West Papua: Reconciliation as a Way of Promoting Peace Dialogue

Report on Workshop II (12 - 13 December 2001)

and Future Plans

by John Ondawame with Peter King

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Introduction

Over the course of the past two years human rights activists and supporters of the West Papua cause became concerned with the increase in violence and violations of civil rights in Papua, and recognized the need for a convening of interested parties, with the goal of promoting reconciliation and peaceful dialogue within Papuan civil society foremost on the agenda. To facilitate the brainstorming and clarification of ideas on reconciliation, the West Papua Project organized a workshop, the second of its kind, on December 12-13, 2001, through the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at Sydney University, with the title: Promoting Reconciliation as a Way Towards Peace Dialogue. Its major objective was to determine under which circumstances a promotion of reconciliation as a way towards peace dialogue could occur, and to highlight the difficulties in conducting social justice dialogue in an unpredictable political atmosphere. Our specific aim was to bring together key West Papuan leaders with a view to analysing and "mapping" intra-Papuan conflicts and their causes, considering strategies and processes for reconciliation with the Papuan community in West Papua and abroad, and also continuing discussion of a workable peace plan for West Papua.
The workshop was well attended. Forty participants, from various groups representing civil society in Australia, Indonesia and West Papua took part in the discussion. This included academics, support group representatives, politicians, non-governmental organization activists, and individuals from both West Papua and Indonesia. [The program of the workshop ("Workshop 2"), together with the position paper ("Position Paper 2") issued before it, can be found on the Project homepage: http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/cpacs]

The original agenda presented some practical difficulties, which forced the organising committee to redefine the subject of the discussion and reduce the number of presenting participants. Our initial goal of addressing broader subjects of discussion, and bringing together 13 key leaders representing the full spectrum of Papuan society was not attainable. Funding responses came too late, presenting administrative problems. But, most importantly, the crisis in the domestic political situation with the death of Theys Eluay on November 10, 2001, threatened the security of all the proposed participants from West Papua. Another difficulty was that the workshop was held during the holiday season when travel costs were greatly inflated. Three key players, John Rumbiak (Supervisor of the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy [ELSHAM], Jayapura), Theo van de Broek (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Jayapura) and Tom Beanal (vice chairman of the Papua Presidium Council), were unable to attend the workshop.

Despite these challenges, the committee was able to bring Dr. Ben Giay to the workshop. He is an academic, a leader of the Kingmi Church in West Papua, one of the founding fathers of FORERI (the Reconciliation Forum for Irian Jaya) and a former moderator of the Papua Presidium, who is now chairperson of ELSHAM. As a result of direct intervention on the part of the workshop organising committee, in cooperation with ELSHAM-Jayapura, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta provided an entry visa for Ben Giay in just two days. Papuan participation was also enriched not only by the presence of the Director of ELSHAM in Jayapura, Johannes Bonay, who is now under serious threat for his advocacy work, and Henry Wainggai, representative of Aliansi Student Papua Barat, but also by other Papuans living in exile. The discussion became extremely stimulating when two Indonesian colleagues, Ian Siagian and George Aditjondro, who have two sharply different views on the future of West Papua met and were able to share their opinions in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

The workshop was co-sponsored by the Australia West Papua Association (Sydney) and financially supported by CARITAS Australia; the Uniting Church of Australia, Sydney; the International Office, the Centre for International and Public Affairs and the Discipline of Government and International Relations at Sydney University; Community Aid Abroad in Melbourne; the Hills Alliance Church in Sydney; and Global Ministries Uniting Churches in the Netherlands, to all of whom the West Papua Project extends its warm thanks and appreciation.

The workshop was opened by the Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University of Sydney, Professor Judith Kinnear, who also provided funds. Professor Kinnear declared that finding a peaceful means of settling the conflicts in West Papua was an undertaking worthy of the university.
We would like to thank all participants and also the members of the steering committee (who are listed at the end of this report) who made the workshop successful. We are particularly indebted to International House, University of Sydney, which provided the venue and served food during the workshop. We also give special thanks to Dr Jim Elsmie who contributed artefacts for raising funds and Dr Anne Noonan and Joe Collins from AWPA (Sydney) who provided cocktails. We would also like to thank Lynda Blanchard and Anna Moden for effective administration of the workshop. Special thanks go to Susan Skyvington and Julian King who recorded and filmed the workshop, making this report possible. Last, but not least, thanks go to Prof. Stuart Rees, Director of CPACS, for his continuing support of the West Papua Project.

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**West Papua: a Peace Concept**

This paper will examine the situation, attitudes and social behaviour of members of the civil society of West Papua, focusing on power relationships between potential stakeholders in the horizontal conflicts in West Papua itself and in the wider vertical conflict between Indonesia and the people of West Papua. Moreover, by reflecting on the views that were presented at our Workshop II on December 12-13, 2001, future strategies for constructive intervention in the above conflicts will also be discussed. But first, what is the proper role of civil society in conflict situations—and what civil society are we referring to?

**Civil Society: Conflict and Consensus**

The struggle for power, glory and wealth at different levels of society has historically led to social and political conflicts. One possible scenario for self-defence of threatened groups would be the use of force or other forceful methods. Conflicting groups—both state and civil society groups—tend to become aggressive because they fear losing status, face or glory. Society develops a "mental" problem. In such a potentially chaotic situation, people use every means to protect against their weaknesses. Common (in)human attitudes such as prejudice, mistrust, and hatred become more important than ever. As a side effect, enthusiasm for the notion of promoting peace through justice is badly undermined.

The absence of political will for change, and inability to judge and evaluate the root causes of conflict and then find appropriate ways to seek conflict resolution, remains a major problem. Achieving better relationships and a durable social peace is also threatened by narrow definitions of human rights and global responsibilities, particularly for isolated, remote or beleaguered societies. However, without having a political commitment from both civil society and the state, any form of resolution to achieve justice and peace will remain an illusion.
A dynamic civil society is required for self-awareness and consciousness raising about the implications of conflicts and the need for consensus decision making. Policy makers and victims alike need to reorient themselves to new paradigms of conflict resolution, and a new role for leadership and reconciliation initiatives in that context. A central issue here is not just how human behavior may influence political decisions, but how political decisions may influence people’s behavior in specific ways for the better.

The concept of civil society is most often defined in relation to political power and leadership in the state, a major discourse for many centuries. According to Antonio Gramsci, who analysed the relationship between power and leadership in working class society, there was a special problem for the working class to overcome before it could gain state power—to combat the moral and intellectual influence of "bourgeois" leaders over state institutions and civil society. Accumulation of power through a coercive approach to reach a bourgeois "consensus" also undermined the interests of the working class and other subordinated social groups. Power brokers pushing "consensus" views professed to regard these groups in civil society as lazy, disorganised and immoral, incapable of developing and unable to manage themselves. Thus a ruling class, or a strong state apparatus, may seek to maintain social inequality and promote conflict in civil society in order to uphold its power. In recent times and on the international stage, "consensus" decisions on a war against "international terrorism" or refusing debt relief to poor third world countries are two classical examples of the exercise of hegemonic power, based on the wishes of powerful states, in this case the USA and its European partners, rather than adopting a more democratically acceptable and peaceful approach.

Analysing the relationship between power and leadership, Gramsci divided the superstructure of society into two major domains: civil and political. By definition civil society is the ensemble of social organisms commonly called private. It includes non-governmental organizations such as trade unions, churches, universities, mass organizations and political parties. In a state where a dictator gripped power—take Indonesia, for example, during the New Order Regime (1965-1998)—civil society became the object of repression and its groups, institutions and organizations are closely subordinated to the state.

Political society is the totality of the public domain—the state and its apparatus, state institutions, including the military and police, and their international relationships as well. The state readily exerts hegemonic power—control over economic, political, cultural and ideological domains; and in many third world countries, including Indonesia, one particular group (the military) readily dominates the state.

The problem with "consensus" power based on the use of a coercive approach is that it can readily expose, not the strength, but the weakness of the ruling class or the state. "Repressive dominance" can thus indicate the erosion of the social bases of the state, the loss of moral and intellectual leadership by the ruling classes and their social isolation. One attitudinal response is fear of losing their positions. To defend "their" status quo, once again, the use of "demonising" tactics with supposed enemies may seem necessary.

**Civil Society and Conflict Resolution**
Conflict resolution at the vertical level addresses conflict that occurs in the state-society relationship. Intra-social group conflict we call horizontal conflict. Such conflict can emerge within a ruling alliance, within social classes or ethnic groups, between local and non-local ethnic or immigrant groups, and between divergent religious groups. Such conflict can go beyond mere competition, particularly in a situation where uncertainty is certain and social chaos is likely, or during a power vacuum or transition period.

A common theme in such conflict situations is the need of competing forces to secure "loyalty/obedience". For a state in conflict with society, the maintenance of loyalty requires control over civil institutions, resources and people. Repression, coercive manipulation and violence are a very familiar old paradigm that is applied in many conflict situations, which may lead to the shrinking of the social and political space available to civil society, including social organisations, political parties, trade unions, churches, universities, corporations and mass organisations.

Reconciliation in Papua

Any reconciliation process requires different approaches to particular situations. Reconciliation within the Papuan civil society can therefore require many different approaches to achieve a durable and successful settlement of differences between contesting parties. The general characteristics of reconciliation at each level of conflict are thus different. However, for Papua, key issues and options may be identified, as follows:

1. Options at the level of vertical conflict:

   (a). Cessation of hostilities

   (b). Transformation of a violence-oriented conflict into a political dialogue

       (c). Agreement on mechanisms for contesting power, holding a free and fair referendum under international supervision, etc.

   (d). Withdrawal of military presence

   (e). Demilitarisation

   (f). Intervention by a qualified third party to support reconciliation processes and peaceful dialogue

   (g). Special autonomy arrangements

   (h). Replace the Indonesian Armed forces with an International Peacekeeping Force

   (i). Public apology for past grievances
(j). Education in the culture of dialogue and reconciliation

2. Options in horizontal conflict

(a). Negotiate with the leaders of the independence movement/major actors

(b). Facilitate traditional leaders to encourage customary reconciliation

(c). Build trust and possibly weakening popular support for extremists

(c). Encourage tolerance, respect and cooperative behavior

(d). Establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

(e). Reform FORERI (Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya) and urge churches to play a facilitator role

(f). Offer public apology in a customary manner

(g). Disarm armed groups

(h). Sign an agreement of understanding and cooperation

(i). Encourage equal distribution of resources, labour power and education

(j). Encourage women’s participation in the peace process

These are a few key issues and concerns in the process of reconciliation and peaceful dialogue. But the most important requirement for achieving these options is the capability of the actors, both facilitators and "receivers". Developing capacity that will enable mapping out of the conflict and an effective pre-negotiation process is a first step to formal negotiations or talks between major conflicting parties. One of the objectives is not only to reach common perceptions and break through deadlocks, but also to develop a common mental map and learn how to proceed forward from it. Major elements of reconciliation in pre-negotiations are: agreeing on basic rules and procedures, ensuring wide participation in the process; identifying methods of representation and preconditions for negotiation, and overcoming barriers to dialogue while creating a level playing-field for the parties and providing resources for the negotiators, including venues and locations, communication links and information exchanges Stuart (1991:107-108). Informal negotiation enables concerned stakeholders to collect information and make plans and decide whether it is necessary to seek the help of outsiders in the first phase.
Promoting Reconciliation as a Way Towards Peace Dialogue

The West Papua Project seeks to promote peaceful dialogue between the people of West Papua and Indonesia, and to promote conflict resolution as a viable alternative to the current escalating conflict. The Project aims to put in place concrete strategies to achieve the goal of peaceful dialogue between Indonesia and West Papua. These strategies consist of strengthening networks, addressing the information deficit on West Papua through research and a public awareness campaign, and promoting education on conflict resolution relevant to the West Papuan issue. The project seeks to coordinate its work in collaboration with various key players in West Papua and in other countries.

However, such objectives cannot be achieved until the culture of dialogue and reconciliation is "socialized" among key stakeholders, or unless they can find another appropriate way to solve the fundamental problems that exist within Papuan civil society itself. Problems of national disunity, conflicting perceptions and incoherent strategies are perceived as major hindering factors in the peace and reconciliation process.

In the past two years, notably in August 1998, in an effort to obtain a genuine reconciliation among groups in Papuan civil society, and to formulate a common position on the ongoing conflict, the Forum for Reconciliation of the People of Irian Jaya (FORERI) was established in Jayapura by civil society groups such as churches, traditional councils, women's groups and student organizations.

In an attempt to promote reconciliation among the West Papuans as a vital step towards peaceful dialogue, the West Papua Project organized its second workshop in December 2001 with the following two key aims in mind:

1. Identifying root causes of horizontal conflict in Papua: that is, identifying stereotypes and other problems that exist (a) between the main rival parties (highlanders and coastal dwellers); (b) in intertribal relations; (c) between urban and rural Papuans; (d) between the OPM and the Papua Council Presidium; (e) between OPM factions (abroad and at home), and also (f) between academics and politicians, men and women, et cetera.

2. Exploring strategic options for a non-violent leadership in West Papua, including ideas about how to (a) identify and advance new key role players in the peace and reconciliation process; (b) develop international links and collaborations, and (c) allocate rights and responsibilities among key groups.

The primary workshop objective was to find ways and means of setting in motion a reconciliation process that would lead to negotiated solutions of both micro and macro conflicts. But first the workshop discussed the current socio-political situation in Papua in a broad perspective.

West Papua: the Unfinished Saga.
The power relationships between major actors within Papuan civil society, on one hand, and the relationships of these actors to the state of Indonesia, on the other, have been problematic.

Democratic values and human rights have not been well understood in the political vocabulary of Indonesia or West Papua. One of the simplest ways to grasp a conflict is to imagine it as a triangle with three points: situation, attitude and behavior, with a causal relationship between these three. Situation refers to the objective position that causes conflict, while behavior refers to the actions of the people and attitude refers to actors' perceptions of other people. Each of the three can be a root cause of conflict.

The situation in West Papua today is characterized by violence and increasing intolerance. Widespread human rights abuses abound and economic and social disparities and accompanying political pressures grow. Most often, groups in civil society blame the OPM or the Indonesian state for failing to take responsibility for social and political chaos. However, horizontal conflict within civil society itself, including relations between Papuans and non-Papuans, is well known and problematic, as we have seen. This is perceived as a major hindrance to peaceful dialogue.

Who are the groups in conflict?

The workshop participants identified the following groups as major source of the current conflict in West Papua -- groups which often suffer breakdown in communication and need to build a common foundation for peace and reconciliation:

a. OPM and Presidium

The OPM (Free Papua Movement) is the only organization which has operated in West Papua since 1965 with a clear national political agenda: self-determination and an independent West Papua. Its strategy includes both military and peaceful approaches, and it has both political and military wings as important campaign tools. Membership is varied, but most Papuans are associated with the OPM in one way or another.

The Papua Council Presidium is the executive body appointed at the Second National Congress 2000 in Jayapura. The credibility and legitimacy of the body is still doubtful as far as the OPM is concerned, for many reasons. The OPM accuses the Presidium of accommodating Indonesian agents and promoting incorrect historical facts. However, the Presidium, which is only two years old and has attracted wide local and international support, regards itself as a legitimate body and condemns violence, calling for peaceful dialogue as a viable alternative to armed conflict.

b. Highlanders and "Coastals"

Divisions arise not only on the basis of geographical location but also social and physical differences. Those who live over 1000 m above sea level are regarded as highlanders. Two thirds of the Papuan population are highlanders and living in a most inaccessible landscape. Their development has lagged. This affects their social status seriously. Despite this, in the last 40 years, highlanders have shown a political will to
catch up with the other Papuans. On the other hand, coastals have been contacting the outside world for approximately 500 years. They fear that the advancement of highlanders may see them take over power in a new West Papua.

c. Rural and Urban Dwellers

The majority of Papuans are living in the rural areas. Traditional culture remains strong and the traditional keeping of livestock continues, but many traditional customs are vanishing, overshadowed by new, imported cultures. Unlike urban dwellers, who depend on wage income and trade, rural people depend on cultivation, hunting and fishing. Urban dwellers have power, money and communication networks. Conflict is often started when urban dwellers seek control over traditional land and resources, most often without permission. The urban dwellers use state law to over-ride the traditional landowner.

d. Men and Women

West Papuan men, as in many other traditional Third World societies still demand control over women. Most West Papuan traditional societies are patrilineal. Women have been seen as objects to be exploited. This traditional view of women is still strong among both rural and urban dwellers. Domestic violence is very common also, given high levels of alcohol consumption among men with traditional values. Women are regarded as second-class citizens and "baby factories"; they are also seen as objects that can be sold or bought. Under this view, men often attempt to keep women far away from power centres. In traditional society, this behaviour is hard to break down.

e. Landowners and Resource Companies

Landowners are people affected by mining, oil and gas exploitation, logging, dam projects, road making, tourism, public building and fisheries in their traditional lands and waters. Social values are also affected by unwanted intruders. Over 100 companies, both domestic and foreign registered, operate in West Papua. Indonesian law provides certain privileges, tax haven status for example, to over-ride traditional rights. In the absence of any form of negotiation process, the companies exploit the resources without paying any form of compensation to traditional landowners. The case of the Freeport mine and the Amungme and Kamoro people is a classical example. This is a source of conflict at micro level.

f. Papuans and non-Papuans

Non-Papuans here may refer to immigrants and their descendants, to foreign workers or to missionaries, all of whom have affected Papuan's lives. According to the last population census in 2001, the total population of West Papua is 2.1 million, of which the Papuan proportion is unknown, but commonly estimated at about 60 per cent. The relationship between Indonesian immigrants and Papuan indigenous people has always been unhealthy, overshadowed by strong sentiments entertained against each other. In line with government policy, West Papuans are regarded by many immigrants as a lazy, primitive and underdeveloped people who should be "civilised". Social mockery is used to undermine the Papuans, in order to continue Indonesian
control over them and, in particular, to exploit their land and its resources. The infiltration of new culture and traditions has also brought devastating effects for the Papuans in many fields—a contributing factor in the increase of intolerance and inter-ethnic strife.

**Major Problems Facing the Papuan Cause**

Analysing major problems facing the Papuan cause, particularly in the state-civil society nexus, workshop participants concluded that six major causes of conflict must be addressed:

* a. Denial of Papuan rights

The first problem is the denial of the Papuans' rights. Their right to live, preserve their culture and way of life and claim their basic democratic freedoms have been denied and violated since the 1960s. The serious violation of Papuans' human rights begins even before what was called the Act of Free Choice in 1969, continues in many parts of West Papua today and represents a major stumbling block in the quest for a peaceful dialogue. To understand the root causes of the problem from a historical perspective, "straightening" West Papuan history has been seen as a crucial step towards a peace process. However, the issue was not deeply discussed at the workshop due to key speakers not being able to attend.

The power relationship between Freeport Indonesia and the landowners—the Amungme and Kamoro—who live around mining areas in the southern part of West Papua was taken as a case study to look specifically into the intensity of local sentiment and levels of resistance. Chris Ballard and Denise Leith, who analysed the denial of the Papuans' rights in this area, concluded that the vertical conflict in the mining region is caused by:

- Lack respect for and recognition of the land rights of the landowners
- The failure of the January Agreement of 1974 with Freeport which did not accommodate the rights of landowners
- High militarisation
- Increasing human rights abuses
- Environmental destruction
- Discriminatory policies in socio-economic development.

One possible scenario is that PT Freeport Indonesia and the landowners will be in conflict for years to come unless there are great changes in the company’s social-economic policy. The workshop consensus was very skeptical, that any likely policy change will not benefit the landowners, or change their position on the need for fundamental political and social change. The offer of "special autonomy" for the province and its regencies will not buy off the Papuans either for Amungme and Kamoro people, like other Papuans, see this policy as paying only lip-service to self-determination. In order to promote peace in the region, in the view of many workshop participants, only "straightening" the history of West Papua and then reviewing the special autonomy law can avert further escalation of conflict in the future.
b. The lack of a culture of dialogue

Speaking about the origins of the conflict under the heading: Major Problems Facing the Papuan Cause, Ben Giay and Peter King identified the lack of a culture of dialogue in Indonesia as a major problem, but also Jakarta’s own acute fear of Indonesia breaking up-- Balkanization of the whole Indonesian archipelago. These two speakers speculated that Jakarta is reluctant to engage in a peaceful dialogue because of fear that such involvement may give the Papuans an opportunity to support the idea of Balkanisation through independence. This fear was clearly stated by President Megawati Sukarnoputri in her speech in the front of Indonesian military in December 2001.

President Megawati, unlike her predecessor, Gus Dur, has shown little interest in peaceful dialogue with the Papuans, but several participants argued that for its own best interests Jakarta should get involved in such dialogue. Director of ELSHAM-Jayapura, Johannes Bonay, elaborated this view. According to him, the policies of transmigration, militarisation, direct foreign investment and centralized power, and the empty promises of "special autonomy", together with social injustice, are key causes of Papua's problems. The people of West Papua interpret the government’s policies as subjugation of the people that can not be tolerated. The influx of transmigrants and discrimination in the educational system and other public institutions combine with the additional factors of mistreatment of the Papuans and arrogant behavior of the administrative power to negatively influence local sentiments. There is no Indonesian development paradigm visible yet that can reduce tension and restore peace and democracy in West Papua today as far as the Papuan representatives at the workshop were concerned.

c. Promotion of "divide and rule" policy

The promotion of divide and rule policy in a fragmented society such as West Papua with 250 ethnicities has created a climate of hatred and violence with problematic and serious side effects. The deployment of large numbers of military in the region has not helped people in settling their differences in a peaceful manner or in improving their relationships with each other. A very dangerous development in the security area is the encouragement of pro-Indonesia and pro-independence militias in West Papua, both orchestrated by the military. This has already sparked violence in many places. The recent provocative activities promoted by the Laskar Jihad group in Fakfak have fuelled more religious tension.

d. Making empty promises

Mistrust among the Papuans towards the policy of the government of Indonesia has been well known for many years. This attitude is built on many years of experience in the past and present. At the macro level, for example, as already noted, the Papuans have very little trust in Jakarta promises on special autonomy:

"We do not want autonomy, but independence. This is why many West Papuans are still suffering and have died."
Thus spoke Henry Wainggai, representative of Aliansi Student Papua (and the son of Thomas Wainggai who was sentenced to a long prison term for raising an independence flag and died in a Jakarta gaol) at the workshop. But Ian Siagian, who represents President Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in Australia, defended Jakarta’s policy on autonomy:

"I think the government's special autonomy proposal is good for the Papuans. The Papuans needs to accept the autonomy proposal, and try it. If within a few years, they feel it does not accommodate their wishes, they may review it."

Actually, he said, the proposal (which is now law) was supported by a fraction of PDI-P which had strongly endorsed the original, much more radical, provincial proposals on special autonomy, which were elicited from local intellectuals and officials and submitted to Jakarta by the Papuan regional government.

e. Perpetration of human rights abuses

Most workshop participants seemed to believe that, in the absence of any new peace commitment on the part of the central government, the escalation of violence is likely to continue in the near future. The fact is, so the arguments went, violence against civilians has greatly increased in many parts of West Papua. Pro-independence Papuan leaders have become a primary target of secret military operations--which will not restore either law and order or peace: indeed social chaos is likely. The death of peace advocator and Papua Presidium chairman Theys Eluay, murdered by unknown persons on November 10, 2001 in Jayapura, and death threats to human rights advocates John Rumbiak and Johannes Bonay in recent months, demonstrate that the peace initiatives already promoted by the OPM, FORERI and the Papua Council could be undermined completely." In such a situation, how can we trust Indonesia to engage in peaceful dialogue?", asked Johannes Bonay.

f. Lack of transparency, accountability and participation

Many speakers suggested that the lack of these principles in current government policy has been antagonistic to democratic values and peace initiatives and a better relationship between the state and the Papuan civil society. Honesty and openness are two of the most important grounds for building trust. But the history of West Papua shows that they have frequently been neglected and crumbled. Each party to a conflict must have an ability to "open up" about past wrongdoing, take steps forward to overcome it and be able to take risks and be accountable for what is actually said and promised. In the absence of these basic principles, West Papua is seen merely as a paradise for gaining wealth and power while the people of West Papua become an object of exploitation. As one workshop participant said, "We are not a real partner in the discussion on development, peace and justice. This is a major obstacle to building trust and reconciliation."

Demystifying the Issues

As mentioned earlier, horizontal conflict occurs when the relationship between communities breaks down and mistrust develops. Despite the lack of a fully unified view on the basic reasons for disunity it was generally agreed that the most important
core problems are struggle for power and leadership, regional sentiment, lack of shared perceptions, "party" antagonism and strong local loyalties in all aspects of life. These issues were discussed in the workshop under the title: Demystifying the Issues. Participants reached general conclusion as follows:

a. Power and leadership struggle within the elites

Power and leadership struggle has often characterised relations between the OPM and the Presidium and between factions within each of them. The accumulation of power and wealth can result in strong influence for individuals, and thus increased chances of surviving and prevailing politically, which is a significant motivator in the Third World context. Power struggles within the OPM, for example between Nicolaus Jouwe and the late Marcus Kaisepo in the 1960s; between Jacob H. Prai and Zeth Rumkorem in 1976 and after; within regional commands of the National Liberation Army of the OPM in the North in 1984 and 1998, and in the South in 1988; between the OPM and the Fourteen Star movement of Thomas Wainggai in the 1980s and subsequently; between the Tom Beanal and Theys Eluay groups within the Papua Presidium; between FORERI and the churches which set it up, and between ELSHAM and the Presidium. There has also often been an unhealthy relationship between NGOs, the Presidium and the OPM, and gender imbalance is a neglected dimension of power struggles too. Another problem is opportunistic behaviour on the part of some individuals who may seek to exploit their access to money and other resources and the weaknesses of others.

Current leadership problems are acute. Dr. George Aditjondro pointed out the difficulty of finding a charismatic and consensual leader, such as Xanana Gusmao of East Timor, in the West Papuan context.

b. Regional sentiments

West Papua is a multicultural society. From a language perspective, West Papuans are divided between Papuan and Melanesian phyla. Each language group has its own unique characteristics. Moreover, development is unbalanced. Two thirds of the country, mainly in the highlands, is still underdeveloped, while the coastal areas, particularly in the north, are quite well developed due to the earlier contact with the outside world compared to the rest of West Papua.

This development standard is often used as a main criterion to develop stereotypes. Many groups feel that their original social and political structures are "superior" to others and so if one of them becomes more "developed" than the rest, it feels power should be in its hands. Domination of one ethnic group over others, or of non-Papuans over Papuans, with discriminatory practices at many levels, has already fuelled serious resentments. During the leadership election at the Second National Congress 2000 in Jayapura, for example, a group led by the late Theys Eluay threatened to boycott the congress. They believed leadership must be in the hands of northerners, not southerners or highlanders. Self-appointed leader, Theys Eluay, declared himself the new Chief, undermining the more popular prospective leader, Tom Beanal, who comes from an undeveloped highland region in West Papua. There was an immediate response by the highlanders (Dani and Ekagi peoples), who expressed frustration and anger, and demanded respect for the democratic rule of law.
They then formed the *Dewan Masyarakat Koteka* (DEMAK) or Highland Consultation Council, altering the balance of power in the Presidium.

Another cause of problems here is the influx of both regional and internal transmigrants and the consequent destabilising of Papuan society. With new influx of "alien" culture, and free movement of capital, population and social systems, local culture has been undermined. Fear of losing their own culture manifests itself often in the form of increasing regional sentiment, with discriminatory and intolerant behaviour as a consequence. The Amungme people in the mining region in the south, and the Arfak people in Manokwari regency, for example, have felt their culture threatened by influx of immigrant workers from other parts of West Papua as well as Indonesia. In many instances these sentiments become explosive, with casualties on both sides. Several episodes involving the Amungme, and the expulsion of Ayamaru people from the Arfak region last year, exemplify this.

**c. Misperceptions and choosing a different strategy**

The failure to make real progress towards national unity is, according to workshop participants, the result of a lack of unifying vision. The OPM emphasizes the relevance of both military and peaceful approaches as a means of addressing the political struggle, while the Presidium uses peaceful approaches alone. The two can be highly critical of each other. The OPM, for example, has criticized the Presidium as a puppet of the Indonesian government, arguing that peaceful dialogue alone will not solve the problem. And they suspect the other side of a double game. Conversely, the Presidium condemns the OPM’s association with violence. The following are seen as key issues:

- Lack of confidence in leaders due to their insufficient education
- The failure of the Indonesian government to provide opportunities for the Papuans, particularly the youth and women
- Living in an extremely polarized society, where struggles for power are intense
- A decline in the quality of leadership in the Papuan community, resulting, at its worst, in opportunism and "KKN" (corruption, collusion and nepotism).

**d. The "absence" of women and their potential role in reconciliation**

One topic of concern keenly discussed at the workshop was the role of women in the reconciliation process. Clearly West Papuan women have the potential to fulfil this role. But the constraints imposed upon them by the male-dominated society, with its tight traditional controls over women, make any immediate change unlikely. Women become victims of both state oppression and domestic violence. Effecting any change in the attitude of men will be a slow process. The lack of participation by women in the reconciliation effort is obvious. Women should be given an opportunity to play a key role in any peace and reconciliation process. There is also an urgent need to improve the quality of life for women and resolve the regional conflicts between highland women and coastal women. There is an overall need to resolve these differences and achieve recognition of woman's role as an equal in the society. The following steps may help change men’s attitude towards women:
• provide equal opportunity, and promote the participation of women in fields such as education, politics, law and social reform

• engage in dialogue not only for breaking down isolation but also to lift up women and help them gain new skills and knowledge in wider fields

• support women's development agencies inside West Papua.

• support exchange programs between Papuan women and women in foreign countries

General attitudes towards reconciliation

Prejudice is the mistaken perception that one social group is less valuable than another, and results in attempts by dominant groups to impose their own values on subordinate groups. A dominant group, believing itself superior, feels it had the right to decide over the future of the others, as we have said.

Highlanders often refer to the coastal ethnic groups by stereotyping labels such as two tongues. This ethnic slur implies that there is a difference between one's words and one's deeds, and implies inconsistency. The coastal groups are seen as being responsible for the highlanders' suffering, because they supposedly invited Indonesia to come to West Papua. On the other hand, coastals may condemn the highlanders as backward, and unable to manage themselves.

At the micro level, reconciliation has traditionally been practiced, however. Compensation is the most common method, with ritual ceremonies. But when inter-tribal warfare is involved, or in conflicts with the state, this type of reconciliation is insufficient.

"We have tried hard in this area of concern, by forming FORERI, but failed because of the lack of accountability of the people in charge. Now, church leaders are trying to revise it, and organize regular ecumenical prayer for reconciliation", said Ben Giay.

The evidence indicates that reconciliation is not yet taken seriously. Many of the parties involved feel that such a process may threaten their original status. Any promotion of reconciliation and peace can be seen as a threatening challenge, which becomes a stumbling block for a genuine peace and reconciliation process.

Reactions of the people

In the Papuan civil society problem behaviors that have appeared include unwillingness to compromise, non-cooperation, failure of empathy and emotional unwillingness to resolve problems. The bad relations between the OPM and Presidium, for example, have resulted in loss of trust among the people, solidarity groups and sympathetic governments. The rejection of a Papuan delegation to the last Pacific Island Forum in 2001 by the Nauru government was a clear example. The competing groups declared themselves the only legitimate representatives, which confused the Forum.
Nevertheless reconciliation talks within the Papuan community and between the Papuans and non-Papuans remain important. The questions is how to achieve a minimal reconciliation?

**Strategic Options**

There is no magic medicine for patient recovery. Because the nature of the problem of West Papua is complex, sensitive and difficult, what is required are systematic, effective and accountable strategies. In discussing the strategic issue the workshop focused on two major possibilities:

1. Cultivating a new non-violent leadership in West Papua and claiming for it a key role in the peace and reconciliation process

2. Building international links and collaborations—and identifying interests and concerns and rights and responsibilities in the process.

**Non-violent leadership**

Non-violence refers to liberating and creative behaviour, which contributes to understanding, influence and inspiration in politics and in interpersonal relationships (King 1992; Suu Kyi 1995). Promotion of peace with justice is a paramount objective. As Mahatma Gandhi said: "a non-violent society can be built only on the foundation of harmony and cooperation, without which society is bound to remain violent". This aspiration can be expressed through language and other symbols, cultural and educational development, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, civil disobedience, power sharing, empowerment and building solidarity through alliances.

Leaders who have this vision can transcend the problems we have identified. However, such visionaries are hard to find in West Papua today, as Jim Elsmie said at the workshop. Power struggles have caused problems in finding a single Papuan leader who can project a clear vision and mission for the future. Empowerment of Papuan leaders is therefore vital. Reconciliation among Papuan leaders should be encouraged, so that they will continue to address the importance of the dialogue for peace by presenting a serious peace plan with a clear substance and time scale, identifying major key players and resources. The workshop participants continued discussion of the strategic problem under the following headings:

1. Towards a New Papua

2. NGOs and Liberation /Reconciliation

3. Consultation and negotiation among OPM and Presidium/FORERI/NGOs

4. Reconstruction of existing institutions-- OPM, Presidium and FORERI

5. New partnerships between peace advocates inside and outside West Papua and with Indonesians committed to peace with justice

6. Plans for a new "pan-Papuan" peace congress
Towards a New Papua

Because the Papuans have been subject to exploitation for several decades, we must acknowledge that many have lost their own identity, culture and ways of life. "Towards a New Papua" is Ben Giay's formula for the struggle to reverse this situation. "The government should pass new laws to protect Papuan values", according to him. He also urges adoption of the following priorities in the struggle:

* Reform of FORERI. This forum should take responsibility in the reconciliation process but now fails to carry out its tasks.

* Apologising to each other. By being able to say *I am sorry* to each other, we can bury the past and begin anew.

* Rejection of Indonesianisation. A change of Papuan mentality is needed, for the Papuans are too much Indonesianised, both in behaviour and attitude, which often makes stumbling blocks in finding appropriate ways forward.

* Papuanisation in all fields. Papuans must revisit their culture and give it the highest value, and change old systems into "new Papua" ones. In education, for example, a completely new curriculum must be introduced.

* Revisiting and rewriting history. This will create a vital asset for the coming generation, especially the history of the politics of denial in 1969.

* Achieving truth and reconciliation. Therapy for collective trauma is needed whereby each party to conflict may be able to come forward and acknowledge their past grievances and offences.

NGOs and liberation

The relationship between NGOs in West Papua and the OPM has been unhealthy. Each has accused the other for bringing about social chaos and many casualties. Churches, for example, have been blamed for years for not playing a key role in the reconciliation and peace process. The Institute for Human Rights Study and and Advocacy (ELSHAM) and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, both in Jayapura, are the only NGOs that have spoken out loudly over the last six years. We in Australia should support their work. Many NGO workers fear above all losing their status and positions, which is wrong, according to Ben Giay and Johannes Bonay.

Consultation and negotiation among OPM, Presidium, FORERI and other NGOs

Consultation and negotiation among these key players are vital. There is urgent need to proceed to this in the near future. In any peace plan, essential components such as cease fire, national peace dialogue, demilitarisation in the region, the end of
transmigration, the intervention of third parties, respect for the Pauans' rights, democratic freedom and a fair balance of power in Papua must be addressed. The following preconditions must also be met:

- Respecting the existence and uniqueness of each other
- Increasing effectiveness of two-way communication
- Eliminating any "ism" that hinders the reconciliation process, and
- Achieving transparency with each other

Reconstruction of existing institutions--the OPM, Presidium and FORERI

Each of these organizations is still very weak. They all lack a clear structure, vision and mission and are wracked by power struggles. To improve this chaotic situation, these organizations should take up the following tasks:

* Take reconciliation seriously as a first step
* Try to unify perceptions and stipulate them in clear texts and directives
* Form a new national body that can be accepted by all
* Establish a new partnership between peace advocates inside and outside West Papua and with Indonesians committed to peace with justice

In the spirit of achieving cooperation and developing common understandings, it is a vital need to develop partnerships among and with key players in Papua and with other solidarity groups outside. So far, groups tend to address matters of concern in an isolated manner. Thus the following tasks should be shouldered:

- Establish partnership with key players inside West Papua, in Indonesia and in other parts of the world.
- Increase the level of support for Papua within the Indonesian community by providing the true historical story and the truth of the current situation in West Papua
- Establish cooperation and exchange programs with selected student, democratic, environmental and human rights movements in Indonesia.
- Identify issues which have "resonance" with Indonesians and other outsiders, such as human rights, land and environment issues and other social issues
- Lobby for the possible intervention of third parties to facilitate reconciliation and a peace process

Plan for a new "pan-Papuan" peace congress

. Previous attempts to set up such a congress did not accommodate the aspirations of all Pauans. One of the problems was lack of consultation and preparation. The primary objective must be to overcome the differences among Pauans and present a common platform and strategies for a peace process. To facilitate this possibility, the following tasks should be taken up:

- Consult all interested groups before presenting ideas
West Papua Project Workshop III: Reconciliation and Consolidation Among Pauans - Sydney, September 2002

As a follow-up to Workshop II and especially its shortcomings in participation, the West Papua Project Steering Committee has decided in principle to hold a third workshop, again focused on internal reconciliation, in Sydney during September 2002. Reflecting on the last workshop, one may conclude that the voices of the Papuans were not clearly heard, not only because of the lack of wide Papuan participation, but because our striving to achieve common perceptions and recommendations for the future did not fully reflect the complexities of the Papuan situation.

The primary objectives of Workshop III will be to:

- identify common interests in the issue of reconciliation
- continue with analysis and mapping of internal conflict,
- achieve common positions and strategies for the reconciliation and negotiation process.
- prepare terms of reference for peace dialogue

Pre-workshop, the Project Steering Committee will prepare the following papers:

- A discussion paper on the problems, prospects, basic principles and strategic options of the reconciliation and peace process
- General terms of reference for Workshop III.

An International Consultation Group for West Papua (ICGWP)

A third party intervention role in the process of peace negotiations can be very helpful as discussed above. The West Papua Project is now working to establish terms of reference for an International Consultation Group on West Papua (ICGWP). A statement of aims, potential membership and future plans will be formulated. One of the objectives is to demonstrate the importance of raising national and international concern over West Papua and accelerating efforts to promote mediation and peaceful dialogue.

Description of the ICGWP

In a global democratic perspective, to renew peace talk between a people and a government where relationships have broken down is a global responsibility. Since West Papua is a potential global citizen, the success or failure of peace talks will clearly and dearly affect global and regional interests. Against this background and in the spirit of helping forward a peace process in Papua, an International Consultation Group on West Papua will be established. Its major objectives will be to:

- bring together the two conflicting parties in Papua and facilitate negotiation between them
• lobby major stakeholders in Papua--government institutions, pro-independence organisations, churches, NGOs and traditional and grass root organisations to support peace dialogue as a vital alternative to conflict
• formulate terms of reference for peace negotiations as necessary
• monitor and evaluate the progress and process of any peace talks

Membership is open to those with real expertise and relevant experience in the fields of political, economic, social and legal conflict resolution, with particular reference to peace negotiation and third party mediation. Representatives of governments, corporations, solidarity groups and other NGOs and voluntary organisations will be eligible, both Papuans and Non- Papuans.

**International Workshop IV: Promoting a Culture of Dialogue**

Developing a common understanding between the two conflicting parties in Papua--the people of West Papua and Indonesia - is a key issue in the efforts of the West Papua Project to help resolve the conflict between them peacefully. Official Indonesian representatives with an interest in the Project are concerned about the "lack of a culture of dialogue" in their own history and experience. There is therefore a commitment to addressing this issue and to work together on a "peace plan" for improving not only the situation in Papua but also Australia's regional relationships, and there is therefore interest in organizing yet another workshop on the culture of peace dialogue. This workshop may be held either in Indonesia or in Australia later in the year 2002 in accordance with a suggestion made by the retiring Indonesian Ambassador to Australia.

**Further Recommendations**

Our Position Paper for Workshop II made many recommendations on paving the way for conflict resolution approaches to the conflicts in Papua. Most of them are still timely and relevant, and we commend them to the readership of this paper. Perhaps the most important are those which seek to provide skill training, in Australia or elsewhere, on conflict resolution and the culture of peaceful dialogue for young Papuans and Indonesians.

In breaking through the vicious circle of mistrust which prevents the development of a new culture of dialogue and people-to-people networking and cooperation, we in the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies are aware that much depends on taking up this great challenge with determination and dedication for a long haul.

**Conclusion**

A major problem we face is that leading figures in Indonesia perceive peace calls from and on behalf of West Papua as a new threat to the Indonesian state, and thus take a hostile stand against them. However, there is some political will in Jakarta to engage in peace talks with the Papuans and their supporters in Indonesian civil society--an encouraging point which has emerged in the Project’s own dialogue with the outgoing Indonesian ambassador and Consul General over the last two years.
Mobilising public opinion within civil society in Indonesia, particularly among academics, university students, and NGOs, remains essential.

In this particular context the December workshop was generally perceived as successful despite the problems we have identified. Perhaps the most important, but problematical, outcome of the workshop was the response it drew from the Indonesian parliament, some of whose members, on the basis of an intelligence report circulated after the workshop, accused Australia and the Australian government of supporting West Papuan independence. It seems that what happened at the workshop was seen as direct support for the independence movement. This is only partly true, but it shows that the West Papa Project’s efforts to promote peaceful dialogue can be readily misunderstood, and that it may be necessary to achieve a higher level of tact and political sophistication in the future if Indonesia is to be won over as a partner for peace-making in Papua.

References


West Papua Project and Workshop Steering Committee (2001-2):

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