Professor David Braddon-Mitchell
People_

Professor David Braddon-Mitchell

Professor of Philosophy
Philosophy
Phone
+61 2 9351 2372
Fax
+61 2 9351 6660
Address
A14 - The Quadrangle
The University of Sydney
Websites

David Braddon-Mitchell is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He was previously at the University of Auckland and a Research Fellow at the Australian National University.

He is the author of articles in leading philosophy journals including The Journal of Philosophy, Nous, Mind, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Review, Synthese, Erkenntnis, Analysis, The Monist, Ratio, The Journal of Political Philosophy, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

He is the author, with Frank Jackson, of The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.

He works in Philosophy of Mind and metaphysics, and cross borders into philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, ethics and political philosophy from time to time. The next section contains some of his recent papers either forthcoming or soon to be forthcoming (touch wood) that may otherwise be hard to get.

Project titleResearch student
Complex Individuality: The Spatial Temporal and Agential Dimensions of The Problem of Biological Individuality.Rebecca MANN
How Temporal Binding Organises Conscious PerceptionRasmus PEDERSEN
A new descriptivist approach to meaning and referenceAaron WU

Selected publications

Publications

Books

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Jackson, F. (2007). The philosophy of mind and cognition. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.

Edited Books

  • Anstey, P., Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2022). Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Nola, R. (2009). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. United States: MIT Press.

Book Chapters

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. (2025). What Should Conativists Say about Belief Sensitivity? In Conventionalism about Personal Identity? In N.F Wagner, A. Muñoz-Corcuera (Eds.), Conventionalism about Personal Identity (Forthcoming). United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
  • Anstey, P., Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2022). A Materialist Theory of the Mind in Context. Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind, (pp. 9-23). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2022). Causal Conditionalism. Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind, (pp. 211-236). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]

Journals

  • Baron, S., Beebee, H., Braddon-Mitchell, D., Eagle, A., Miller, K. (2025). How much did each of the authors of this paper causally contribute to its writing? (Forthcoming). Philosophers' Imprint. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Latham, A., Miller, K. (2023). Can We Turn People Into Pain Pumps? On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion. Journal of Moral Philosophy, , 1-32. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Latham, A. (2022). Ancestor simulations and the Dangers of Simulation Probes. Erkenntnis. [More Information]

Conferences

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2014). Against the illusion theory of temporal phenomenology. CAPE International Workshop, Kyoto, Japan: CAPE Publications.

Reference Works

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2002). Functionalism [in Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science]. In Lynn Nadel, editor-in-chief (Eds.), Encyclopedia of cognitive science. (pp. v. 2 : 170-175). London: Macmillan Press.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2001). Intentionality and rationality: an analytic repspective. In Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes (Eds.), International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences. (pp. 7685-7691). Amsterdam ; New York: Elsevier.

2025

  • Baron, S., Beebee, H., Braddon-Mitchell, D., Eagle, A., Miller, K. (2025). How much did each of the authors of this paper causally contribute to its writing? (Forthcoming). Philosophers' Imprint. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. (2025). What Should Conativists Say about Belief Sensitivity? In Conventionalism about Personal Identity? In N.F Wagner, A. Muñoz-Corcuera (Eds.), Conventionalism about Personal Identity (Forthcoming). United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

2023

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Latham, A., Miller, K. (2023). Can We Turn People Into Pain Pumps? On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion. Journal of Moral Philosophy, , 1-32. [More Information]

2022

  • Anstey, P., Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2022). A Materialist Theory of the Mind in Context. Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind, (pp. 9-23). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Latham, A. (2022). Ancestor simulations and the Dangers of Simulation Probes. Erkenntnis. [More Information]
  • Anstey, P., Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2022). Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]

2020

  • Chan, L., Braddon-Mitchell, D., Latham, A. (2020). Alien worlds, alien laws, and the Humean conceivability argument. Ratio, 33(1), 1-13. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. (2020). Conativism about Personal Identity. In Andrea Sauchelli (Eds.), Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry, (pp. 159-269). Abingdon: Routledge. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2020). Reactive Concepts : Engineering the Concept CONCEPT. In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen, David Plunkett (Eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, (pp. 79-99). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]

2019

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. (2019). Quantum Gravity, Timelessness, and the Contents of Thought. Philosophical Studies, 176(7), 1807-1829. [More Information]

2017

  • Angus, D., Latham, A., Harmon-Jones, E., Deliano, M., Balleine, B., Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2017). Electrocortical components of anticipation and consumption in a monetary incentive delay task. Psychophysiology, 54(11), 1686-1705. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. (2017). On Time and the Varieties of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, 326, 67-85. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2017). The Glue of the Universe. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, Huw Price (Eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, (pp. 1-23). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]

2015

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2015). A Priori Analysis and the Methodological a Posteriori. In Daly, C (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods, (pp. 33-50). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. (2015). On Metaphysical Analysis. In Barry Loewer, Jonathan Schaffer (Eds.), A Companion to David Lewis, (pp. 40-59). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. [More Information]

2014

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2014). Against the illusion theory of temporal phenomenology. CAPE International Workshop, Kyoto, Japan: CAPE Publications.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2014). David Lewis, David Armstrong, and the Causal Theory of the Mind. In A Bailey (Eds.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers, (pp. 129-146). USA: Bloomsbury Publishing. [More Information]

2013

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2013). David Lewis, David Armstrong and the causal theory of the mind. In A Bailey (Eds.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers, (pp. 129-146). USA: Bloomsbury Publishing.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2013). Fighting the Zombie of the Growing Salami. In Karen Bennett and Dean W. Zimmerman (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 8, (pp. 1-12). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2013). Weasels and the A Priori. In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury, and Kenneth Williford (Eds.), Millikan and her critics, (pp. 241-258). Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. [More Information]

2009

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Nola, R. (2009). Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. United States: MIT Press.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2009). Introducing the Canberra Plan. In David Braddon-Mitchell, Robert Nola (Eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, (pp. 1-20). United States: MIT Press.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2009). Naturalistic Analysis and the A Priori. In David Braddon-Mitchell, Robert Nola (Eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, (pp. 23-43). United States: MIT Press.

2007

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2007). Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness. In Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, (pp. 287-299). UK and USA: Blackwell Publishers.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Jackson, F. (2007). The philosophy of mind and cognition. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.
  • Miller, K., Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2007). There is no simpliciter simpliciter. Philosophical Studies, 136, 249-278. [More Information]

2006

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2006). Believing Falsely Makes It So. Mind, 115(460), 833-865. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. (2006). Talking about a Universalist World. Philosophical Studies, 130(3), 499-534. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. (2006). The physics of extended simples. Analysis Reviews, 66(291), 222-226. [More Information]

2005

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2005). Conceptual stability and the meaning of natural kind terms. Biology and Philosophy, 20(4), 859-868.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2005). The Subsumption of Reference. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56(1), 157-178. [More Information]

2004

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2004). Folk Theories Of The Third Kind. Ratio, 17(3), 277-293. [More Information]
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2004). How Do We Know It Is Now Now? (Time Theories). Analysis Reviews, 64(3), 199-203.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Miller, K. (2004). How To Be A Conventional Person. Monist, 87(4 (Oct)), 457-474. [More Information]

2003

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2003). Qualia and analytical conditionals. The Journal of Philosophy, 100(3), 111-135. [More Information]

2002

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., Jackson, F. (2002). A Pyrrhic Victory for Teleonomy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80(3), 372-377.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2002). Functionalism [in Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science]. In Lynn Nadel, editor-in-chief (Eds.), Encyclopedia of cognitive science. (pp. v. 2 : 170-175). London: Macmillan Press.

2001

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2001). Intentionality and rationality: an analytic repspective. In Neil J. Smelser, Paul B. Baltes (Eds.), International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences. (pp. 7685-7691). Amsterdam ; New York: Elsevier.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2001). Lossy Laws. NOUS, XXXV, 260-277.
  • Braddon-Mitchell, D., West, C. (2001). Temporal Phase Pluralism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXII, 59-84.

2000

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2000). Causation and persistance : a theory of causation / by Douglas Ehring [Review]. Mind, 109(435), 587-597.

Selected Grants

2018

  • Time: The Scientific and Folk Perspectives, Miller K, Callender C, Beebee H, Braddon-Mitchell D, Tallant J, Baron S, Wilson A, Australian Research Council (ARC)/Discovery Projects (DP)

2013

  • Sydney Neuroscience Network, Balleine B, Absalom N, Braddon-Mitchell D, Callaghan S, Chawla S, Christie M, Collins M, Einfeld S, Grieve S, Haber P, Hanrahan J, Harris A, Hickie I, Kassiou M, Kril J, Meikle S, Morris R, Ramos F, Rong Y, Sue C, DVC Research/Research Network Scheme (SyReNS)