Dr Thomas Besch

PhD Oxf
Lecturer

A14 - The Quadrangle
The University of Sydney

Telephone +61 2 9351 2216
Fax +61 2 9351 3918

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Biographical details

Thomas M. Besch did his PhD at the University of Oxford. He mainly works in the area of contemporary political and moral philosophy, with special interest in the issue of diversity and discursive inclusion, as well as the phenomenology, epistemology and the morality of disagreement about the grounds, standards and the scope of practical reasoning, justification, reasonableness and justice. Before he came to Sydney, he taught Logic at Oxford and Social and Political Philosophy in Ankara.

Teaching and supervision

  • Society (PHIL1013)
  • Democratic Theory (PHIL2634)
  • Contemporary Political Philosophy (PHIL2635)
  • Public Reason
  • On Toleration
  • Cosmopolitanism and Community
  • Rawls

Associations

  • Member of the Australasian Association of Philosophy (since 2009).
  • Member of the International Society for Justice Research (2008).
  • Member of the American Philosophical Association (since 2007).

Selected grants

2006

  • Research Grant, Bilkent University; Besch T; Bilkent University/Research Grant.

Selected publications

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Books

  • Besch, T. (1998). Über John Rawls’ politischen Liberalismus: Zur Rolle des Vernünftigen in Rawls' Begründung einer politischen Gerechtigkeitstheorie. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Publishing.

Book Chapters

  • Besch, T. (2010). Diversity and the Limits of Liberal Toleration. In Duncan Ivison (Eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Multiculturalism, (pp. 75-94). Farnham: Ashgate.

Journals

  • Besch, T. (2014). On Discursive Respect. Social Theory and Practice, 40(2), 207-231.
  • Besch, T. (2013). On a Reflexive Case for Human Rights. Journal of East-West Thought, 4(3), 51-64.
  • Besch, T. (2013). On Political Legitimacy, Reasonableness, and Perfectionism. Public Reason: Journal of Political and Moral Philosophy, 5(1), 58-74.
  • Besch, T. (2012). Political liberalism, the internal conception, and the problem of public dogma. Philosophy and Public Issues, 2(1), 153-177.
  • Besch, T. (2011). Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity. Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review, 50(2011), 347-365. [More Information]
  • Besch, T. (2009). Kantian Constructivism, the Issue of Scope, and Perfectionism: O'Neill on Ethical Standing. European Journal of Philosophy, 19(1), 1-20. [More Information]
  • Besch, T. (2008). Constructing Practical Reason: O'Neill on the Grounds of Kantian Constructivism. Journal of Value Inquiry, 42(1), 55-76. [More Information]

2014

  • Besch, T. (2014). On Discursive Respect. Social Theory and Practice, 40(2), 207-231.

2013

  • Besch, T. (2013). On a Reflexive Case for Human Rights. Journal of East-West Thought, 4(3), 51-64.
  • Besch, T. (2013). On Political Legitimacy, Reasonableness, and Perfectionism. Public Reason: Journal of Political and Moral Philosophy, 5(1), 58-74.

2012

  • Besch, T. (2012). Political liberalism, the internal conception, and the problem of public dogma. Philosophy and Public Issues, 2(1), 153-177.

2011

  • Besch, T. (2011). Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity. Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review, 50(2011), 347-365. [More Information]

2010

  • Besch, T. (2010). Diversity and the Limits of Liberal Toleration. In Duncan Ivison (Eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Multiculturalism, (pp. 75-94). Farnham: Ashgate.

2009

  • Besch, T. (2009). Kantian Constructivism, the Issue of Scope, and Perfectionism: O'Neill on Ethical Standing. European Journal of Philosophy, 19(1), 1-20. [More Information]

2008

  • Besch, T. (2008). Constructing Practical Reason: O'Neill on the Grounds of Kantian Constructivism. Journal of Value Inquiry, 42(1), 55-76. [More Information]

1998

  • Besch, T. (1998). Über John Rawls’ politischen Liberalismus: Zur Rolle des Vernünftigen in Rawls' Begründung einer politischen Gerechtigkeitstheorie. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Publishing.

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