Daniel Garber, Why the Scientific Revolution Wasn't a Scientific Revolution
25 August 2014
6:00 - 7:30pm
Law LT 101
Sydney Law School
The University of Sydney
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Jennifer Mensch (Penn State) on Kant's Organicism
20 August 2014
3:30 - 5:00pm
Muniment Room, Main Quad
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Anthony Grafton, How Jesus Celebrated Passover: Renaissance Scholars and the Jewish Origins of Christianity
13 August 2014
The Great Hall
The University of Sydney
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The Future of the History of Ideas Workshop
11–12 August 2014
The Professorial Board Room
(upstairs from the Nicholson Museum)
Quadrangle, The University of Sydney
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ROCK, BONE AND RUIN: Evidence in Historical Science
Thursday & Friday 8-9 May, 2014
University of Sydney
Historical scientists frequently work under poor epistemic conditions: as traces degrade there is a dearth of direct evidence for theories about the deep past. Some philosophers and scientists are sceptical about our ability to uncover many facts about the deep past, and yet, in the face of epistemic deprivation, historical scientists produce (at least sometimes) well-supported theories and hypotheses. This suggests that some philosophers have underestimated the ingenuity of historical scientists. By incorporating approaches and evidence from a wide variety of disciplines, taking surrogative approaches such as analogous reasoning and modelling, and by weaving complex, interdependent explanations, they extend our reach into the past. The aim of this workshop is to extend our models of historical confirmation by considering two broad questions: (1) How should we understand evidence in the historical sciences? (2) How should this affect our optimism or otherwise about scientists’ abilities to know the past?
Related topics include the role of models in confirming historical hypotheses, the nature of historical explanation, material remains as evidence and their connection to behavioural and social facts, the role of background (or ‘midrange’) theories in confirmation, as well as the importance of new technologies and perspectives in historical science.
- Alison Wylie (University of Washington): How archaeological evidence bites back: scaffolding, critical distance, and triangulation.
- Derek Turner (Connecticut College): A second look at the colors of the dinosaurs.
- Lindell Bromham (ANU): Testing hypotheses in macroevolution.
- Peter Hiscock (Sydney): Staying put or moving on? Ethnographic reference as stabilizing framework or as limiting vision in Australian archaeology.
- John Wilkins (Melbourne): Evolutionary novelty and surprise.
- Adrian Currie (ANU & Calgary): Ethnographic analogy, the comparative method and archaeological special pleading.
- Malte Ebach (UNSW) and Michaelis Michael (UNSW): Do the links between evidence and causation in the historical sciences stand up to scrutiny? A need for standard criteria.
- Roland Fletcher (Sydney): What are the entities of cultural evolution?
- Kim Shaw-Williams (ANU) & Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera (ANU): towards a new view of human origins: the wetlands foraging hypothesis.
- Maureen O’Malley (Sydney): Molecular stories from the life sciences: reconciling the past.
- Robert Hurley (Well): Ask any scientician: the unique difficulties of applying the philosophy of the historical sciences to human history.
Hosted by the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science and the Tom Austen Brown Bequest.
Thursday 8th May
All events in CCANESA Boardroom in Madsen unless otherwise noted.
|9:00||Paul Griffiths (Sydney):
Welcome & Introduction
|9:15||Malte Ebach & Michaelis Michael (UNSW):
Do the links between evidence and causation in the historical sciences stand up to scrutiny? A need for standard criteria.
|10:15||Lindell Bromham (ANU):
Testing hypotheses in macroevolution
|11:40||Adrian Currie (ANU/Calgary):
Ethnographic analogy, the comparative method, and archaeological special pleading
|1:30||Peter Hiscock (Sydney):
Staying put or moving on? Ethnographic reference as stabilizing framework or as limiting vision in Australian Archaeology.
|3:00||Keynote: Alison Wylie (University of Washington):
How archaeological evidence bites back: scaffolding, critical distance, and triangulation.
Eastern Avenue Lecture Theatre
|5:00||Reception, Macleay Museum|
Friday 9th May
All events in CCANESA Boardroom in Madsen unless otherwise noted.
|9:30||Maureen O’Malley (Sydney):
Molecular stories from the life sciences: reconciling the past
|11:00||Kim Shaw-Williams & Ivan Gonzalen-Cabrera (ANU):
Towards a new vision of human origins: the wetlands foraging hypothesis.
|1:00||Keynote: Derek Turner (Connecticut College):
A second look at the colors of the dinosaurs
|3:30||John Wilkins (Melbourne):
Evolutionary novelty and surprise
|4:30||Roland Fletcher (Sydney):
What are the entities of cultural evolution?
The Hut Thai on Glebe Point Road
Katherine Dunlop (Texas): SCFS Visitor
Kant on “Transcendental” and Ordinary Logic’
Wednesday 5 March, 3:30-5:30pm
The Critique of Pure Reason is structured as an (eighteenth-century) treatise on logic. In particular, the Categories are identified through their supposed correspondence with logically basic forms of judgment. But while Kant claims logic abstracts from thought's content, i.e. its relation to an object, his own theory of cognitionwhich he designates 'transcendental logic'is supposed to concern 'pure thinking of objects'. To solve the puzzle of how Kant can regard his theory as a logic, I argue that the content thematized in transcendental logic is already presupposed in ordinary logic. Like many other eighteenth-century thinkers, Kant conceives logic as rules for the use of mental faculties, and on his view the proper use of our understanding is to relate to objects (through intuition). On this interpretation, Kant's view is undeniably psychologistic. As such it faces the classic objection that it wrongly narrows logic’s scope, to things we can think about. In particular, on this interpretation logic is inapplicable to things in themselves. I argue that this consequence should be accepted: logical knowledge, as Kant conceives it, exceeds what we can claim about things in themselves.
Arithmetic and Geometry in Poincaré’s Science and Hypothesis
Monday 10 March, 4:00-6:00pm
It is usually supposed that Poincaré’s Science and Hypothesis contains a unified view of mathematics and physical science. But its defense of a role for intuition in arithmetic does not fit well with the conventionalism Poincaré advocates elsewhere in the book. After bringing out the conflict, I argue that the most usual way of resolving it does not succeed. That is to suppose the sciences are arranged in a hierarchy such that arithmetic is presupposed by geometry, which is presupposed by mechanics, etc. On the usual reading, Poincaré takes arithmetic to depend on an a priori intuition which underlies the notion of natural number (and with it the principle of mathematical induction), and is thereby seen to underlie all science. In contrast, I maintain that Poincaré conceives mathematical reasoning as a general type, of which the justification of arithmetical notions is just one instance, distinct from its application to geometry. The sense in which intuition is foundational for all science is that it helps us to decide on conventions, by showing them to be appropriate in light of our experience. So Poincaré’s account of arithmetic has a place in his overall view of science, just a different place than is usually supposed.
Workshop: ‘Methodology and Mathematics from Newton to Euler’
Thursday 20 March, 9:15-5:00pm
Participants: Peter Anstey, Katherine Dunlop, Stephen Gaukroger, Kristen Walsh
|9.15||Katherine Dunlop (Texas): 'Christian Wolff on Newtonianism and Exact Science'|
|11:00||Peter Anstey (Sydney): 'From scientific syllogisms to mathematical certainty'|
|2:00||Kirsten Walsh (Otago): 'Newton's method'|
|3:30||Stephen Gaukroger (Sydney): ‘D’Alembert, Euler and mid-18th century rational
mechanics: what mechanics does not tell us about thee world’
Stephan Hartmann (Munich)
The No Alternatives Argument
Wednesday 19 March, 1:00-2:30pm
Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this paper. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning (which we call the No Alternatives
Argument) is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis.
Evolutionary Thinking: The 7th Munich-Sydney-Tilburg Philosophy of Science Conference
University of Sydney 20–22 March 2014
Evolutionary thinking is hugely influential in various areas of science as well as in philosophy. Philosophers of biology study core concepts of evolution, such as fitness and selection. Ethicists use evolutionary models to shed light on social institutions and moral practices. Evolutionary mechanisms are frequently invoked in philosophical debates about cognition and the human mind. Finally, evolutionary game theory has found its way into philosophy of language, theories of rationality, political and social philosophy. This conference will bring together scientists and philosophers from diverse backgrounds to explore the extent of evolutionary thought in contemporary philosophy and to consider the potential for future developments.
The keynote speakers at this conference are Rob Brooks (University of New South Wales), Anya Plutynski (Washington University, St Louis), and Kim Sterelny (Australian National University).
This is the 7th annual Munich-Sydney-Tilburg Philosophy of Science Conference. It is jointly sponsored by the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP), the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science (SCFS) and the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS). The conference series focuses on topical subjects in philosophy of science, with an eye towards modeling, applications and policy.
Conference Organising Committee:
- Mark Colyvan (SCFS, Sydney)
- Ofer Gal (SCFS, Sydney)
- Paul Griffiths (SCFS, Sydney)
- Stephan Hartman (MCMP, Munich)
- Daniela Helbig (SCFS, Sydney)
- Jan Sprenger (TiLPS, Tilburg)
Themes in early modern mathematics and medicine
8 November 2013
- 9.30 Charles Wolfe (Ghent): 'Early modern medical empiricism' (60 mins paper & discussion inclusive)
- 10.30 Alan Salter (Sydney): 'Richard Lower's model heart. The diagram as object of inquiry in early modern anatomy'
- 11.30 Coffee
- 12.00 Anik Waldow (Sydney): 'Experience and its explanatory role'
- 1.00 Lunch (provided) in Main Quad N293
- 2.30 Peter Anstey (Sydney): 'Mathematical principles as models'
- 3.30 Laura Kotevska (Sydney): 'Geometry at Port-Royal: some remarks on Arnauld’s Nouveaux éléments de géométrie' (45 mins paper & discussion)
- 4.15 Roundtable discussion
- 5.00 Wind up
The Quarantine Project Conference
14 -16th August 2014
This international conference builds from a large multidisciplinary investigation of more than 1,000 sandstone inscriptions that cover the stunning Quarantine Station in Sydney, Australia.
For further information please follow the link below
The Quarantine Project
History and Philosophy of Science Research Seminars 2013
Paul Oslington (Australian Catholic College)
The Religious Background of Adam Smith's Economics
Adam Smith (the historical Smith – not the imagined Smith of certain apologists for the contemporary American economic order) is a crucial figure in the history of economics, and the history of the larger scientific enterprise. Like his 18th century Scottish Enlightenment friends Smith was shaped by the Calvinism of the dominant Presbyterian Kirk. Newton and the British tradition of scientific natural theology provided the framework for his economic investigations. Continental natural law ethics influenced his moral philosophy, far more than utilitarianism. Aristotle was always in the background.
Whether or not Smith was an orthodox Christian is an unanswerable and ultimately irrelevant question, but the presumption of significant influence of theology on his system of thought is strengthened by his student notes of his (now lost) Glasgow lectures on natural theology, the prevalence of the language and thought forms of natural theology in his works, and the almost universal theological reading of his economics by his contemporaries.
I will test a theological reading of Smith’s works through the invisible hand passages. There are only three passages and each expresses an ambivalence about the harmonious functioning of the new market order, and the need for special providential divine action (or something of the sort) to maintain rough equality and thus the stability of the market order. This reading of the passages against their Calvinist and Newtonian natural theological background is directly opposed to the traditional economists reading of the passages as celebrating the co-coordinating and stabilizing properties of markets –the “magic of markets”. Smith did believe that a competitive market order generates good outcomes (applying the doctrine general providence to the economy) but the somewhat wistful invisible hand passages express something quite different.
The argument about Smith applies to some of the other major figures such as Paley, Malthus, Whately and Whewell who shaped the emergence of political economy as a discipline in the early 19th century.
When: Monday, September 2, 6pm - 8pm
University of Sydney Philosophy Seminars
Against Boltzmann's Brain Argument
Abstract: I set out an argument call it the Boltzmann Brain Argument to the effect that it is very likely that I am a disembodied brain-in-thermal-equilibrium vat with false perceptions and memories that have just fluctuated into being out of a state of chaos. In resisting the epistemic catastrophe brought about by Boltzmann Brain Argument, some philosophers of physics, notably Sean Carroll, have raised the early low entropy condition of the universe embodied in the Past Hypothesis to the status of a condition necessary for our knowledge of the external world. In this paper I attempt to dethrone the Past Hypothesis from this grandiose, transcendental status. I propose two arguments, arguably independent of the Past Hypothesis, to evade Bolzmann's epistemic catastrophe. One, which builds upon an argument by Richard Feynman, takes into account the orderliness of the observable portion of the universe. The other starts from the observation that we are carbon-based sentient life forms.
When: Monday, September 2, 1pm - 2:30pm
Where: University of Sydney Philosophy Common Room, Quad Building
"The Philosophical History of Wonder"
When: Friday September 6th, 10:30am - 12pm
SHAPE: Diego Bubbio (UWS)
"Hegel, the Trinity, and I
The main goal of this paper is to argue the relevance of Hegel’s notion of the Trinity with respect to two aspects of Hegel’s idealism: the overcoming of subjectivism and his conception of the I. I contend that these two aspects are interconnected and that the Trinity is important to Hegel’s strategy for addressing these questions.
I first address the problem of subjectivism by considering Hegel’s thought against the background of modern philosophy. I argue that the recognitive structure of Hegel’s idealism led him to give the Trinity a decisive role in his philosophical account. Next, I discuss the Trinity by analysing the three divine persons. This analysis paves the way for the conclusion, where I argue that the Trinity represents a model for re-thinking the I in a way that overcomes a “naïve realist” and a “subjective” account of the self. I suggest that Hegel’s absolute idealism can be conceived as an approach to the I that considers the role of acts of mutual recognition for the genesis of self-conscious thought, and that the Trinity is the Darstellung of the relational and recognitive structure of the I.
When: Friday, September 13, 10:30am - 12pm
The Munich-Sydney-Tilburg Conference Series: Models and Decisions (Munich, 10-12 April 2013)
History and Philosophy of Science in Australia: Looking Forward
26-28 September 2012
University of Sydney
The National Committee for History and Philosophy of Science workshop. Click here to go the workshop's webpage.
New Perspectives on Human Diversity
6-7 September 2012
Novotel Manly Pacific
Click here to go to the workshop's webpage.
The Inaugural Sydney Winter School in History and Philosophy of Science was held 16-27 July 2012. Click here to go to the Winter School website.
Visiting Fellow Steven Orzack appears in and will be discussing, along with Paul Griffiths, Flock of Dodos, a film which looks at how and why the debate over evolution has changed. The film will be screened at 6.00pm, Monday 14 May at the Eastern Av. Auditorium, and will be followed by a panel discussion including Steven and Paul and the film's director, Randy Olson.
Co-presented with Sydney Ideas and the School of Biological Sciences
Integration in Biology and Biomedicine workshop, 3-4 May 2012, held in conjunction with the Charles Perkins Centre and the Institute for Sustainable and Integrated Solutions.
Click here to go to the workshop's webpage, which includes information on the speakers, talks, and the program.
The Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS) conference
Friday 1 July to 1 pm Sunday 3 July, 2011
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
4th Sydney-Tilburg conference on the philosophy of science: "The Authority of Science"
8-10 April 2011, The University of Sydney
Click here for more information.
John Armstrong (University of Melbourne) and Paul Griffiths (USyd, SCFS): Ways of Seeing
Sydney Ideas event co-presented by the SCFS and Griffith Review
7 April 2011
Sydney Ideas lecture by Professor Alison Gopnik (University of California, Berkeley): The Philosophical Baby: What Childrens' Minds Tell Us About Truth, Love and the Meaning of Life
Thursday 24 February 2011
Law School Foyer, Eastern Av.
Sydney Ideas lecture by Professor Michael Hunter (University of London): The Royal Society and the Decline of Magic
Co-presented by the SCFS
Tuesday 15 February 2011
Summer workshop on Causation
13-14 January, 2011
This meeting is to be held in conjunction with a visit to the Centre for Time by the world-renowned Berkeley psychologist, Professor Alison Gopnik. Further details are available here.
"A Philosophy of Science Answerable to Chemistry"
An International Collaborative Workshop
Australian Academy of the Humanities
15-16 December 2010
Visiting Fellow Brian Keeley will present a paper, "Positing the Sixth Sense: Ground Rules and Candidates," at the HPS Research Seminar series.
23 August, 6-8pm, Carslaw 441
"Evolving the Future" workshop
28 September 2010
Organised by the Committee on the Human Aspects of Science and Technology & the Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science, University of Sydney.
Sydney International Ideas lecture: "Writing Science Lives" with Janet Browne, Harvard History of Science
The Seymour Centre, University of Sydney
12 August 2010, 6.30pm
The Australasian Association for Logic 2010 conference
2-4 July 2010, Room MB211 Morven Brown Building, The University of New South Wales
2010 Australasian Association of Philosophy (AAP) conference
4-9 July 2010, Kensington Campus, The University of New South Wales
Australasian Association for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Science (AAHPSSS) conference
9-11 July 2010
Professor Robert Olby International Ideas Public Lecture
"Francis Crick: Who was the Man Who Discovered DNA?"
9 March 2010, 6:30pm
Seymour Theatre Centre
Sydney-Tilburg conference on The Future of Philosophy of Science
14-16 April 2010
Tilburg University, The Netherlands
12-16 July 2009
Sydney-Tilburg Philosophy of Science Conference on "Evidence, Science and Public Policy"
26-28 March 2009
The opening of the SCFS, 31st July 2008. Public Lecture by Brian Skyrms:
"Groups and Networks: Their Role in the Evolution of Cooperation" (Podcast)