Dr Brian Hedden

BA Princeton, PhD Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Lecturer in Philosophy

A14 - The Quadrangle
The University of Sydney

Telephone +61 2 9351 2205
Fax +61 2 9351 3918

Website > Personal Website

Biographical details

Brian Hedden received his BA from Princeton University in 2006 and his PhD in Philosophy from MIT in 2012. His PhD dissertation was on epistemology and decision theory. From 2012 until 2014, he was a Junior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford.

Research interests

Brian works primarily in epistemology and decision theory, with a particular interest in rationality and time. In addition to those main areas of research, he has strong interests in philosophy of language, ethics, and philosophy of science.

Teaching and supervision

  • Epistemology
  • Decision Theory/Practical Rationality
  • Probability
  • Philosophy of Science
  • Philosophy of Language

Current projects

Recently, I have been defending a time-slice-centric picture of rationality on which rationality is a matter of how you are at particular times – in particular whether your beliefs are supported by your evidence at that time, and whether your decisions are in accord with your beliefs and desires at that time – rather than with how your attitudes evolve over time. On this view, the relationship between time-slices of a single agent is treated as not fundamentally different from the relationship between time-slices of distinct agents.

PhD and master's project opportunities

Selected grants

2017

  • Groups as Individuals: New Insights on Group Rationality and Agency; Hedden B; Australian Research Council (ARC)/Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (DECRA).

2014

  • New Staff Start-Up grant; Hedden B; University of Sydney/Internal Research Grant Allocations.

Selected publications

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Books

  • Hedden, B. (2015). Reasons without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Book Chapters

  • Hedden, B. (2016). Does MITE Make Right?: Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty. In Russ Shafer-Landau (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 11), (pp. 102-128). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]

Journals

  • Hedden, B. (2017). Should juries deliberate? Social Epistemology, 31(4), 368-386. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2016). A Defense of Objectivism about Evidential Support. Canadian Journal Of Philosophy, 45(5-6), 716-743. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2016). Mental Processes and Synchronicity. Mind, 125(499), 873-888. [More Information]
  • Hare, C., Hedden, B. (2016). Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions. NOUS, 50(3), 604-628. [More Information]
  • Greco, D., Hedden, B. (2016). Uniqueness and Metaepistemology. The Journal of Philosophy, 113(8), 365-395. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2015). Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief. Logos & Episteme, 6(4), 495-513. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2015). Options and Diachronic Tragedy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XC(2), 423-451. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2015). Time-Slice Rationality. Mind, 124(494), 449-491. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2013). Incoherence without Exploitability. NOUS, 47(3), 482-495. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2012). Options and the subjective ought. Philosophical Studies, 158(2), 343-360. [More Information]

2017

  • Hedden, B. (2017). Should juries deliberate? Social Epistemology, 31(4), 368-386. [More Information]

2016

  • Hedden, B. (2016). A Defense of Objectivism about Evidential Support. Canadian Journal Of Philosophy, 45(5-6), 716-743. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2016). Does MITE Make Right?: Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty. In Russ Shafer-Landau (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 11), (pp. 102-128). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2016). Mental Processes and Synchronicity. Mind, 125(499), 873-888. [More Information]
  • Hare, C., Hedden, B. (2016). Self-Reinforcing and Self-Frustrating Decisions. NOUS, 50(3), 604-628. [More Information]
  • Greco, D., Hedden, B. (2016). Uniqueness and Metaepistemology. The Journal of Philosophy, 113(8), 365-395. [More Information]

2015

  • Hedden, B. (2015). Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief. Logos & Episteme, 6(4), 495-513. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2015). Options and Diachronic Tragedy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XC(2), 423-451. [More Information]
  • Hedden, B. (2015). Reasons without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Hedden, B. (2015). Time-Slice Rationality. Mind, 124(494), 449-491. [More Information]

2013

  • Hedden, B. (2013). Incoherence without Exploitability. NOUS, 47(3), 482-495. [More Information]

2012

  • Hedden, B. (2012). Options and the subjective ought. Philosophical Studies, 158(2), 343-360. [More Information]

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