Sedition: ‘Conduct or language inciting to rebellion against the constituted authority in a state’.

Sedition poses immanent problems for liberal states. These states are founded on principles of freedom of expression and individual liberty; yet they draw the line at sedition. In denying individuals the right to sedition, liberal states curtail their constitutive principles. Ultimately, the problem posed by sedition is the problem of distinguishing legal from illegal violence. If states come into being through violence (either as a matter of historical fact or understood ‘transcendentally’, i.e., in the absence of any prior legitimation), then a critical reflection on sedition inevitably questions the basis of the modern legal-juridical order.

Is the critique of sedition a seditious act? Or is sedition a dialectical ruse of the state, a doubling that defines the object to which the state is opposed? Is it possible, on the other hand, that questioning the state is the wrong strategy; that we must learn to think sedition otherwise than sovereignty and the state? What ethical status may be granted to ‘communities of sedition’? How have recent depictions of sedition in art, literature, music and film challenged us to rethink sedition in the name of positive social transformation and renewal?

In the United States, Britain, Australia and elsewhere, a juridical concept of sedition threatens to undermine or even criminalize activities that might otherwise promote positive social transformation and renewal. How might we recast the problem of sedition so as to alleviate its sovereign violence? How might we rethink the problem of sedition so as to liberate the critical and progressive (i.e., creative) energies of society?


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