Shipping lines well, and lets us enjoy some side stories, such as watching J. P. Morgan prove that though he could perhaps spell "transatlantic oligopoly," he certainly did not know how to run one.

One of the several virtues of this study is that Keeling sets the transatlantic cartels in a context that makes it clear that their activities were part of a bigger story of transatlantic economic and migration patterns. The cartels were servants of people, usually of middling or lesser means, who were going to make major life changes and would make these moves whether or not massive steamship empires existed. Keeling has admirable discussions of the conditions of second- and third-class facilities on ships and of their surprisingly rapid upgrading around the turn of the century, much greater improvements than simple economic rationality would have dictated. Given his prodigious research, my only disappointment on this front is that Keeling either intentionally ignores or is unaware of the second most comprehensive contemporary study of transatlantic migration patterns in this period (the report by the U.S.'s Dillingham Commission was the most sweeping). This was the Swedish government's *Emigrationsutredningen* (1907–1913). It consisted of a massive report and twenty appendixes, several of which were monographs in themselves. A significant portion of the data collected compared European nations and their participation in the transatlantic migration business. Information on the details of migrants' conditions was assembled by interviewers and also by direct investigation of the conditions of carriage and of shore-wait facilities. My guess is that this material would have strengthened Keeling's conclusions, not undermined them.

Of course, all historical authors have to negotiate their own trade-offs between depth and breadth. The depth of this study is made possible by the author's concentrating almost entirely on the four main U.S. Atlantic ports (New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore). However, the worldwide migration trade was more extensive than Keeling is willing to grant. The U.S. was often only a landing port for a stepwise migration to other nations, especially to the various parts of the British Empire and to South America. It would be splendid if he would make that his next project.

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Internationalism, as social scientists might say, is under-defined. This is especially evident when one considers the phenomenon of nationalism, with which internationalism is often paired. The theoretical and empirical scholarship on nationalism is massive. Yet despite what Glenda Sluga aptly calls the “international turn in history” in recent years, the scholarship on internationalism remains rudimentary by comparison. For this reason alone, *Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism* is welcome.

In the book, which is more an extended essay than a monograph, Sluga explores the nature of twentieth-century internationalism. Her basic argument is that internationalism and nationalism were “entangled.” “[T]he history of internationalism,” she writes, “maps profoundly onto the genealogy of nations and nationalism,” and “in the twentieth century the international and national shadowed each other as the object or method of political ambitions” (p. 157). Scholars, accordingly, need to write internationalism back into the history of the last century, a history, Sluga notes, that is dominated by “narratives of nationalism” (p. 3). In very general terms, there is not much to be said about this argument. Few scholars nowadays are likely to disagree that internationalism and nationalism are interconnected or that an exclusive focus on nationalism and the nation-state is insufficient. More intriguing is the way in which Sluga defines internationalism.

Sluga is principally interested in liberal internationalism, which encompasses the manifold activities of individuals and organized groups aimed at promoting global peace, prosperity, and liberty. Liberal internationalists viewed unbridled nationalism as the principal threat. In a world of competing nation-states, nationalism fostered endemic rivalry, conflict, and war. To subdue nationalism meant to restrain the nation-state and, more precisely, the exercise of national sovereignty by individual states. Numerous proposals were floated, among them creating some form of world government, establishing regional federations, and constructing human and minority rights regimes. Meanwhile, efforts to cooperate across national borders flourished on a host of issues, including labor, health, women’s rights, anticolonialism, and disarmament. One important advantage of Sluga’s definition of internationalism is that it allows her to highlight the scope of the phenomenon: a vast and diverse array of people and groups strove to make the world a better place. There is much fodder here for the enterprising scholar. At the same time, Sluga’s definition risks obscuring other actors who operate across borders and regions, such as migration networks, multinational corporations, anarchist groups, and organized criminal enterprises.

In focusing on liberal internationalism, Sluga roots her study of the subject in two prominent international organizations: the interwar League of Nations and the postwar United Nations. Here she builds on recent scholarship by Patricia Clavin and Susan G. Pedersen, among others, who show that the League was not simply a security institution, but was also active in the social, economic, financial, and colonial realms. This choice reinforces Sluga’s emphasis on attempts to restrain national sovereignty. After all, whether implicitly or explicitly, the League’s Covenant and the UN’s Charter both envisaged a world divided into sovereign nation-states in which governments enjoyed undisputed au-
thority at home. In working with, through, and alongside the League and the UN, liberal internationalists sought, in effect, to improve international governance. Just as importantly, for the most part they did not look to overthrow the existing international order. Throughout, Sluga is at pains to stress the realism of the individuals and groups she identifies. They were not “ideologues and radicals” but practical and progressive political operators imbued with a communitarian sense of international politics (p. 2). Taken together, she insists, they imagined “a liberal international world order compatible with national patriotism and ‘collective security’ . . . and profoundly connected to the history of democracy as well as peace and moral improvement” (p. 6). For Sluga, two points follow from the emphasis on a realistic reform agenda centered on the League and the UN. First, at several moments during the twentieth century, and particularly following World War II, the liberal internationalist vision and its prescriptions were immensely popular in the Western world, occupying the “liberal political mainstream” (p. 8). Second, in recent decades the UN has declined as the leading locus of internationalism, as countries have opted for more “nation-state-specific responses” to the international challenges facing them (p. 149). For Sluga, the history of twentieth-century internationalism is thus the story of a “world that we have lost” (p. 150). No longer do people conceive of the nation-state as a transitional development in a world advancing toward “ever-widening circles of association” (p. 150).

One might question whether the UN has been as marginalized as Sluga suggests or whether liberal internationalism belongs to the past. More fundamentally, perhaps, one wonders whether other definitions of internationalism might generate different narratives and conclusions. But if so, this simply underscores the immense value of Sluga’s contribution. She has written a stimulating essay that prods its readers to think hard about a multifaceted phenomenon that marked the twentieth century.

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Jonathan M. House seeks to fill some empty spaces with this general survey of military history in the early Cold War period. In many ways this work is a logical addition to the publisher’s Campaigns and Commanders book series, which offers traditional unit histories, military biographies, narratives of epic battles, and studies of transformations of tactics in the Western world. While including some of those aspects, House’s synthesis aspires to do more by examining the “neglected middle ground” between elite policymakers and the proverbial boots on the ground (p. xi). It reminds readers that, despite politicians’ characterization of the period between wars as “peacetime,” millions served in uniform in a state of constant military readiness. House gives even-handed treatments of several themes: military alliances, civil-military tensions, conscription and mobilization, and inter-service bureaucratic battles over appropriations, reorganizational structures, and control over nuclear weapons. By doing so, he shows how military history encompasses more than non-specialists often realize.

The book fills another common void left behind by other military histories of the Cold War. It moves the narrative away from a traditional bipolar understanding of the Cold War by examining the international dimensions in places as diverse as Greece, China, Algeria, Lebanon, and Cuba. This comprehensive military history succeeds in demonstrating how historical actors on the periphery, particularly colonial insurgencies and revolutions, caused the superpowers to react in many strategic locations. Perhaps the book’s greatest achievement, therefore, is its ability to cover the breadth of military experiences across much of the globe, balanced with the depth of specific operations, all in the context of the international Cold War.

By showing how operations were executed, House connects the dots that other histories ignore. For example, diplomatic histories of the origins of the Cold War often reference the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and aid to Greece as early signs of the U.S. containment policy that would soon include the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In this work, though, readers come to understand what military assistance looked like in the context of the withdrawal of British troops, the Greek Civil War, a bickering insurgency, and tensions behind the Iron Curtain. Despite the substantial investment of $1 billion to prop up the anticommunist government, House concludes that it would be “simplistic” to assume that the Americans played the decisive role, as is often portrayed in other works (p. 74). The insurgency ultimately failed when it attempted to wage an impossible conventional war, and the Soviets’ reluctance to intervene, thereby avoiding a wider war, also sealed the fate of the Communists. In this and other case studies, readers can gauge the limits of power and also understand how military affairs provided the fuel that kept the Cold War on a warm simmer.

One should pause before finding fault with any ambitious work that spans more ground than a specialized study. And yet, one concern is worthy of consideration. This is a two-directional history. One direction shows the impacts of external forces on a nation’s decision and ability to wage war; the other direction flows down the chain of command within a state. Despite bringing in more historical actors, House largely ignores a third direction that moves from the bottom up: the people who were affected by military developments at all levels, especially those who influenced the very policymakers and commanders under examination. This is, of course, in part by design. But individuals at the unit level and in the broader public helped shape decisions made at