ARE Seminar by Dr Andrew Reeson
22 March 2012
Running repeated auctions for ecosystem provision - will they keep working?
Repeated discriminatory price auctions are now routinely used in Australia for the procurement of ecosystem services from landholders. Whilst such auctions have been demonstrated to be highly efficient in a one-shot setting, it is less clear whether this efficiency will be maintained with repetition, particularly as information about previous auctions is disseminated amongst participants. This paper presents the results of laboratory experiments designed to test the performance of repeated discriminatory price procurement auctions (reverse auctions) under three different levels of information (1. information regarding own offers, 2. information provided on two neighbours' offers, and 3. information about all offers in the auction) and two levels of competition (with different budgets resulting in different proportions of participants being successful in each auction). We compare the results of these laboratory experiments to a case study from the field where multiple auctions for ecosystem services have been run over a number of years.
Dr Andrew Reeson is part of the Markets, Incentives & Institutions team in CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems. His major research focus is the design and implementation of environmental policies, particularly market-based instruments (MBIs). This involves applying experimental economics to incorporate a sound understanding of human behaviour into policy design. Originally an ecologist, Dr Reeson has formal training in both ecology and economics, and research experience in the United Kingdom, Africa and Australasia. He spent four years as a virologist and microbiologist at the Institute of Virology & Environmental Microbiology in Oxford, United Kingdom, and was involved in some of the early field trials of genetically modified organisms. Dr Reeson also has experience of field ecology and molecular biology.
Location: Room 109, RD Watt Building
Contact: Dr Todd Sanderson
Phone: 02 9351 2527