The authors deserve serious praise for a useful examination of institutional corruption within an applied philosophical framework. There are however, some disappointments, mainly in the book’s failure to come fully to grips with the nature of corruption and approaches to stopping it
The major accomplishment is the book’s attempt to place many philosophical beliefs in a practical framework. In doing so it provides a solid background on issues of illegal and corrupt activity that can be used by philosophy departments in teaching applied ethics courses. It is particularly useful to teachers concerned with ethical behaviour in an institutional or organisational setting. The book provides many case examples and concrete discussions on current corruption issues.
The concentration is on institutional, rather than personal corruption, although the book notes the interdependence of the two actions. The authors examine the causes and motivation for corruption and why it is wrong. They also specify types of corrupt activities including a full chapter on one of the main causes - conflicts of interest. The second half of the book details a lengthy series of anti-corruption measures – the investigative and legislative framework, as well as from the viewpoint of preventative systems – codes of ethics, regulatory frameworks, corporate governance and systems for increasing transparency A full chapter is devoted to whistleblowing. In addition, several real life examples are discussed at length including the Columbian Drug industry, Enron, the Cash for Comments case, the US Savings & Loan scandal, Watergate, the Lockheed bribery scandal, Bhopal, HIH, plus numerous smaller issues.
If the book deserves criticism, it is for the scattered and sometimes illogical way in which it sets out its arguments. It is a criticism that can be mitigated however, by a sound editing for sequence and clarity of argument. A second edition of the book should correct these problems, and would ensure that the book is a welcome addition to any ethical philosopher’s bookshelf.
The most noticeable need for correction is the definition of corruption itself. The book notes that it “demolishes” the definitions of corruption used by the World Bank and others (p.x). Unfortunately, the authors fail to replace the demolished definition. The opening chapter explores a series of forms of corruption, noting at the outset that “it is unlikely that any precise definition is possible” and concludes with “finding a neat definition of corruption has proved to be an elusive one”. Corruption, as “a species of moral wrongdoing”, is illustrated rather than defined. Among the illustrations are that it is relative to a morally acceptable position or person prior to the act; that it is an habitual action (in that a public official who accepts only one bribe is not corrupt (p. 12)); that there must be the intention to corrupt (p.13). The overall effect is that a reader is not sure of what corruption actually is.
The World Bank and OECD also have a problem defining corruption, but their problem is in deciding when there is wrongdoing. The meaning of corruption is not too ambiguous – the OECD describes it as the acceptance of various types of favours to subvert trusted ways of conducting private, business or government affairs. OECD research has identified several grey areas in defining wrongdoing. They are facilitation payments, gifts and hospitality offerings, conflicts of interest and the use of intermediaries. It is, for instance, extremely difficult at times to differentiate between a well–couched extortion demand and a lobbying suggestion. And deciding whether paying that demand is bribery or facilitation, requires a highly analytical capability in moral reasoning The World Bank also does not see corruption as solely an economic issue. “The Bank has identified corruption as the greatest single obstacle to economic and social development… especially severe on the poor … increases the price for public services, lowers its quality, and restricts access water, education, health care…”
Corruption and Anti-corruption outlines a number of moral principles in chapter 4 presumably to help ascertain what aspects of corruption are wrong, The chapter discusses infringement of rights, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, teleological arguments, and consequentialist issues. The discussion is not exhaustive in that it does not explore the weaknesses and inconsistencies in these theories in any depth. In fact, the discussion appears to permit the use of any of these concepts to demonstrate corruption. A final section of the chapter examines the harm consequent on an act of corruption under five categories – harm to self, family, profession, organization and society. These harms, however, do not appear to be put forward as the principal measures of wrong-doing. Even the claim in this chapter that corruption undermines a social institution (p.80) as a further illustration of the nature of corruption adds to the uncertainty. Refusals to vote, or to attend for jury duty, for instance, undermine our social institutions but are unlikely to be thought of as corrupt acts.
Subsequent chapters carry the assessment of wrong-doing further, giving attention to ethical virtues (p.108) plus a more complete analysis of rights (p.173), including a brief description of Alan Gewirth’s advocacy of the rights to freedom and well being. Gewirth also proposes that one right can override another if harm is minimised. The authors claim that the institutions of justice carry the major burden for making this judgement. It is, however, a judgment that many of us also need to make when moral issues conflict.
The chapter on whistleblowing is another major step forward for it is rare that an applied philosophy book will give much attention to this topic. Unfortunately, however, the chapter is in need of updating and correction The organization Whistleblowers Anonymous has been Whistleblowers Australia for some years. Nor is there a federal counterpart to the NSW Protected Disclosures Act, 1994. The authors, in fact, would have done well to note that Australia is the only English speaking nation without national legislation to protect whistleblowers. A proposed bill from the Australian Democrats has been sitting in parliament for two to three years, raising the speculation that neither of the major parties want effective whistleblower protection, a speculation that receives support from developments in other countries.. Other points that the authors could consider is that a whistleblower need not be a member of the organisation – the more progressive state legislation (which is in Victoria & W.Australia, incidentally, not NSW) protects any person – contractors, suppliers – who has access to information on wrongdoing. A more serious point, however, is the claim that in the public sector whistleblowing to an agency such as an Ombudsman or a Commission against Corruption is not whistleblowing. In fact, all effective whistleblower protection legislation, world wide, has such an agency, or sometimes several. Without them, no method exists to ensure the accusation is investigated and corrected if it is not sufficiently dramatic to interest the media. Nor is the whistleblower protected, - a principal function of these agencies.
The final chapters are devoted to the rights of suspects, punishment (mainly concerned with white collar crime), and institutional justice. Interesting, well written and useful, the connection with corruption is nevertheless, somewhat distant. They would fit better perhaps in a philosophy of law text. The space might be used more effectively to provide a deeper analysis of the organisational approaches to strengthening ethical behaviour, and minimising corruption, in the public and private institutions of the country.
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