovitz, Chair of the International Steering Group for *Global Action to Prevent War*, suggests that the language of non-violence is the 'power' that underpins GAPW objectives. Moreover, he states that an important strand in the global efforts to abolish war emanates from the non-violence movement. Indeed, the practices and ideology of non-violence is the most fundamental challenge to militarism and the use of coercive force. Militarism is a belief system based on the assumption that military values and policies are conducive to secure and orderly society. It has served to legitimate both warfare and civil use of coercive force in the interest of national security. Militarism accepts war as an inherent feature of interaction of human groupings.

Non-violence challenges this belief system, calls for demilitarisation, and the disciplined use of active non-violence to bring about social change. The success of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr and civil societies of Poland, Philippines and Haiti in toppling their dictators in non-violent fashion are illustrative of the strength of this challenge. Mendlovitz questions whether at this moment in time, humanity is prepared to accept non-violence 'as part of our social and individual psychological make-up'. However, movements for non-violence continue to question in a most profound manner the validity of the institution of war and large-scale, organised violence, and killing. As such, non-violence, articulated in notions of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding (see detailed discussion of these concepts on pages 19-21 of this working paper) is the cornerstone of delegitimising processes of militarism.

"The authors of GAP are not pacifists, albeit our hearts are there; we believe, however, that [the need for] police and armed forces to uphold the law against aggression, genocide, and crimes against humanity will probably be necessary for at least the 21<sup>st</sup> Century".<sup>1</sup>

Yet, there is clear evidence of a critical mass of advocates of non-violence throughout the globe. Mendlovitz cites two recent examples of the effectiveness of this general movement. In 1997 some 850 civil society organisations from all regions of the world organised the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, which lobbied governments of the world to create the international criminal court.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, individuals and organisations from civil society prepared much of the analyses and papers that were used in discussions and led to achieving this result. Similarly, it was civil society that mobilised general public opinion around the project of banning land mines and within a year effectively lobbied governments to agree to this ban, with the exception of the United States, Russia and China, who indicated that they might join in the next five years. It is clear that the movement for peace with justice has various initiatives, emphases and organisations. The remarkable achievement of the Hague Appeal for Peace is the sense of a coherent, ongoing movement with individuals and organisations throughout the globe participating in an overall political process to abolish war. The Hague Appeal for Peace has also identified *Global Action to Prevent War* as a central program for implementation over the next decade".<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Saul Mendlovitz, "The Prospects for Abolishing War: A Proposal for the Twenty-First Century", *Rutgers Law Review* Vol 52, Winter 2000, p 627.

<sup>2</sup> See Rome Statute of the Criminal court, as of July 1999 UN Doc. A/CONF. 18319.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid note 1, p. 629.

## **Organisational Structure**

In May 2000, in a meeting held at Rutgers University Law School, *Global Action to Prevent War* established an International Steering Committee comprising over thirty people worldwide. The international Steering Committee established a list of high-priority steps (see pages 10 -13 of this paper) and Working Groups, revised in the Committee's meeting in Berlin in April 2002. Working Groups are seen as a means to bring together *Global Action to Prevent War* supporters to promote and advance individual measures of the *Global Action to Prevent War* program. They are the main vehicles for action in the project.

## **Examples of GAPW in Action**

*Jonathan Dean, Adviser on International Security Issues, Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington DC, November 6<sup>th</sup> 2002.*

"It is suggested that the General Assembly consider establishing a Conflict Prevention Committee. The Committee, composed of permanent representatives or their deputies, would supplement the work of the Security Council. This panel could send teams of its members to areas of potential conflict, hold hearings on the spot or report on the situation and purpose of solutions".<sup>4</sup>

A first step towards furthering the idea of a Conflict Prevention Committee within the UN was achieved when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/337 -Prevention of Armed Conflict - on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2003<sup>5</sup>. Although Resolution 57/337 did not specify the terms of reference for such a committee, the Secretary General's report leading to the adoption of this resolution clearly endorses the creation of such a committee.

"In September 2002, Don Kraus, Executive Director of Campaign for UN Reform in Washington discussed the prospect of getting a UN Rapid Response Force established, a hot topic ten years ago, but then the political will disappeared and other areas became prioritised. Don's discussion drew on Peter Languille's newly published book *Bridging the Commitment - Capacity Gap: A Review of Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment* (Centre for UN Reform and Education 2002).<sup>6</sup>

An evaluation of Regional Security Organisations (RSO) and the notion of a Rapid Response Force are detailed on pages 22-24 of this working paper. The proposed role of the RSO is to liaise with the UN Conflict Prevention Committee in the monitoring of

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<sup>4</sup> "Memorandum: A Possible Conflict Prevention Committee of the General Assembly", see the international GAPW website <http://www.globalactionpw.org/>

<sup>5</sup> Resolution 57/337 can be found on the GAPW – Australia webpage at <http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/centres/cpacs/gapw.htm>

<sup>6</sup> "UN Working Group for Global Action: 2002-2003 Highlights", see the international GAPW website <http://www.globalactionpw.org/>

regional hot spots with the prospect of regional response units available to ameliorate tensions and negotiate peace between conflicting parties.

"In February 2003, Felicity Hill of UNIFEM and formerly of the UN WILPF Office, discussed the potential for basing a demilitarization campaign ... upon Articles 11 and 26 of the UN Charter. Article 26, never implemented, says the Security Council is responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for regulation of armaments. Article 11 provides that the General Assembly may make recommendations with regard to principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. Some NGOs, notably WILPF, are already talking with governments about acting upon these provisions".<sup>7</sup>

The important role of women in conflict prevention and the recognition that full participation of women in peace processes can significantly contribute towards the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security is clearly stated in the *Global Action to Prevent War* program. Moreover, the active role of Civil Society Organisations, including that of women's organisations, is crucial to the coalition-building platform on which GAPW is based. (A summary of CSOs and NGOs in Australia concerned with promoting non-violence and peace with justice are listed on page 18 of this working paper.)

"In June 2003, Nicole Deller, Research Associate for the Lawyer's Committee on Nuclear Policy, reported on a June meeting in the Netherlands that concerned an initiative of a collection of NGOs involved in issues of peacekeeping brought together in response to a recommendation by Kofi Annan in his report on the prevention of armed conflict. Kofi Annan said, I urge NGOs with an interest in conflict prevention to organise an international conference of local, national and international NGOs on their role in conflict prevention and future interaction with the United Nations in this field."<sup>8</sup>

In response to this appeal and with the Secretary General's support, the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) proposed 'a three-year integrated program of research, consultation and discussion to take place globally. Six regional conferences will focus the experience of each region and lead to a major international conference at UN Headquarters in 2005'. It is open to all organisations - on an international scale - involved at any level of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The June 2003 meeting in the Netherlands was the first step in this proposed process. It created a structure for ongoing work, including an international steering group, regional groups and a UN group.

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<sup>7</sup> "UN Working Group for Global Action: 2002-2003 Highlights", see the international GAPW website <http://www.globalactionpw.org/>

<sup>8</sup> "Notes on Conflict Prevention Conference held June 18, 2003, The Netherlands", see the international GAPW website <http://www.globalactionpw.org/>

## II. The feasibility of GAPW priorities within an Australian context - an initial response

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### Priorities for 2003 -2007

Aspects of the *Global Action to Prevent War* program that are proposed over the next five years are detailed here. An initial response - by way of questions, statements, observations - relating to each is aimed as a starting point for discussion about how Australia and civil society organisations operating within Australia might begin to address each of these stated priorities.

**1. Establish a corps of 50 professional mediators at the disposal of the Secretary General and the Security Council. Today, when the Secretary General wants to send out a conflict preventing mediation mission to head off building tension, he has to identify and borrow personnel from member states. He does not have the personnel or financial resources to position these part-time mediators for weeks or months at the crisis site to permit them to identify important local participants and to establish working relationships with them. A small corps of professionals trained in conflict prevention and resolution would provide an immediate conflict avoidance resource.**

In Australia (or indeed the Asia-Pacific region), who might be named in the possible pool of professional mediators and conflict resolution negotiators able to be considered for such a team? Would these professionals necessarily need to be independent of government agencies such as AusAID, DFAT, or the Australian Federal Police Service? What special training or skills could each mediator provide? What considerations for protection and wellbeing these professionals would need to be formally established? What might a roster system for the region look like? In what ways might we approach the federal government to begin a fund for this mediation work?

In the 1980s Dr Stella Cornelius, director of the Conflict Resolution Network, was commissioned by the United Nations to conduct conflict resolution courses and workshops for United Nations personnel in New York. Details about this process (and these programs) could be sought.

Further, there are examples of individuals working as independent mediators and negotiators who are commissioned by the United Nations in specific disputes. One example is international peace scholar Professor Johan Galtung's recent experience working with political leaders in North and South Korea. An investigation into this 'resource' and the ad hoc or otherwise nature of this approach by the UN may be helpful.

**2. Establish a Conflict Prevention Committee in the UN General Assembly. This open-ended committee of General Assembly members would be a less formal, more flexible conflict prevention group than the Security Council. It would not be subject to the veto and would set its own agenda. The job of the Conflict Prevention Panel would be to serve as a rapid action conflict prevention and early warning institution. It would send teams to possible conflict sites and invite witnesses to New York. Its job would be to give the UN, the world public, national governments and legislatures, comprehensive and balanced**

**information on the disputed issues and to propose possible solutions. The General Assembly already has authority to establish such a committee.**

UN Resolution 57/337 on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, adopted by the General Assembly on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2003 'emphasizes that the prevention of armed conflict would be promoted by continued cooperation among Member States, the United Nations system... and regional and sub regional organisations, noting that the private sector and civil society have supporting roles to play'. There is no specific mention in the resolution for the establishment of a Conflict Resolution Committee / Panel within the UN. However, as stated earlier in this report, establishing such a committee has the explicit endorsement of Secretary General Kofi Annan in tabling the proposal for Res 57/337.

Discussion with UN associates within GAPW would illuminate the operational power of this Committee and discern whether all Member states are entitled to representation on that Committee: Who might Australia's representative be?

**3. Establish a standing volunteer police force at the UN, initially consisting of 10,000 men and women. A ready police force can carry out many preconflict and postconflict peacekeeping tasks without raising the same issues of national sovereignty as peacekeeping units from armed forces.**

Australia has recent experience in using military personnel as peacekeeping 'forces' in the region, as in the recent transition to democracy in East Timor. Research into the strengths and weaknesses of this approach would provide a reflective appraisal of the 'issues of national sovereignty for peacekeeping units from the armed forces'. This might then be contrasted to the 2003 regional policing initiative that saw Australian police service personnel monitor tensions in the Solomon Islands. Further, alternative regional initiatives echoing the sentiment of this proposal could be studied. For example, non-violence scholar and practitioner, Professor Chaiwat Satha-Anand is working with the Thailand Government to establish a quick response Humanitarian Force trained in the language, skills and practice of conflict resolution to be available to the State as an alternative to Defence Forces, to be available for both domestic and international application.

A more detailed evaluation about the issues implicit in the notion of a UN rapid response force is discussed by Adam Maine in pages 22-24 of this working paper. One clear concern with the stated priority is the centralised notion of this service as 'a volunteer police force at the UN'. A decentralised notion is to involve Regional Security Organisations lobbying their governments for philosophical and financial support, for the recruiting and training of Humanitarian Forces (possibly a combination of police and military personnel) as an alternative to the deployment of military personnel in pre-conflict and post-conflict peacekeeping missions.

**4. Promote the worldwide ratification of the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, making government officials individually accountable for abusive human rights treatment of their citizens when local courts fail to act. Include in all newly concluded treaties provision for compulsory referral of unresolved disputes to the International Court of Justice.**

Review of Australia's commitment to, and obligations under the ICC is necessary. How is the current federal government responding to the relatively newly established ICC

(operative as of July 2002)? In what ways are Australia's domestic laws supporting the objectives of the ICC?

**5. To finance the above activities, the United States and other dues delinquents must pay their UN dues. It is futile to call for an improved UN while withholding already obligated payments. To avoid this situation in future, individual UN member states could decide to impose a peacekeeping surcharge on air tickets in the country where the flight originates. This procedure would not be based on an international treaty, so it could not be blocked in national legislatures.**

Is Australia keeping up with its UN dues?<sup>9</sup> Given the current climate of concern regarding international travel, is there the possibility of lobbying the Australian government to introduce 'a peacekeeping surcharge' on international flights, much the same as the 'airport tax' on domestic flights - introduced earlier this year in the wake of the corporate collapse of one of Australia's leading domestic carriers? In the absence of a Department of Peace, which government office is appropriate to oversee such revenue-raising options?

**6. To launch the first steps toward worldwide "conventional" disarmament, governments, led by the major powers, should exchange comprehensive data on main components of their armed forces; and they should commit themselves not to increase the overall size of their armed forces, defence budgets, or arms production and to cut arms transfers by 50 percent for a ten-year period while negotiations on reductions take place.**

If the current barrage of (expensive) television advertising involving a campaign for the recruitment for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is any indication, there seems little commitment by the federal government 'not to increase the overall size of their armed forces'. Indeed, the advertisements make special mention of the creation of 'new elite military units' within which personnel will be 'fast tracked' through training. Moreover, the recent Defence White Paper, *Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force* "represents the most comprehensive reappraisal of Australian defence capability for decades" and announces "major increases, over a long time scale in defence spending".<sup>10</sup>

Another disconcerting feature of this report is the introduction of the term 'peace-enforcement' which may or may not run counter to notions of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding. (A more comprehensive analysis of these concepts is undertaken by Bronwyn Armytage in pages 19-21 of this working paper. Notably, the term 'peace-enforcement' has no place in this discussion of approaches to peace with justice.)

To collate independent research data on the ADF including statistics on numbers of personnel, working and projected budgets, armament supplies etc. might be a useful exercise. More research also needs to be undertaken to investigate, in the words of United Nations Australia President Professor Margaret Reynolds, 'the impressive conflict resolution training programs' currently provided to the ADF.

**7. To eliminate surprise attack or accidental use of nuclear weapons and to move decisively toward total nuclear disarmament, de-alert nuclear arsenals and reduce them**

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<sup>9</sup> See Appendix 5 for commentary on the difficulties facing the UN system of dues.

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/>

**to small immobilized stocks of nuclear warheads, separating warheads from delivery systems and storing both under international monitoring. This would be done by all nuclear weapon states -- United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, India, Pakistan and Israel.**

Response to this initiative would start with a review Australia's prior commitment to processes of international disarmament under the leadership of former Prime Minister Paul Keating and his work in establishing the Canberra Commission. (See pages 14 -16 of this working paper for a detailed review of the initiative). In light of a changed Australian political climate, what has happened to the vision and global leadership expressed in the Canberra Commission's mission statement on 'moving decisively toward total [global] nuclear disarmament'? How might we resurrect interest in this important work?

## The Canberra Commission

### *Australia's First Steps Towards Disarmament*

Almost unnoticed outside Australia, an unprecedented and dramatic new initiative followed hard on the heels of the historic proceedings in the World Court seeking an opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons. At those hearings in 1995, Australia went a good deal further than any of the more than 40 nations presenting arguments to the court. Australia's then-Attorney General, Gareth Evans, asserted that the use, threat of use, development, deployment and even possession of nuclear weapons was illegal. He also announced that Australia would set up an international commission in its capital, Canberra, to prepare a report for presentation to the UN and all disarmament agencies on practical steps to rid the world of nuclear weapons. This was the first time a national government had attempted such an immense and comprehensive global undertaking.

"An extraordinary thing happened at the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration of the United Nations in June 1995. Then Prime Minister of Australia, Paul Keating, announced that he would set up the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The head of a State "under the nuclear umbrella", and an ally of the United States was going to explore the elimination of the "deterrence" that had kept the U.S. safe from invasion for 50 years and no one said a word to stop him!" (Alan F Phillips, 1995)<sup>11</sup>

The Canberra Commission, as it has become known, was launched in late January, 1996, when the sixteen members met to set the agenda. Future meetings were planned for New York in April, Europe in June, and a final meeting back in Canberra in August.<sup>12</sup> The commission included, among others, physicist Joseph Rotblat, the Nobel Peace Prize winner; former U.S. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara; Russian nuclear scientist, Roald Sagdeev; General George Butler, former head of the U.S. Strategic Air Command; Swedish diplomat Rolf Ekeus, and Maj Britt Theorin, former Swedish disarmament minister (and the only woman on the panel, a source of some criticism).

While the Canberra Commission took the notion of nuclear abolition into a whole new realm, it was linked to a growing, global "Abolition 2000" movement that was rapidly gaining international momentum. Activists were rallying around two important documents. A Citizen's Pledge to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, initiated by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, that had been signed by 34 Nobel Laureates and more than 300 citizen groups. Many of these individuals and groups, and others, also embrace the Call for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, issued by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. This key document did not call for abolition by the year 2000, but rather that the nations of the world "enter immediately into negotiations to abolish nuclear weapons" - pledging to complete a treaty by the dawn of the next century. The Canberra Commission's mandate was that immediate and determined efforts need to be made to rid the world of nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to it. It observed that nuclear

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<sup>11</sup> "Consensus in Canberra: No Nukes from Now On!", <http://www.peacemagazine.org/archive/phillips.html>

<sup>12</sup> "Canberra Commission off to a good start", [http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/pd/pd\\_april\\_96/pd5.html](http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/pd/pd_april_96/pd5.html)

weapons are held by a handful of States which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable.

Further, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968 with its promise of a world free of these weapons was based on the idea that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the most immediate security challenges facing the international community. Despite the impact of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, the disconcerting reality was that several states had made, and some continue to make, clandestine efforts to develop nuclear arsenals. The possible acquisition by terrorist groups of nuclear weapons or material was seen as a growing threat to the international community.

Concurrent with the central disarmament push, there was a need for activity supported by all States, but particularly the nuclear weapon States, to build an environment conducive to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Commission noted with satisfaction the response of the International Court of Justice made in July 1996 to a request from the General Assembly of the United Nations for an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court's statement that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control is precisely the obligation that the Commission wished to see implemented.<sup>13</sup>

The Commission considered carefully the merits of setting out a precise timeframe for the elimination of nuclear weapons, but elected not to do so. In recognising constraints could be relieved by political decisions and the allocation of resources required to advance disarmament, the timeline was perceived as flexible. In addition, another limiting factor was establishing the necessary confidence in the verification regime which would be required to take the final step to complete elimination. In this context, the Canberra Commission remained convinced of the basic importance of agreed targets and guidelines which would drive the process inexorably toward the ultimate objective of final global elimination of nuclear weapons, at the earliest possible time.

### *Two steps forward one step back*

In the months after its release, the Canberra Commission Report<sup>14</sup> featured prominently in multilateral disarmament discussions in both Geneva and New York. Several other prominent 'middle powers', including Austria, Sweden and Brazil, used the Report's findings to call for greater consideration of nuclear weapons elimination. Moreover, both India and the United States agreed -- referring positively to the Report's program of phased elimination steps in statements made to the UN General Assembly.

"For one brief moment it appeared as though the Canberra Commission Report might heal one of the main divisions between the two sides of the nuclear disarmament debate: namely, the

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<sup>13</sup> "Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons", <http://dfat.gov.au/cc/cchome.html>

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*

difference in opinion over the obligations of the US and other [Nuclear Weapons States] under Article VI of the [Non-Proliferation Treaty]." (Carl J Ungerer, 1998)<sup>15</sup>

However, as Carl Ungerer goes on to point out, the new Australian Government's limited advocacy of the report, and the deteriorating climate for nuclear arms control throughout 1997, served to dampen any residual enthusiasm for the elimination cause. While the report's findings continued to be pressed by some of the individual Commissioners, most notably General Lee Butler,<sup>16</sup> a hardening of attitudes in Russia, the Middle East and South Asia meant that the nuclear disarmament debate had reached a stalemate and that the great advances in global arms control of the previous decade were unlikely to be matched by any new agreements.

The prospects of reconvening the Canberra Commission are not good. The current Liberal/National government in Australia has shown little enthusiasm for independent nuclear disarmament initiatives, particularly ones that would require a degree of argumentation with Washington. While the Canberra Commission Report may be the best placed and most comprehensive program for dealing with the twin goals of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the absence of any sustained political support by the Australian government means that it is unlikely to achieve what Paul Keating, Gareth Evans and others had hoped for it. The main advantage the Canberra Commission's Report had over similar statements and reports was that it was government sponsored and carried with it the imprimatur of a leading Western State on disarmament issues. Unfortunately, it will take either a change of heart or a change of government in Australia before serious consideration is given to reconvening the Canberra Commission.

The challenge for Australian associates of GAPW is to find ways to resurrect elements of this insightful initiative to promote the ideals and aspirations implicit in the essence of the Canberra Commission. We might take the cue from the efforts of regional neighbours such as Japan - recently a leading nation in championing the total elimination of nuclear weapons.<sup>17</sup>

### *Postscript*

#### **Australia at the Conference of Disarmament Geneva, 3<sup>rd</sup> Session July-Sept 2003**

"Ambassador Michael Smith of Australia reiterated Australia's support for a treaty to Ban the Production of Fissile Materials and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices. Australia also supported Japan's suggestion to establish a group of experts on verifying FMCT "in advancement of the commencement of negotiations". Although Smith's wording of "capping fissile material *available* for nuclear weapons use" (emphasis added) left much to be desired, Australia also urged all non-nuclear weapons States Parties to the NPT to sign and ratify the additional Protocol." (MAPW, September 2003)<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> "Following the Leader: The Canberra Commission and the Renewed Case for the Eliminating Nuclear Weapons", <http://www.acronym.org.uk/33canb.html>

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.worldforum.org/initiatives>

<sup>17</sup> See Appendix 6.

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.mapw.org.au/conference-on-disarmament/cd-index.html>

## **The Role of Civil Society in Prevention of Armed Conflict**

### *Distinctions between the roles of military/civil society*

Notwithstanding the vagaries in political climates and government policy persuasions, from the very outset GAPW has acknowledged the crucial role of civil society in the prevention of armed conflict. GAPW invites the continued support of efforts to pursue practices that foster a climate of peace, help to prevent or mitigate crisis situations and contribute to reconciliation.

The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies has suggested a further 'priority' be added to the GAPW program over the next three years.

#### **8. To define the role of civil society or non-governmental organisations in the prevention of armed conflict and mechanisms by which CSOs and NGOs might raise their issues, concerns and activities in this regard.**

There is a need to articulate distinctions between the roles of military and civil society in terms of (i) peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding; and (ii) education and training programs for non-violence. What is the role of civil society in the prevention of armed conflict? How is this role protected and supported by national and international structures?

In Australia, like elsewhere, Civil Society Organisations and conflict prevention groups face the difficulty that their efforts in promoting peace and security remain largely undefined; in their approaches to governments, and in questions pertaining to accountability, legitimacy and transparency.<sup>19</sup> In the 'peace with justice' constituency itself, there can be a perceived lack of coordination leading to duplication and competition. One local example is the recent schism that resulted from a divided approach in the efforts of the NSW Walk Against War Coalition.<sup>20</sup> An inability of disparate groups within the coalition to agree upon strategies and (in particular) public claims to counter Australia's collusion with the 'coalition of the willing', led to divided loyalties and a splintering of programmed activities. Improved networking and organisation is seen as a partial solution, but the need for greater cohesion cannot be ignored.

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<sup>19</sup> "Australia scrutinizes influence of nongovernmental groups", Janaki Kremmer, September 5, 2003. (See Appendix 7). Interestingly, an internet search on "Civil Society Organisations, Australia" brings up mostly government affiliations.

<sup>20</sup> "Divisions in the Sydney peace movement", *The Guardian*, No. 1148, July 30, 2003.

*Mapping of Australian civil society organisations advocating conflict prevention*

Amnesty International Australia	<a href="http://www.amnesty.org.au">www.amnesty.org.au</a>
The Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia	<a href="http://www.anawa.org.au">www.anawa.org.au</a>
Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition, NSW	<a href="http://www.anti-bases.org">www.anti-bases.org</a>
Australian Catholic Social Justice Council	<a href="http://www.socialjustice.catholic.org.au">www.socialjustice.catholic.org.au</a>
Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Qld	<a href="http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/acpacs">www.polsis.uq.edu.au/acpacs</a>
Australian Human Rights Centre	<a href="http://www.ahrcentre.org">www.ahrcentre.org</a>
Australian Lawyers for Human Rights	<a href="http://www.alhr.asn.au">www.alhr.asn.au</a>
Australian Peace Committee, SA	<a href="http://www3.unesco.org">www3.unesco.org</a>
Bar Ilan Conflict Resolution Centre, WA	<a href="http://www.faculty.biu.ac">www.faculty.biu.ac</a>
Big Volcano EcoTourism Resource Centre	<a href="http://www.bigvolcano.com.au">www.bigvolcano.com.au</a>
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, NSW	<a href="http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/cpacs">www.arts.usyd.edu.au/cpacs</a>
Centre for Peace Studies, NSW	<a href="http://fehps.une.edu.au/PdaL/Courses/ProfessionalStudies/peace/">http://fehps.une.edu.au/PdaL/Courses/ProfessionalStudies/peace/</a>
Centre for Human Rights Education, WA	<a href="http://www.ajustaustralia.com">www.ajustaustralia.com</a>
Conflict Resolution Network, NSW	<a href="http://www.crnhq.org">www.crnhq.org</a>
Diplomacy Training Programme, NSW	<a href="http://www.law.unsw.edu.au">www.law.unsw.edu.au</a>
Foundation for Development Cooperation	<a href="http://www.fdc.org.au">www.fdc.org.au</a>
Greenpeace Australia	<a href="http://www.greenpeace.org.au">www.greenpeace.org.au</a>
Griffith University Multi-Faith Centre, Qld	<a href="http://www.gu.edu.au">www.gu.edu.au</a>
Gun Control - Australia	<a href="http://www.guncontrol.org.au">www.guncontrol.org.au</a>
International Commission of Jurists, Australian Section	<a href="http://www.icj-aust.org.au">www.icj-aust.org.au</a>
International Conflict Resolution Centre, VIC	<a href="http://www.psych.unimelb.edu.au/icrc/">www.psych.unimelb.edu.au/icrc/</a>
International Peace Bureau	<a href="http://www.ipb.org">www.ipb.org</a>
Launceston Peace Action Network, TAS	<a href="http://www.tas.gov.au">www.tas.gov.au</a>
Medical Association for the Prevention of War, Australia	<a href="http://www.mapw.org.au">www.mapw.org.au</a>
NSW Human Rights Education Committee	<a href="http://www.nswhrec.freesevers.com">www.nswhrec.freesevers.com</a>
NSW Walk Against the War Coalition	<a href="http://www.greenleft.org.au">www.greenleft.org.au</a>
One Voice for Peace	<a href="http://www.onevoiceforpeace.org">www.onevoiceforpeace.org</a>
Palm Sunday Committee	<a href="http://palmsunday.socialchange.net.au">palmsunday.socialchange.net.au</a>
Pax Christi Australia	<a href="http://www.paxchristi.org.au">www.paxchristi.org.au</a>
Peace Brigades International Australia	<a href="http://www.peacebrigades.org">www.peacebrigades.org</a>
Peace Tasmania	<a href="http://www.tased.edu.au">www.tased.edu.au</a>
Peacemakers Trust, NSW	<a href="http://www.peacemakers.ca">www.peacemakers.ca</a>
Peace Movement Aotearoa, NZ	<a href="http://ww.converge.org.nz">ww.converge.org.nz</a>
Queensland Peace Network	<a href="http://ww.qldpeace.org">ww.qldpeace.org</a>
Riverina Community for Nuclear Disarmament	<a href="http://www.csu.edu.au/">www.csu.edu.au/</a>
Soka Gakkai International Australia	<a href="http://www.sgiaust.org.au">www.sgiaust.org.au</a>
Stop the War Coalition, NSW	<a href="http://www.sydney.active.org.au">www.sydney.active.org.au</a>
Sydney Peace and Justice Coalition, NSW	<a href="http://www.nswpeace.org">www.nswpeace.org</a>
Sydney Peace Foundation	<a href="http://www.spf.arts.usyd.edu.au">www.spf.arts.usyd.edu.au</a>
TEAR Australia	<a href="http://www.tear.org.au">www.tear.org.au</a>
UNIFEM, Australia	<a href="http://www.unifem.org.au">www.unifem.org.au</a>
United Nations Association Australia	<a href="http://www.unaa.org.au">www.unaa.org.au</a>
United Nations Information Centre	<a href="http://www.unic.org.au">www.unic.org.au</a>
United Nations Association NSW	<a href="http://www.unaansw.org.au">www.unaansw.org.au</a>
United Nations Youth Association, Australia	<a href="http://www.unya.asn.au">www.unya.asn.au</a>
Victoria Peace Network, VIC	<a href="http://www.vicpeace.org">www.vicpeace.org</a>
West Australian No War Alliance, WA	<a href="http://www.nwawa.org">www.nwawa.org</a>
Women in Black Australia, SA	<a href="http://www.womeninblackoz.com">www.womeninblackoz.com</a>
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Australia	<a href="http://www.peacewomen.org">www.peacewomen.org</a>
World Vision Australia	<a href="http://www.worldvision.org">www.worldvision.org</a>
Women Against Armed Conflict	<a href="http://www.osw.dpmc.gov.au">www.osw.dpmc.gov.au</a>
WYSE Australia	<a href="http://www.wyse-ngo.org">www.wyse-ngo.org</a>

## **Defining the Peace Process: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding**

*Commentary by Bronwyn Armytage*

Defining the peace process involves outlining three transitional phases or strategies of conflict prevention, from the initial decision to intervene in a dispute, to the sustainable management of promoting and maintaining a culture of peace. Defining these steps helps when analysing processes of intervention and in constructing successful strategies for sustainable peace.

An increase in the occurrence of intra-state conflict has resulted in a more complex form of violence and conflict. This shift away from more traditional inter-state conflict has created the need to redefine measures associated with peace processes. The UN plays a pivotal role in the development of strategies for peace with justice. The former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has formally identified peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding as three of five interconnected roles for which the UN is responsible.<sup>21</sup>

### *Peacemaking*

The first stage in the peace process is peacemaking. The UN refers to peacemaking as “the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in a conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute.”<sup>22</sup>

Once the peacemaking step has been achieved, the process of rebuilding a region of conflict into a peaceful environment can begin. Peace negotiators are aware of the importance of all related parties being willing to pursue the objective of peace.

### *Peacekeeping*

The second phase of the peace process is peacekeeping. The practice of peacekeeping was derived from the need for an international actor to halt the unjustified use of armed conflict or violence. The UN defines peacekeeping as “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.”<sup>23</sup>

The role of peacekeepers is becoming increasingly important in international relations and is constantly evolving to adapt to specific cases of intervention. The increase in intra-state conflict has also affected the demand for peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping is primarily a military function controlled by the UN, with the local community playing a secondary role.

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<sup>21</sup>Ed. Crocker, Hampson & Aall., *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, in ‘War Making, Peace Making, and the UN Post-Cold War Record’, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, USA., 1996.

<sup>22</sup> [www.una-uk.org/UN&C/Peacemaking.html](http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/Peacemaking.html)

<sup>23</sup> [www.una-uk.org/UN&C/Peacekeeping.html](http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/Peacekeeping.html)

There has been great debate over the conduct of peacekeepers and how necessary the military is for peacekeeping operations. The main argument against military peacekeeping is the use of armed force to create peace. The global community, and in particular civil society, has raised relevant questions as to how and when the use of force is justified.

Peacekeeping is an area of the peace process traditionally controlled by the UN. The UN's role in peacekeeping assumes military force will be stronger than political intervention. The traditional nature of peacekeeping is beginning to evolve as international norms and principles are shifting away from the use of the military to create peace, as in the objectives of the *Global Action to Prevent War* program. The increase in global awareness and accountability for action in international relations may ultimately induce a change in the way the UN conducts its peacekeeping operations. Existing rules regarding the use of force for peacekeeping are creating antagonisms as the global society plays a more participatory role in the global effort to provide peace.

Contrasting the view of political intervention, is the argument based on global assumptions about the power of the UN military force. There is an unspoken assumption that the UN is capable of using military force, which acts as a deterrent for any party to resume armed conflict. Paradoxically, it is this assumption that reduces the need for the UN to use force in its peacekeeping operations.

### *Peacebuilding*

The third and most critical stage of the peace process is peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is only introduced once all parties have chosen to pursue peace. This process involves participation from both external actors and intra-state actors.

The UN defines peacebuilding as the action and identification of a support structure designed to “strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict – rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife (and tackling the) deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.”

Peacebuilding seeks to re-establish peace in an area of conflict and requires a very structured framework to reach its goal. Peacebuilding aims to provide a basic foundation on which to build peace, including the provision of suitable tools for the local network to continue the idea of building peace. Most efforts at peacebuilding also seek to develop a stable government, which can then monitor and maintain a peaceful environment.

Sustainable peacebuilding requires participation from both international and local networks. The former minister for foreign affairs, Gareth Evans, reinforces this assumption by emphasising the need for ‘in-country’ peacebuilding in the search for long term peace.<sup>24</sup> This idea is more easily adopted in theory than in practice, especially with the shift away from more traditional cases of conflict between states, toward intra-state conflict.

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<sup>24</sup> Evans, G., *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*, Allen and Unwin, NSW, 1993.

The number of participants in the peacebuilding process has posed problems due to a lack of coordination and communication between the individual networks. External actors proceeding as separate entities have caused confusion within the local community they

seek to help. Diverse NGOs contribute different benefits for regions of conflict, thus a greater emphasis on these grassroots networks cooperating and coordinating their resources and activities, as in the work of the ECCP, would result in a clearer peacebuilding framework and a more likely probability of sustainable peacebuilding.

An increase in peacebuilding at the grassroots level does not detract from the need to improve global governance and the influence of the UN to monitor international conflict. Studies of past cases of intervention would suggest the lack of cooperation between multiple grassroots networks. This increase in participation by NGOs is welcomed, yet requires assessment to provide stronger links of communication to maximise the benefits in working toward peace.

The peace process requires a long-term strategy, with a strong focus on the related parties learning how to begin rebuilding peace and maintaining it in the long term. The positive and rapid response by NGOs to conflict must be complemented with an adequate structure for sustainable management. Past attempts to create peace have suggested a lack of planning for long-term peacebuilding, for a number of reasons.

The implementation of sustainable peacebuilding is more complex than a simple agreement to the pursuit of peace. For example, there is a need to provide more regular assessment of the peacebuilding process after its initiation. A more collective response to peacebuilding would increase the already significant role grassroots operations and NGOs play in building peace. These networks play a vital role in encouraging the negotiation between conflicting parties however despite this important contribution of NGOs, there needs to be stronger communication between the various actors to coordinate and maximise implementation processes.

All these actors are primarily interested in the same objective – the pursuit of peace. It is therefore necessary to provide a collective response to conflict and integrate the resources of all participants to maximise the benefits in the long term. Greater communication would abate the problem of individual actors each pursuing their own peace strategy, causing confusion for the local community it is trying to assist. The strategy for peace must be flexible and reflexive.

Reaffirming definitions of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding provides a more structural approach to the objectives of creating a culture of peace evident in the *Global Action to Prevent War* program.

## **Regional Security Organisations and Quick Response Units**

*Commentary by Adam Maine*

The *Global Action to Prevent War* program identifies several objectives that are attainable within the coming five years. By addressing these objectives it would serve to ameliorate the frequency, intensity and scale of war. A new conflict prevention infrastructure would result and allow further initiatives to be pursued. By focusing our efforts on the more local and regionally specific goals of GAPW we will be setting the foundation on which future projects can be built. It is of great importance, therefore, that these foundations are sturdy and lasting. The idealism of GAPW needs to be grounded in tangible changes to the existing methods of conflict prevention, in a way that can be added to and complemented by further, more global approaches.

One of the first necessities of the GAPW project is to “develop a program to strengthen the mediation and peacekeeping capabilities of existing universal-membership regional security organisations”<sup>25</sup> such as ASEAN, African Union and the OSCE, while also establishing such organisations in regions not currently member to one. Regional Security Organisations (RSO) must be centralised under the auspices of the United Nations in accordance with the Article VIII of the UN Charter, which encourages “the development of pacific settlement of local disputes...by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council”<sup>26</sup>.

These organisations become the foundation and framework within which future GAPW objectives can be pursued. RSOs allow for each region to structure itself according to its own individual experiences and historical realities becoming more responsible for situations in its immediate vicinity. The objectives and methods of each RSO, however, must observe parity with one another in order to achieve consistency between each organisation. The role of the RSO is to provide regional mediation and peacekeeping capabilities to member states and house a regional Centre for Conflict Prevention. It is envisioned that these Centres will consist of approximately fifty professional mediation specialists from the region’s religions, academic institutions, business and professional communities and NGOs. The regional centres will liaise with and work in collaboration with the Conflict Prevention Committee in the UN. As well as monitoring regional hot spots and identifying potentially dangerous areas, members of each Centre will be part of special mediation and observation ground units sent to ameliorate tensions and negotiate a just peace between conflicting parties. The remainder of the unit will consist of humanitarian workers and possibly a small peacekeeping unit (See Figure 1.)

While the concept of a regional quick response unit has considerable merit, it poses certain questions of character, training, funding and implementation that need to be addressed before any serious attempt to establish such a unit can be made. Firstly, who would make up the unit? How many people would there be? What training would be needed as a prerequisite for joining the unit? Furthermore, as the GAPW project advocates a move away from the military approach, the peacekeeping unit would require a balanced composition of military training as well as an understanding of human rights,


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<sup>25</sup> *Global Action to Prevent War*, Program Statement, 2003

<sup>26</sup> *United Nations Charter*, VIII; 52; 3

conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance. It must be stressed that the quick response unit will not be a fighting force, but rather will act as a ground unit to work amongst the people to dismantle the pervading climate of conflict.

It is envisioned that peacekeeping units would be divorced from the military of their nation of origin and trained in non-aggressive, non-confrontational methods of conflict prevention. Each RSO would form its own regional quick response unit consisting of several hundred men and women that could be dispatched at short notice to emerging disputes or conflicts in their region. Due to their regionally-based nature the units will be able to be dispatched more quickly and with less bureaucratic red-tape. Regionally constituted, quick response units would ensure familiarity with the political and geographical climate and be trained in the sensitivities of different cultural and religious elements in the region. The emphasis of the unit is to move away from the military orientated intervention forces currently being used in peacekeeping missions that can institutionalise a culture of militarism in an area where peace is the objective. Furthermore, by establishing a lightly armed, non-aligned unit there would be less chance of a local misperception that the unit was an occupying force. This situation is currently being witnessed in Iraq, where even those that supported the deposing of Saddam Hussein are now beginning to grow tired of the US military presence in their country. The experiences of East Timor and now the Solomon Islands intervention force, provide a limited example of the employment of a multi-national force to allay the perception of occupation.



**Figure 1. The hierarchical structure of international conflict prevention**

Amongst others, the *Global Action to Prevent War* project sets out these initiatives in its *2003 Program Statement*. While they offer a broad insight into the desired outcomes of the program they fail to identify specific ways in which these may be achieved. Generally, the program suggests a top-down approach whereby implementation of the various components will take place within the structures of the UN and, in particular, the

Security Council. As GAPW operates independently of the UN and through a network of academics and NGO's, its objectives may better be served through a narrower dimension for reform and advancement. By pursuing a bottom-up approach while also lobbying for change in the UN, the foundations of inter-state conflict prevention can be laid at a regional level. This presents an opportunity for the global GAPW network to focus on incremental progress through national governments and regional networks, setting precedents and experiences for other regional groups to draw from. The efforts of Professor Chaiwat Satha-Anand to establish a training program for a quick response humanitarian force in Thailand is the first practical application of this component in public policy. Professor Satha-Anand has been lobbying the Thailand government to attain state-sponsored support for a similar humanitarian quick response unit with considerable success. The interest of the Thailand government gives impetus for GAPW advocates in other countries to lobby their own government towards the creation of such a regional security organisation.

Whilst in-depth discussion and prophetic posturing contributes to the vision and broader objectives of GAPW, practical developments in national and regional arenas is fundamental for the advancement of the program. Dialogue must first take place between GAPW representatives around Australia to agree on the priorities and agenda for advancement. This should be followed up by engagement with the federal government, lobbying them to engage in regional discussions on the establishment of the various components outlined in the GAPW project. To this end it is recommended that a meeting of Australian GAPW representatives take place at least once a year, including similar organisations and NGO's such as the Medical Association to Prevent War (MAPW), to align objectives and set a national agenda. In a regional context, as is being seen now in the current APEC meeting, regional forums should be used to facilitate discussion on the implementation of some of the initiatives outlined above.

### III. Liaison with national associates

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The University of Sydney



**Centre for Peace  
and Conflict Studies**

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ABN 15211513464

Mackie Building K01  
University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 Australia  
<http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/cpac>

Telephone +61 2 9351 7686  
Facsimile +61 2 9660 0862  
cpacs@social.usyd.edu.au

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#### **Proposed Working Group -- GAPW (Australia) Project:**

##### **Convenors:**

**Professor Joseph Camilleri**, Centre for International Relations, LaTrobe University (Vic)  
**Professor Stuart Rees**, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney (NSW)

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**Ms Joan Anderson**, Public Information Officer, Soka Gakkai International (Japan)  
**Ms Bronwyn Armytage**, Intern, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (NSW)  
**Ms Lynda-ann Blanchard**, Chair NSW Human Rights Education Committee (NSW)  
**Mr Juan Carlos Brandt**, Director, United Nation Information Centre (Asia-Pacific Region)  
**Rev Elenie Poulos**, National Director, Uniting Social Justice Australia (NSW)  
**Dr Stella Cornelius**, Director Conflict Resolution Network (NSW)  
**Dr Gillian Deakin**, Vice-President, Medical Association for the Prevention of War (NSW)  
**Ms Giji Gya**, Executive Officer, Medical Association for the Prevention of War (Vic)  
**A/Professor Chris Hamer**, Australian Registrar for the World Citizens Registry (NSW)  
**Professor Jim Iff**, Director, Centre for Human Rights Education, (WA)  
**Ms Samantha Lee**, Chair of the National Coalition for Gun Control (NSW)  
**Dr Ken Macnab**, President, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (NSW)  
**Mr Adam Maine**, Intern, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (NSW)  
**Dr Tim Marchant**, Conflict Resolution Desk, CPACS (NSW)  
**Father Claude Mostowik**, Pax Christi; Sydney Peace and Justice Coalition; Walk Against War Coalition  
**Professor Mary O'Kane**, Director, Colombo Plan (NSW)  
**Ms Annie Pettitt**, Policy Officer, Public Interest Advocacy Centre (NSW)  
**Professor Margaret Reynolds**, President, United Nations Association Australia (Tas)  
**Ms Janelle Saffin**, International Commission of Jurists (ACT)  
**Joanna Santa Barbara**, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (Canada)  
**Jack Santa Barbara**, Associate, Centre for Peace Studies, McMaster University (Canada)  
**Mr Bret Solomon**, Amnesty International (Australia)  
**Ms Chaikhin Soon**, Soka Gakkai International Australia (NSW)  
**Ms Rosalind Strong**, Vice-President UNIFEM Australia (NSW)  
**Dr Sue Wareham**, President, Medical Association for the Prevention of War (ACT)  
**Mr Roger Wescombe**, Legal Officer, NSW Attorney Generals Department (NSW)  
**Ms Iris Wielders**, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney (NSW)  
**Mr Hans van der Bent**, Director, Soka Gakkai Australia (NSW)

#### **Proposed CPACS Working Group**

Dr Wendy Lambourne  
Ms Christina Batchen  
Mr Andrew Grieg  
Ms Bernadette Connole  
Mr Dennis Christley  
Mr Abe Quadan

## IV. Inaugural Australian Working Group meeting - December 2003

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The University of Sydney



**Centre for Peace  
and Conflict Studies**

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ABN 15211513464

Mackie Building K01  
University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 Australia

Telephone +61 2 9351 7686  
Facsimile +61 2 9660 0862  
cpacs@social.usyd.edu.au

**November 13<sup>th</sup> 2003**

<http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/cpacs>

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Dear Colleagues,

[re: Global Action to Prevent War (GAPW) Project]

This invitation is an opportunity to join a small working group of interested people to represent Australia's response to this significant project. The proposed half day dialogue will take place on: *Thursday December 4<sup>th</sup> 2003 from 2pm - 5.30pm at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney.*

The Global Action project is a coalition-building platform for individuals, civil society groups, and governments everywhere. Some components of the program, such as cuts in conventional and nuclear arms or multilateral action against aggression and genocide, concern mainly governments and civil society working in combination. Other components, such as those dealing with non-violent conflict resolution and peace / human rights education, can be implemented separately by individuals and state and local communities through education and advocacy.

Academics, lawyers, civil society groups and government representatives around the world have put together a very thoughtful program and detailed set of proposals for the prevention of war. The proposed half day workshop will initiate the brainstorming of ideas for an Australian response, particularly pertaining to areas of (i) education and (ii) advocacy. A working paper will also be prepared for this session.

As colleagues may be travelling from interstate for this inaugural Australian GAP workshop, we'd be grateful if you could email respond with your expression of interest and confirmation of availability at your earliest convenience.

We are hopeful of your positive response to this initiative and will telephone you within the next week to discuss your important contribution to this significant project.

Yours sincerely,  
Joe Camilleri  
and  
Stuart Rees  
(GAPW, Australia)

## V. GAPW References

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*The Prospects for Abolishing War: A Proposal for the Twenty-First Century* (pdf format) by Saul Mendlovitz, Rutgers Law Review Vol. 52:621, Winter 2000

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## APPENDIX 1: Minutes of the inaugural meeting of GAPW - Australia

Date:

Thursday 4 December 2003

Present:

Joe Camilleri (CIR, GAPW Australia Convener), Stuart Rees (CPACS, GAPW Australia Convener, chair), Joan Anderson (SGI Japan), Bronwyn Armytage (CPACS intern), Lynda-ann Blanchard (CPACS, notes), Elenie Poulos (UJA), Stella Cornelius (CRN), Gillian Deakin (MAPW), Giji Gya (MAPW), Chris Hamer (ARWCR), Samantha Lee (NCGC), Ken Macnab (CPACS), Adam Maine (CPACS intern), Claude Mostowik (PJC), Janelle Saffin (ICJ), Joanna Santa Barbara (IPPNW, Canada), Jack Santa Barbara (CPS, Canada), Bret Solomon (AI), Chaikin Soon (SGI Australia), Sue Wareham (MAPW), Iris Wielders (CPACS, notes), Hans van der Bent (SGI Australia)

Apologies:

Juan Carlos Brandt (UNIC), Jim Ife (CHRE), Tim Marchant (CPACS), Mary O’Kane (CP), Annie Petitt (PIAC), Margaret Reynolds (UNAA), Rosalind Strong (UNIFEM), Roger Wescombe (NSW AGD)

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### 2.30 – 3.30 pm Session One

Professor Joe Camilleri introduced the GAPW project to the workshop participants. (For more information see the GAPW working paper) Each of the participants was then asked to briefly introduce him/herself and their organisation. In addition, each of the participants mentioned an issue that they thought might be suitable to be taken up by the GAPW Australia group.

Professor Stuart Rees then summed up some of the themes that were mentioned during these introductions:

- Arms control – small arms as well as nuclear arms
- The role and reform of the United Nations system
- War as a health issue
- Focus on grass roots initiatives, skills and education

### 4 – 5.30 pm Session Two

Participants brainstormed on priorities and strategies for the Australian GAPW project. Some of the issues discussed were:

- Difficulties in getting the media to pick up the messages that we are trying to convey. Possible strategies to remedy this:
  - Strengthening alternative media
  - Set up a dialogue with friends within the media: finding journalists and editors that are sympathetic to our messages
  - Becoming more media aware: learning how to deal with the media
  - Media Peace Awards, such as the ones that are awarded by the United National Association of Australia every year
- How to translate the GAPW vision into an Australian view, placing GAPW into an Australian context:
  - Advocacy for schools/education in general
  - Working on PR – how to package the ‘product of non-violence’
  - Stressing the notion of ‘international’ citizenship
  - The importance of voicing alternative stories – to counter the profound insecurity that people have in this time of a ‘war on terrorism’
  - Contrast Australia’s foreign policy in the region with the actions of other Australian actors such as NGOs – e.g. the ‘The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Prevention’ project
  - Contrast the ‘normal’ package on security issues that is being put out by the Australian government with alternatives, such as a focus on non-violence and regional organisations, and challenge the government with regard to the UN – perhaps contact Gareth Evans about this?

## APPENDIX 2: GAPW – Priorities for Australia

by Professor Joe Camilleri

### BACKGROUND

**Global Action to Prevent War (GAPW)** is a comprehensive programme for moving to a world in which deadly conflict is rare, brief, and small in scale — in other words, a programme for working towards the abolition of war.

**GAPW** is a thoughtfully integrated programme aimed at the phased introduction of key components of the effort. It comprises three main strands of activity:

- A comprehensive programme of measures (mainly non-military) for the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, that includes systematic development of the conflict reduction capabilities of multilateral organizations. This strand aims to reduce internal conflict of all kinds;
- A phased program of global disarmament, conventional and nuclear, accompanied by deliberate augmentation of the peacekeeping capabilities of international organizations. The objectives here are to reduce the possibility of interstate war and genocide and gradually to shift the responsibility for international security to multilateral peacekeeping and legal institutions;
- Continuing growth of the culture of peace.

It is envisaged that such a programme would be implemented over the next three to four decades, with the disarmament process divided into four phases of five to ten years each.

The concept has been developed over the last six years through extensive consultation and redrafting, involving a large number of advocates and experts. Key figures in the development of project in the United States have been:

- Former Ambassador Jonathan Dean, now with the Union of Concerned Scientists
- Dr. Randall C. Forsberg, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies
- Dr. Saul Mendlovitz, Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of International law, Rutgers Law School, & Co-Director, World Order Models Project
- Dr. John Burroughs, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy.

**GAPW** has established a broadly based international Steering Committee and a US National Committee, and is in the process of developing several other national chapters. Details of the programme may be found on its website: <http://www.globalactionpw.org/>.

### GAPW IN AUSTRALIA

GAPW offers a large number of individuals and organisations in Australia with a strong interest in issues of demilitarization, disarmament, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping:

- an opportunity to link their activities to a programme for the global elimination of large-scale organised violence
- a greater capacity to network within Australia and internationally
- an intellectually credible platform from which to advocate far-reaching changes in Australian government policy and practice

*What might be key priorities in getting GAPW off the ground in Australia?*

In the light of Australia's current situation, a strong case can be made for GAPW initiatives in the areas of disarmament, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, crisis prevention and peacekeeping. Equally, initiatives are needed to strengthen the international rule of law, democratic governance (nationally and internationally), and multilateral institutions, all of which can help to settle disputes peacefully and eliminate the causes of armed conflict.

More specifically, GAPW in Australia should address the following issues:

- developing a coherent Australian programme aimed at the long-term elimination of weapons of mass destruction – it would have three prongs:
  - a) unilateral initiatives (terminating all security links with the United States which directly and indirectly support its nuclear weapons arsenal)
  - b) advocacy in bilateral relations and in major international forums, in collaboration with like-minded countries, for the phased reductions of all WMD capabilities
  - c) joint initiatives with Asian and Pacific neighbours
- strengthening the UN's security role (including reform of UN Security Council, more effective peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis prevention arrangements, and a sounder financial base for the world body and its various agencies) and devising appropriate forms of Australian support and involvement (including the development of appropriate skills in the armed services, the police force, the civilian bureaucracy, and relevant professions and NGOs)
- Enhancing Australia's support for stronger global and regional mechanisms for the enactment and maintenance of international law by the international community, leading towards an eventual system of democratic world governance
- ensuring strong diplomatic, financial and organizational support by Australia for the International Criminal Court (and lobbying for greater support by Asian governments, including signing and ratification of Rome Treaty)

- Detailed scrutiny of Australia's defence policies, capabilities and planned purchases to see how they could be brought into line with the main benchmarks of the GAPW programme (perhaps some modelling indicating the economic and social costs of war, and of Australia's military expenditure)
- Support for an enhanced regional (Southeast Asian and Pacific) capability for peacekeeping, crisis prevention and post-conflict reconstruction that is tailored to the needs, aspirations, and cultural sensitivities of these societies, and is in accordance with UN norms and authority
- Research and education highlighting the 'civilianization' of war.

What might be GAPW's contribution to this rather large agenda:

- Public advocacy (including representations/submissions to political parties, more effective interventions in media, circulation of GAPW Charter inviting the endorsement of political [MPs], religious and other community leaders)
- Research (adapting GAPW proposals to Australia's specific circumstances)
- Education (injecting the GAPW agenda into schools and other educational institutions)
- Networking (establishing more effective liaison nationally and internationally)

## APPENDIX 3: Human Rights and Nuclear Weapons

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*This article was published in the Australian Human Rights Centre's journal 'The Human Rights Defender' in October 2003*

by Dr Sue Wareham  
President, Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)

July 2003

Australia has taken part in a war allegedly fought because of the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction.

Certainly the given reasons for the war against Iraq shifted over time, and included also the need to eliminate terrorism and its leaders - despite the overwhelming futility of war in achieving this goal in Afghanistan - and the need to oust one of the world's most tyrannical rulers. It was indeed interesting to observe the new-found concern among the "coalition of the willing" for the welfare of the Iraqi people, whose economic rights had been devastated by over a decade of the most harsh economic sanctions in recent history. The sanctions were fully supported by the Australian Government despite evidence of their appalling effects on the health and education of Iraqi children.

Nevertheless it was the assessments of Iraq's weapons capacity which was held out by the US President as necessitating war, and the leaders of the UK and Australia fell into line behind him. With staggering hypocrisy, the nation which regularly threatens to use the most destructive weapons ever created declared that such weapons are not to be tolerated. Or at least those held by "rogue states".

While it might appear self-evident, it is useful to put nuclear weapons firmly in the context of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948, is universally recognised as setting out those rights and freedoms to which all humans aspire and to which all are entitled. They include political, legal, social, cultural and economic rights. Included (article 28) is the right to "a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized".

It is in the nature of nuclear weapons that they destroy civilised society as we know it and on which the realization of our human potential, our rights as humans, depends. The International Court of Justice in its historic 1996 ruling on the legal status of nuclear weapons, stated "The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilisation and the entire ecosystem of the planet."

In making its decision, the Court confirmed that nuclear weapons must fulfill the principles of international law applicable to armed conflict. That is, they must discriminate between military and civilian personnel. They must not cause harm disproportionate to the preceding provocation and/or objective. They must not cause unnecessary or superfluous suffering, or widespread, long-lasting and severe damage to the environment. Nuclear weapons fulfill none of these criteria.

The unanimous ruling of the Court was that there is an "obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

It might be argued that nuclear weapons are not unique in this respect, for most modern warfare destroys civilised society to a greater or lesser extent. While this argument overlooks the unique destructive capacity and radioactive legacy of nuclear weapons, in addition it does not diminish the case against nuclear weapons. It simply augments the case against many modern acts of warfare.

It might also be argued that newer nuclear weapons, such as "mini-nuke" bunker-busters currently being developed by the US, have less destructive capacity than those of even 10 years ago. However, it should be remembered that there is nothing "mini" about the destruction wrought by, say, a bunker-buster nuke dropped on Baghdad or Pyongyang, except that it is likely to kill tens of thousands of people rather than hundreds of thousands or millions.

It should be noted also that the Court treated the use of nuclear weapons, and the threat to use nuclear weapons as a single indivisible concept, and drew no legal distinction between the two.

Nuclear weapons are often regarded as being in the same category as chemical and biological weapons. That is, all are weapons of mass destruction and of similar destructive capacity. However while all three types of weapons are inhumane, neither chemical nor biological weapons can physically destroy a whole city and hundreds of thousands of people in an instant and leave a radioactive wasteland. And while there are specific treaties banning chemical and biological weapons, there is as yet no treaty banning nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are possessed by eight nations - the US, Russia, China, France, the UK, Israel, India and Pakistan, and between them they have approximately 30,000 weapons. 95 % belong to the US and Russia. (The status of North Korea is not known with certainty, but it may have one or two nuclear weapons.) Of these eight nations, one has been extremely vocal in highlighting the dangers of nuclear weapons spreading to "rogue states", while proclaiming repeatedly that nuclear weapons are indispensable to its own security and that it reserves the right to use them. It is the only nation which has in fact ever used nuclear weapons. The problem with the US position is that one cannot have it both ways. Either nuclear weapons aid security, in which case everyone should have some, or they are a violation of international law and threaten the most basic of human rights, in which case they must be abolished.

In March 2002 the US Nuclear Posture Review was leaked to the press. The review stated that the US would be prepared to use nuclear weapons against seven states which it named, including Iraq and North Korea. This threat of illegal and inhumane action was repeated by President Bush on December 10 in his "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction". Part of his strategy for combatting weapons of mass destruction is to use them. On each occasion, as our ally announced its willingness to commit the most grievous crime imaginable, the Australian Government was silent.

Of particular concern in the US nuclear weapons plans is the development of a missile shield. The overwhelming danger with missile defence is that it is offence masquerading as defence. It marks the death-knell of any hope that the US will give up its own nuclear weapons. Who needs a shield if the world is heading to zero nuclear weapons? And if the US does not give up its weapons, we can forget about persuading “rogue” states to do so.

And when it comes to missile defence, Australia is an important player. Pine Gap near Alice Springs is one of the key ground stations needed to receive and relay signals relating to missile launches and tracking. As in the Cold War, it will be a nuclear target.

The existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a profound violation of human rights. The political will to achieve their global elimination exists in a number of countries, but not in Australia. With increasing pressure on North Korea to renounce any aspirations to nuclear weapons status, now is the time to ensure that our allies also are held accountable to their legal, moral and human rights obligations to eliminate these weapons.

## APPENDIX 4: Summary of Global Action to Prevent War Program

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### **I. To Prevent Internal War, Genocide and Terrorism, We Must Strengthen Multilateral Means of Resolving disputes, Protecting Human Rights, and Preventing Armed Conflict.**

#### **Strengthen Ways to Monitor Potential Conflicts, Warn of Escalation, Prevent Outbreaks of Armed Violence, and Foster Conflict Resolution.**

1. Create Universal-Membership Regional Security Organizations (RSOs) in All Regions.
2. Give the RSOs Means of Preventing and Ending Armed Conflict Like Those of the UN.
3. Adopt a Pro-Active Approach to Conflict Prevention in the Security Council.
4. Create Permanent Centers for Non-Violent Conflict Resolution at the UN and in RSOs.
5. Employ Narrowly Targeted Economic Sanctions and Incentives to Help Prevent and End Armed Conflict and Human Rights Abuses.
6. Create a Conflict Prevention Committee in the UN General Assembly.
7. Create a UN Civilian Humanitarian Aid Corps.
8. Pay UN Dues at the Start of the Fiscal Year to Ensure Full Functioning of the UN system.
9. Implement Security Council Resolution 1325 on the Role of Women in Conflict.

#### **Strengthen Support for Human Rights and the Global Rule of Law.**

10. Give Automatic Access to Human Right Monitors.
11. Support the International Criminal Court to Make Individual Leaders Responsible for Major Abuses of Human Rights. (See also item 5 on Sanctions, item 18 on Criteria for Intervention, and item 20 on a Standing UN Police Force.)
12. Create a Convention on Minority Rights.
13. Publicize Failures to Comply with Human Rights Treaties.
14. Deal More Effectively with Terrorism.
15. Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation.
16. Increase Use of the International Court of Justice.
17. Include in New Treaties a Provision for Referring Disputes to the International Court.

#### **Strengthen Multilateral Peacekeeping Capability.**

18. Build International Consensus on Criteria for International Intervention within Countries to Prevent Armed Conflict and Domestic Terrorism or to Protect Human Rights.
19. Make Short-Term Improvements in UN Peacekeeping Capabilities.
20. Establish a Standing UN Police Force and RSO Police Forces.
21. Recognize Service in War-Prevention Units as National Service to Meet Conscription Requirements.

(Also relevant to this section are item 5, Employ Targeted Sanctions and Part II, Increase Reliance on UN Peace Enforcement Capabilities.)

## **Increase the Responsiveness and Accountability of the UN System.**

22. Make the UN Security Council More Representative by Expanding Its Membership.
23. Reach Informal Agreement Among the Permanent Five to Use the Veto Sparingly to Enable More Effective Security Council Action Against Armed Conflict.
24. Focus the Efforts of the General Assembly Committee on Security Council Reform on Further Reducing Use of the Veto.
25. Establish New Conflict Prevention Bodies Linked to the Security Council, But Not Subject to the Veto.
26. Give the General Assembly President a Seat on the Security Council.
27. Establish Judicial Review of Security Council Decisions.
28. Create a World Parliamentary Assembly as an Advisory Chamber of the UN.
29. Strengthen the Advisory and Assisting Role of NGOs at the UN.

## **II. To Prevent International War, We Must in a Phased Process of Disarmament Reduce National Military Forces and Replace Them with Modest UN Forces.**

### **Phase I. Take initial steps to reduce the risks of major international war.**

#### **A. Reduce National Armed Forces, Military Budgets, and Arms Production and Trade.**

30. Begin Talks on Global Cuts in National Military Forces and Spending.
31. Cap Military Forces and Military Spending during the Talks.
32. Conduct a Full and Open Exchange of Information on Military Forces, Spending, and Armaments.
33. Cut Global Production and Trade of Major Weapons and Small Arms by 25 Percent.
34. Promote Democratic Oversight of Military and Security Forces.
35. Implement Carefully Designed Confidence-Building Measures in Specific Conflict Areas.
36. Restrict Economic Benefits from Armed Conflict.
37. Establish a Committee to Resolve Questions Concerning Verification and Elimination of the Armaments Reduced Under this Program.

#### **B. Move Toward Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.**

38. Continue to Combat Nuclear Proliferation.
39. International Action Against Iraq Should Focus on Inspections.
40. De-Alert Deployed U.S. and Russian Nuclear Weapons to Reduce the Risk of Accidental or Unauthorized Launch.
41. Reduce U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces to No More than 1,000 Total (Strategic and Tactical) Warheads Each.
42. Include the Six Remaining Nuclear Weapon States in Talks on Cuts. Seek to Cap Their Arsenals.
43. Limit Missile Defenses; Block the Weaponization of Space.
44. Seek an Effective Compliance Protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention.

#### **C. Increase Reliance on UN and RSO Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Capabilities.**

45. Establish New Mobile Headquarters Units at the UN and a \$500 million Contingency Fund for Rapid Deployment of Peacekeeping Operations.

46. Earmark National Forces for UN Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement.
47. Establish Rapid Response Peacekeeping Brigades on Every Continent.
48. Take the First Steps to Establish a Standing Volunteer UN Peacekeeping Force.

**Phase 2. Make Up to One-Third Cuts in Forces and Spending, with Deeper Cuts in Production and Trade of Major Weapons and Small Arms.**

**A. Reduce National Armed Forces, Military Budgets, and Production and Sale of Arms.**

49. Conclude a Treaty on Global Cuts in Military Forces, Spending, and Major Weapons Systems and Small Arms. Cut 33%, 25%, and 15% in Very Large, Large, and Smaller Forces, Respectively.
50. Cut Worldwide Production and Trade in Major Weapons and Small Arms by a Further 50 Percent.

**B. Move Toward Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.**

51. Reduce Remaining Nuclear Arms to No More than 100 Warheads in Each Country.

**C. Increase Reliance on Enhanced UN and RSO Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement**

**Capabilities.**

52. Expand the UN Standing Force; Begin to Shift Peacekeeping from National Units to UN and RSO Volunteer Forces and Strengthen Those Forces.
53. Create Functioning Military Staff Committees at the UN and in Regional Security Organizations.
54. Give the UN Secretary-General Limited Authority to Use UN Police or Peacekeeping Forces.
55. Conduct a Global Education Campaign to Promote Support for Timely Decisions to Use UN Conflict-Prevention Machinery.
56. Permit the UN to Raise Its Own Funds for Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Aid.

**Phase 3. Trial Ban on Unilateral Military Intervention**

**A. Reduce National Armed Forces, Military Spending and Arms Production and Trade.**

57. Begin Talks on Further Cuts in National Military Forces and Spending.

**B. Move Toward Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.**

58. Immobilize Remaining Stocks of Nuclear Warheads and Delivery Systems by Placing Them in Internationally Monitored Storage on the Territory of the Owner States.
59. Severely Limit all Missiles and All Long-Range Bomber and Attack Aircraft.

**C. Increase Reliance on Enhanced UN and RSO Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Capabilities.**

60. Make a Provisional Commitment Not to Deploy National Armed Forces Beyond National Borders While Rigorously Testing the Capability of the UN and RSOs to Prevent Armed Conflict.

**Phase 4. Transfer Responsibility for Global Security from National to International Institutions.**

**A. Reduce National Armed Forces, Military Spending and Arms Production and Trade.**

61. Make Further Deep Cuts (33%, 25% and 15%) in National Armed Forces and Military Spending.
62. Limit Production of Both Major Weapons and Small Arms to Weapons for UN Forces and for Homeland Defense.

**B. Move Toward Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.**

63. Eliminate All Remaining Nuclear Weapons After Agreeing to a Stringent Verification System and Contingency Plans for Non-Compliance.

**C. Increase Reliance on Enhanced UN and RSO Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement**

**Capabilities.**

63. Strengthen UN and RSO Volunteer Forces.
64. Permanently Transfer the Responsibility for Preventing Armed Conflict from Individual Nations to a Global Security System Operated by the UN and Regional Security Organizations.

**Phase 5. Limit National Armed Forces to Short-Range Homeland Defense.**

**A. Reduce National Military Forces, Spending and Arms Production and Trade.**

65. Limit "Force-Projection" Capabilities to Relatively Small Units Maintained by the UN and Regional Peacekeeping Forces.
66. Convert National Armed Forces Fully to Short-Range Homeland and Non-Offensive Defense.

**III. To Foster Support for National Policies of Peace and Disarmament, We Must Promote the Culture of Peace and Individual Programs for Disarmament and Conflict Reduction.**

Given its comprehensive approach, Global Action supports and participates in activities designed to promote the culture of peace at all levels and disarmament and conflict resolution in all settings. These activities include:

67. Universal education at all levels on non-violent conflict prevention and resolution.
68. Programs to strengthen tolerance and respect for diversity among national sub-groups--ethnic, cultural and religious--and programs opposing political and religious extremism.
69. Programs aimed at reducing violence, including humanitarian aid; refugee relief; economic development; economic justice; human rights; the rights of women and children; prevention of domestic and youth violence; and protection of the environment.
70. Sectoral programs for arms control and disarmament, including limits or bans on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, space weapons, conventional armaments (including missiles and aircraft), land mines, small arms, and handguns.
71. Confidence-building, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict rebuilding in specific settings, like the Near East, India-Pakistan, Sudan and Sri-Lanka.

## APPENDIX 5: Commentary on United Nations Dues

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### ***Poor Nations First to Pay Up UN Dues for 2003 --- by Thalif Deen, Inter Press Service, 2/1/03***

A cash-strapped United Nations got off to a flying start on its first working day for the new year with 10 countries paying their dues in full for 2003. A U.N. spokesman told IPS Thursday that what was unusual about the early payments was that four of the 10 - Bangladesh, Mali, Senegal and Sierra Leone - are member states designated by the United Nations as "least developed countries" (LDCs), the poorest of the world's poor.

"They are the weakest segment of the international community. But their support and commitment to the United Nations is the strongest," Anwarul Karim Chowdhury, U.N. undersecretary-general for Least Developed Countries, told IPS. Chowdhury said it was "wonderful" to hear that four of the 10 member states on the U.N.'s "honour roll" for 2003 were LDCs. "The international donor community, in turn, owes these countries its support and economic assistance for development cooperation." "The LDCs are the most economically vulnerable group of countries at the United Nations," he said, "and they do not have a level playing field."

Currently, there are 49 LDCs, of which 33 are from sub-Saharan Africa. The thresholds for inclusion in the list of LDCs include: population of less than 75 million; per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of less than 800 dollars; and an Augmented Physical Quality of Life Index (combining health, nutrition and education) of less than 59. Bangladesh paid 135,000 dollars as its total U.N. dues for 2003 followed by Mali (11,800 dollars), Senegal (67,500 dollars) and Sierra Leone (13,500 dollars). The other six countries in the "honour roll" are Armenia, whose U.N. dues for 2003 amounted to 27,000 dollars, Belarus with 256,000 dollars, Congo with 13,500 dollars, Honduras with 67,500 dollars, Latvia with 135,000 dollars and Ukraine, 715,500 dollars. The United States, the world's richest nation, is currently the biggest single defaulter owing more than 800 million dollars to the world body.

To date, total outstanding dues from all member states amount to over 2.6 billion dollars, of which 1.7 billion dollars are arrears accrued in 2002. Also in 2002, only 117 out of a total of 191 member states paid their budget contributions in full, compared with 135 the previous year. The U.N.'s budget for 2002-2003 amounts to about 2.6 billion dollars. For 2004-2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan has proposed a preliminary budget of about 2.9 billion dollars. Faced with a growing cash crisis, the United Nations is currently on an austerity drive. It has slashed some 75 million dollars in mostly operational expenses in the U.N. secretariat in New York. The crisis has been prompted by two factors: first, non-payment or delayed payment of U.N. dues by member states, and second, outstanding arrears by some of the key contributors to the U.N. budget, including the United States, Russia, Brazil and Argentina.

When the General Assembly approved the 2002-2003 budget, it was conditional on overall cuts of 75 million dollars in operational services. The cuts include 19.7 million dollars in general operating expenses, 10 million dollars in information technology, 7.2 million dollars in furniture and equipment, 6.4 million dollars in contractual services, 2.8 million dollars in staff travel, 2 million dollars in the hiring of consultants and experts and 1.4 million dollars in supplies and materials. Joseph Connor, the outgoing under secretary-general for management, says the austerity measures are necessary to conform to provisions in a zero-growth budget. Connor said the United Nations does not have sufficient financial resources to maintain services for meetings, facilities management and information technology at existing levels.

"Accordingly, staff, delegates and visitors will inevitably experience reduction or degradation of some services," he said last year. The cuts, which include a ban on all after-hours meetings, have triggered strong protests from the Group of 77 (G-77) coalition of 133 developing nations.

The G-77, the largest single group at the United Nations, is particularly critical of limits placed on meetings of U.N. committees and regional groups, which no longer extend beyond 6 p.m. Since there will no staffers on duty - including interpreters - after 6 p.m. working overtime, no meetings are being held in the evenings or on weekends. The only exceptions are meetings of the Security Council and plenary meetings of the General Assembly. Even heating in the 39 storey building has been kept at a minimum. Annan has said that the secretariat will also review a number of administrative and management procedures. One of them, he said, is conference services. One area that is particularly ripe for scrutiny, he pointed out, is that of documents. "It seems to me there is a need to consider not only the quantity of these documents that we currently prepare, but also the way we do it," he added.

The United Nations has long been known as a paper factory because of the millions of documents it cranks out every year. On an average it produces over 700 million printed pages every year. The cost of printing documents both in New York and Geneva is over 250 million dollars annually. The amount of documents the U.N. cranks out has not decreased appreciably despite the introduction of electronic mail and video-conferencing. Currently, over 300,000 U.N. documents are on U.N. websites.

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#### ***U.N. Freeloaders, Congressman J.D. Hayworth, June 4, 2003***

"What's more, U.N. dues are supposed to be based on ability to pay. Yet there are a dozen countries that in 2003 will pay more in dues than China's \$24 million even though it now has the world's second largest economy. The Chinese are clearly getting a lot of bang for their U.N. buck. So are the Russians. Their 2003 assessment is a paltry \$19 million, less than Canada, Holland, Australia, and tiny Switzerland."

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#### ***United Nations Finance, Global Policy Forum -- January-June, 2003***

"In partnership with experts and scholars in several countries, we analysed the UN's ongoing financial travails. The UN's regular budget for the year, just \$1.4 billion, is smaller than the budget of the Tokyo fire department. The US and UK budgeted \$100 billion for their war on Iraq, more than 75 times the UN budget and 300 times their UN dues. Budgets of UN funds and agencies have faced similar serious problems. We have encouraged more active citizen engagement with these issues, to demand that money be spent constructively on humanity's great global needs."

## APPENDIX 6: A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons

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Fifty-eighth session

First Committee

Agenda item 73

General and complete disarmament

**Australia, Côte d'Ivoire, Italy, Japan and Switzerland: draft resolution**

**A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 49/75 H of 15 December 1994, 50/70 C of 12 December 1995, 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, 52/38 K of 9 December 1997, 53/77 U of 4 December 1998, 54/54 D of 1 December 1999, 55/33 R of 20 November 2000, 56/24 N of 29 November 2001 and 57/78 of 22 November 2002,

*Recognizing* that the enhancement of international peace and security and the promotion of nuclear disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other,

*Expressing deep concern* regarding the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

*Convinced* that every effort should be made to avoid nuclear devastation,

*Reaffirming* the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)<sup>27</sup> as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and as an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and welcoming accession to the Treaty of Timor-Leste,

*Bearing in mind* that recent challenges to the Treaty and to the nuclear non-proliferation regime have further increased the necessity of full compliance and that the Treaty can fulfil its role only if there is confidence in compliance by all States parties,

*Recognizing* the progress made by the nuclear-weapon States in the reduction of their nuclear weapons unilaterally or through their negotiations, including the recent entry into force of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") by the United States of America and the Russian Federation,<sup>28</sup> which should serve as a step for further nuclear disarmament, and the efforts for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by the international community,

*Reaffirming* the conviction that further advancement in nuclear disarmament will contribute to consolidating the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation, ensuring international peace and security,

*Welcoming* the continuation of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions since the last nuclear tests,

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<sup>27</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 729, No. 10485.

<sup>28</sup> See CD/1674.

*Welcoming also* the successful adoption of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,<sup>29</sup> and stressing the importance of implementing its conclusions,

*Welcoming further* the constructive discussions at the second session, held in April-May 2003, of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be held in 2005,

*Welcoming* the successful convening of a series of seminars and conferences aiming at further reinforcement of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, including the International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards, held in Tokyo in December 2002, and sharing the hope that, by making utmost use of the outcomes from the foregoing seminars and conferences, the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system will be further strengthened, by means of universalization of safeguards agreements and the additional protocols,

*Encouraging* the Russian Federation and the United States of America to continue their intensive consultations in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the two States,

*Welcoming* the Final Declaration of the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, convened in Vienna from 3 to 5 September 2003<sup>30</sup> in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty,<sup>31</sup>

*Recognizing* the importance of preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons or related materials, radioactive materials, equipment and technology and underlining the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard,

*Stressing* the importance of education on disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations, and welcoming the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session,<sup>32</sup>

1. *Reaffirms* the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions;

2. *Also reaffirms* the importance for all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty;

3. *Stresses* the central importance of the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation

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<sup>29</sup> 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vols. I-III (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)).

<sup>30</sup> CTBT-Art.XIV/2003/CRP.1/Rev.1.

<sup>31</sup> See resolution 50/245.

<sup>32</sup> A/57/124.

and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty:<sup>33</sup>

(a) The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty;

(b) The establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2004 session to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995<sup>34</sup> and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years and, pending its entry into force, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons;

(c) The establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2004 session in the context of establishing a program of work;

(d) The inclusion of the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures;

(e) An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties to the Treaty are committed under article VI of the Treaty;

(f) Deep reductions by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in their strategic offensive arsenals, while placing great importance on the existing multilateral treaties, with a view to maintaining and strengthening strategic stability and international security;

(g) Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

(i) Further efforts by all the nuclear-weapon States to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

(ii) Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and as voluntary confidence-building measures to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;

(iii) The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

(iv) Concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

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<sup>33</sup> *1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I* (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex, decision 2.

<sup>34</sup> CD/1299.

- (v) A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- (vi) The engagement, as soon as appropriate, of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;
- (h) Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control;
4. *Recognizes* that the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons will require further steps, including deeper reductions by all the nuclear-weapon States in the process of working towards achieving their elimination;
5. *Invites* the nuclear-weapon States to keep the Members of the United Nations duly informed of the progress or efforts made towards nuclear disarmament;
6. *Emphasizes* the importance of a successful Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2005, as the third session of the Preparatory Committee will be convened in 2004;
7. *Welcomes* the ongoing efforts in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, notes the importance of the safe and effective management of the resultant fissile materials, and calls for arrangements by all the nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programs;
8. *Stresses* the importance of further development of the verification capabilities, including International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world;
9. *Calls upon* all States to redouble their efforts to prevent and curb the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, confirming and strengthening, if necessary, their policies not to transfer equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to the proliferation of those weapons, while ensuring that such policies are consistent with the obligations of States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
10. *Also calls upon* all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security, safe custody, effective control and physical protection of all materials that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in order, inter alia, to prevent those materials from falling into the hands of terrorists;
11. *Welcomes* the adoption of resolution GC(47)/RES/11 on 19 September 2003 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency,<sup>35</sup> which recommends that States members of the Agency continue to consider implementing the elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19, adopted on 22 September 2000 by the General

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<sup>35</sup> See International Atomic Energy Agency, *Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Forty-seventh Regular Session, 15-19 September 2003* (GC(47)/RES/DEC (2003)).

Conference of the Agency,<sup>36</sup> and in the Agency's updated plan of action of April 2003, with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and calls for the early and full implementation of that resolution;

12. *Encourages* the constructive role played by civil society in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., *Forty-fourth Regular Session, 18-22 September 2000* (GC(44)/RES/DEC (2000)).

## APPENDIX 7: Australia scrutinizes influence of nongovernmental groups

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### *Australia scrutinizes influence of nongovernmental groups*

(Note: Look at the buzzwords used by the NGOs in defending themselves! Global United Nations words and phrases is what they're using, to achieve 'conflict resolution.')

By Janaki Kremmer, September 5, 2003, *Special to The Christian Science Monitor*

Sydney, Australia - Spurred by conservative rumblings over the growing clout of non governmental organizations (NGOs), the Australian government is taking a closer look at such groups' activities at home and abroad.

Earlier this year, Prime Minister John Howard offered to investigate all aid agencies working in Indonesia using Australian government funding, following complaints by President Megawati Sukarnoputri. And in a move that critics see as politically motivated, his government has hired a conservative think tank to investigate NGO influence on some government agencies.

The investigation by the Melbourne-based Institute of Public Affairs could potentially cut off some charities from further government access, funding, or tax breaks, experts say.

"NGOs are becoming very influential today -- they sit on various committees and are seen to influence governments and big business. As global players they need to be more transparent," says Mike Nahan, executive director of the IPA.

IPA is not the only group scrutinizing NGOs. In June, IPA joined with two organizations in the United States -- the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), known to be close to the Bush administration, and the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies -- to launch [www.NGOWatch.org](http://www.NGOWatch.org). The site will monitor the operations of international NGOs and their relations with corporations and government.

The cyber watchdog is being set up at a time when NGOs are gaining credibility on the world stage for attempting to reform world markets and politics to make them more humane. A study released by the United Nations and SustainAbility, a consulting firm, concludes the groups such as Oxfam International, Greenpeace, and the World Wildlife Fund have become more receptive to market-based solutions to global problems -- and in turn, corporations are more keen to work with NGOs.

Still, some NGOs have become focal points for controversy. An Australian aid agency working in Indonesia found itself in hot water after allegations that it has been active in the pro-independence movement in the provinces of Aceh and Papua.

Union Aid Abroad (UAA), which gets more than half of its funds from the Australian government, says that it favors a referendum in the region, but denies that any funds have been put toward motivating political change.

"Our political views are voiced in Australia alone," says Ken Davis the spokesman for UAA.

The IPA's Mr. Nahan accuses international NGOs of helping to lead Papua New Guinea to bankruptcy by forcing out mining industries there. IPA also claims that British Petroleum sold out its shareholders by bowing to the concerns of aid and development agencies.

Many companies now insist on working with NGO officials to be aware of issues that might cause protests or boycotts of their products by consumers and shareholders.

It's that type of influence, coupled with vocal opposition to the Iraq war by some groups, that has prompted the backlash from US and Australian conservatives.

"This leads to constraining or changing the workings of large corporations -- something that would raise the antennas of right-wing governments who are antiregulation," says Richard Dennis, an NGO expert at the Australian Institute in Canberra.

The executive director of the Australian Council For Overseas Aid, Graham Tupper, says he is surprised that IPA was given the contract to do the NGO study because of the think tank's reputation for "hatred" towards NGOs.

"Why didn't the government tender the contract in the normal way and give it to the group most qualified?" he asks.

The Australian government's allocation for NGOs has fallen 17.2 percent since the 1995-96 budget (the time the current government came to power), according to new figures from the Australian People for Health Education and Development Abroad.

As less than 5 percent of last year's US\$1.15 billion aid budget was allocated to non profit charities -- about US\$12.81 million less than four years ago, NGOs say they are getting fewer contracts, forced out by companies like GRM International and Melbourne-based ACIL Australia.

They have even been warned that they are also likely to miss out on some reconstructive contracts in Iraq.

"Why should NGOs like Oxfam, which were adamantly against the war in Iraq, be given money to work there?" asks Nahan. "They would in fact be a liability there as they would have to deal with the military, whose presence they so despise."

<http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0905/p07s01-woap.html>