the dispensability of merely intentional objects

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plan

• general topic → my topic
• a positive position
• defense of position
FOQ :: what should we be ontologically committed to?

SOQ :: what is it for us to be ontologically committed to something?
• mathematical entities
• moral properties
• possibilia
• time
• artifacts
• unconscious things
• macrophysical objects
• microphysical objects
- mathematical entities
- moral properties
- possibilia
- time
- (merely) intentional objects
intentional objects

- intentional object $=_{dfptt} \text{object of thought}$

- the category of intentional objects is the only ontological category which is not a subcategory of any other ontological category.

- the predicate “is an intentional object” cannot function as a sortal.
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• moral properties
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• time

• (merely) intentional objects
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- general topic → my topic
- a positive position
- defense of position
1) if $x$ is a tree-seeing, then there is a $y$, such that $y$ is the intentional object of $x$;

2) tree-seeings and tree-hallucinations belong to the same intentional kind;

3) intentional acts that belong to the same intentional kind have the same kind of intentional object; therefore,

4) if $x$ is a tree-hallucination, then there is a $y$, such that $y$ is the intentional object of $x$. 
• abstracta
• mental concreta
• non-existent objects
• possibilia
1) if $x$ is a tree-seeing, then there is a $y$, such that $y$ is the intentional object of $x$;

2) tree-seeings and tree-hallucinations belong to the same intentional kind;

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4) if $x$ is a tree-hallucination, then there is a $y$, such that $y$ is the intentional object of $x$. 

**disjunctivism**
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2) tree-seeings and tree-hallucinations belong to the same intentional kind;

3) intentional acts that belong to the same intentional kind have the same kind of intentional object; therefore,

4) if $x$ is a tree-hallucination, then there is a $y$, such that $y$ is the intentional object of $x$. 
• “you perceive red”
• “you perceive redly”
• “you perceive red”
• “you perceive redly”
• “you perceive red”
• “you perceive redly”
• “you perceive red”
• “you perceive redly”
• “you perceive red”
• “you perceive redly”
• “you perceive red”
• “you perceive redly”
• “you think of dragons”
• “you think dragon-wise”
• “you think of dragons”
• “you think dragon-wise”
• “you think of dragons”
• “you think dragon-wise”
• “you think of dragons”
• “you think dragon-wise”
• “you think of dragons”
• “you think dragon-wise”
• “you think of dragons”
• “you think dragon-wise”
• “you represent dragons”
• “you represent dragon-wise”
inferentialist
adverbialism

\[ x \text{ represents dragon-wise iff } x \text{ has a dragonesque inferential role} \]

the grounding problem
phenomenological adverbialism

- $x$ represents dragon-wise iff $x$ has a dragonesque phenomenal character

the generalizing problem
underived intentionality is “adverbial”/non-relational

derived intentionality derives from underived intentionality
• underived dragon-representations are
dragon-representations
underived dragon-representations are dragon-representations not in virtue of bearing the representation relation to dragons,
underived dragon-representations are dragon-representations not in virtue of bearing the representation relation to dragons, but in virtue of instantiating the non-relational property of representing dragon-wise;
• underived dragon-representations are dragon-representations not in virtue of bearing the representation relation to dragons, but in virtue of instantiating the non-relational property of representing dragon-wise;

• derived dragon-representations are dragon-representations
underived dragon-representations are dragon-representations not in virtue of bearing the representation relation to dragons, but in virtue of instantiating the non-relational property of representing dragon-wise;

derived dragon-representations are dragon-representations not in virtue of bearing the representation relation to dragons,
• underived dragon-representations are dragon-representations not in virtue of bearing the representation relation to dragons, but in virtue of instantiating the non-relational property of representing dragon-wise;

• derived dragon-representations are dragon-representations not in virtue of bearing the representation relation to dragons, but in virtue of bearing the derivation relation to underived dragon-representations.
inferentialist adverbialism

- x non-derivatively represents dragon-wise iff x has a dragonesque inferential role

the grounding problem
phenomenological adverbialism

• x non-derivatively represents dragon-wise iff x has a dragonesque phenomenal character

the generalizing problem
thesis 1

only phenomenally conscious intentional acts have non-derivative intentionality
thesis 2

phenomenal intentionality is adverbial
• phenomenal dragon-representations are dragon-representations not in virtue of bearing the representation relation to dragons, but in virtue of instantiating the non-relational property of representing dragons-wise;

• non-phenomenal dragon-representations are dragon-representations not in virtue of bearing the representation relation to dragons, but in virtue of bearing the derivation relation to phenomenal dragon-representations.
plan

- general topic → my topic
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objections

• cute little objection
• adverbialism and intentional compositionality
• quantification over intentional objects
• what about intentionality as a relation to a content?
• *de re* intentionality
cute little objection

• “Jimmy is thinking quickly seriously” =

  – “Jimmy is thinking in a quick way about seriousness”
  – “Jimmy is thinking about quickness in a serious way”
you perceive bluely and purplely and circularly and rectangularly
you perceive bluely and purplely and circularly and rectangularly
you perceive
blue-circularly and purple-rectangularly
you perceive
purple-circularly and blue-rectangularly
1) you perceive a blue rectangle; therefore,
2) you perceive a rectangle.
1) You perceive blue-rectangularly; therefore,
2) you perceive rectangularly.
1) you perceive blue-rectangularly; therefore,
2) you perceive bluely and you perceive rectangularly; therefore,
3) you perceive rectangularly
1) $x$ is a strawberry; therefore,
2) $x$ is a straw and $x$ is a berry; therefore,
3) $x$ is a berry.
1) $x$ is a strawberry; therefore, 
2) $x$ is a berry.
1) $x$ is a strawberry;
2) being a berry is a determinable of which being a strawberry is a determinate; therefore,
3) $x$ is a berry.
1) you perceive blue-rectangularly;
2) perceiving rectangularly is a determinable of which perceiving blue-rectangularly is a determinate; therefore,
3) you perceive rectangularly.
objection 3:
quantification over intentionalia

• the dragon i dreamt of last night was yellow!
• the table i am hallucinating right now is brown.
• the apple i’m visualizing right now is prettier than the peach i visualized yesterday.
fictionalism

- according to (the story of) my dream, the dragon was yellow!
- according to (the story of) my hallucination, the table is brown.
- there are prettiness degrees D and D*, such that according to (the story of) my current visualization, the apple is pretty to degree D, and according to (the story of) my visualization yesterday, the peach is pretty to degree D*, and $D > D^*$. 
intentionality as relation to a content

- content not what we think about
- relation to a content ≠ the aboutness relation
- third version of adverbialism
content
adverbialism

- x represents dragon-wise iff x has a dragonesque content
intentionality as relation to a content

- content not what we think about
- relation to a content ≠ the aboutness relation
- third version of adverbialism
- avant-garde literary movement
- why I prefer phenomenological version
De re intentionality

- reduce de re to de dicto
- De re intentionality is a rubber duck
conclusion

we can avoid ontological commitment to merely intentional objects if:

• all intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality.

• phenomenal intentionality is non-relational ("adverbial").
thank you!!