Associate Professor Nick Smith

A14 - The Quadrangle
The University of Sydney

Telephone +61 2 9036 6242
Fax +61 2 9351 3918

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Biographical details

I have been at Sydney since 2005. From 2001?2004 I was a Lecturer in Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington. Before that I was a graduate student at Princeton University, where I was awarded an MA in 1998 and a PhD in 2001. I did my undergraduate work at the University of Sydney, where I was awarded a BA(Hons) in 1995.

Research interests

Logics, philosophy of language, probability and decision theory, metaphysics, epistemology, history of analytic philosophy.

Teaching and supervision

  • PHIL 1012 Introductory Logic
  • PHIL 2615 Intermediate Logic

Associations

  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Associate Editor
  • Archives for the Philosophy and History of Soft Computing: Editorial Board and Advisory Board

Selected grants

2008

  • A Computational Solution to the Problem of Reference; Smith N; Australian Research Council (ARC)/Discovery Projects (DP).

2007

  • Vagueness in Language and Objects: A Logical Approach; Smith N; University of Sydney/Bridging Support.

Selected publications

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Books

  • Smith, N. (2012). Logic: The Laws of Truth. Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press.
  • Smith, N. (2008). Vagueness and Degrees of Truth. New York, United States: Oxford University Press.

Book Chapters

  • Smith, N. (2014). One Bald Man … Two Bald Men … Three Bald Men—Aahh Aahh Aahh Aahh Aaaahhhh!. In K. Akiba & A. Abasnezhad (Eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity: New Essays on Ontic Vagueness. New York: Springer.
  • Smith, N. (2012). Many-Valued Logics. In G Russell & DG Fara (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, (pp. 636-651). New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
  • Smith, N. (2011). Comments on A Conversation About Fuzzy Logic and Vagueness by Christian G. Fermuller and Petr Hajek. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 417-421). London, UK: College Publications.
  • Smith, N. (2011). Comments on Inconstancy and Inconsistency by David Ripley. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 59-62). London, UK: College Publications.
  • Smith, N. (2011). Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 1-19). London, UK: College Publications.
  • Smith, N. (2011). Reply to Francesco Paoli's Comments on Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 37-40). London, UK: College Publications.
  • Smith, N. (2011). Reply to Libor Behounek's Comments on Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 29-32). London, UK: College Publications.
  • Smith, N. (2010). Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value. In Richard Dietz and Sebastoamo Moruzzi (Eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, (pp. 491-506). Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Journals

  • Smith, N. (2014). Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy - One Kind of Credence. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, , 1-18. [More Information]
  • Smith, N. (2013). Time Travel. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2013, 1-22.
  • Smith, N. (2012). Measuring and Modeling Truth. American Philosophical Quarterly, 49(4), 345-356.
  • Smith, N. (2010). Inconsistency in the A-Theory. Philosophical Studies, 156(2), 231-247. [More Information]
  • Smith, N. (2009). Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference not Consequence. Philosophy Compass, 4(4), 639-665. [More Information]
  • Smith, N. (2008). Why Sense Cannot Be Made of Vague Identity. NOUS, 42(1), 1-16.
  • Smith, N. (2006). Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox. Monist, 89(1), 178-202.
  • Smith, N. (2005). A Plea For Things That Are Not Quite All There: Or, Is There a Problem about Vague Composition and Vague Existence. Journal of Philosophy, 102(8), 381-421.
  • Smith, N. (2005). Vagueness as Closeness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83(2), 157-183.
  • Smith, N. (2005). Why Would Time Travellers Try to Kill their Younger Selves? Monist, 88(3), 1-8.
  • Smith, N. (2004). Vagueness and Blurry Sets. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33(2), 165-235.
  • Rosen, G., Smith, N. (2004). Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(1), 185-198.
  • Smith, N. (2003). Vagueness by Numbers? No Worries. Mind: a quarterly review of philosophy, 112(446), 283-290.

2014

  • Smith, N. (2014). One Bald Man … Two Bald Men … Three Bald Men—Aahh Aahh Aahh Aahh Aaaahhhh!. In K. Akiba & A. Abasnezhad (Eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity: New Essays on Ontic Vagueness. New York: Springer.
  • Smith, N. (2014). Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Belief: Two Kinds of Indeterminacy - One Kind of Credence. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, , 1-18. [More Information]

2013

  • Smith, N. (2013). Time Travel. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2013, 1-22.

2012

  • Smith, N. (2012). Logic: The Laws of Truth. Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press.
  • Smith, N. (2012). Many-Valued Logics. In G Russell & DG Fara (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language, (pp. 636-651). New York, NY, USA: Routledge.
  • Smith, N. (2012). Measuring and Modeling Truth. American Philosophical Quarterly, 49(4), 345-356.

2011

  • Smith, N. (2011). Comments on A Conversation About Fuzzy Logic and Vagueness by Christian G. Fermuller and Petr Hajek. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 417-421). London, UK: College Publications.
  • Smith, N. (2011). Comments on Inconstancy and Inconsistency by David Ripley. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 59-62). London, UK: College Publications.
  • Smith, N. (2011). Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 1-19). London, UK: College Publications.
  • Smith, N. (2011). Reply to Francesco Paoli's Comments on Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 37-40). London, UK: College Publications.
  • Smith, N. (2011). Reply to Libor Behounek's Comments on Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo and Petr Hajek (Eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, (pp. 29-32). London, UK: College Publications.

2010

  • Smith, N. (2010). Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value. In Richard Dietz and Sebastoamo Moruzzi (Eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, (pp. 491-506). Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Smith, N. (2010). Inconsistency in the A-Theory. Philosophical Studies, 156(2), 231-247. [More Information]

2009

  • Smith, N. (2009). Frege's Judgement Stroke and the Conception of Logic as the Study of Inference not Consequence. Philosophy Compass, 4(4), 639-665. [More Information]

2008

  • Smith, N. (2008). Vagueness and Degrees of Truth. New York, United States: Oxford University Press.
  • Smith, N. (2008). Why Sense Cannot Be Made of Vague Identity. NOUS, 42(1), 1-16.

2006

  • Smith, N. (2006). Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox. Monist, 89(1), 178-202.

2005

  • Smith, N. (2005). A Plea For Things That Are Not Quite All There: Or, Is There a Problem about Vague Composition and Vague Existence. Journal of Philosophy, 102(8), 381-421.
  • Smith, N. (2005). Vagueness as Closeness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83(2), 157-183.
  • Smith, N. (2005). Why Would Time Travellers Try to Kill their Younger Selves? Monist, 88(3), 1-8.

2004

  • Smith, N. (2004). Vagueness and Blurry Sets. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33(2), 165-235.
  • Rosen, G., Smith, N. (2004). Worldly Indeterminacy: A Rough Guide. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(1), 185-198.

2003

  • Smith, N. (2003). Vagueness by Numbers? No Worries. Mind: a quarterly review of philosophy, 112(446), 283-290.

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