THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF MIGRATION PROCESSES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT MIGRATION POLICIES

by
Stephen Castles University of Sydney
Ellie Vasta, Macquarie University
Derya Ozkul, University of Sydney

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF MIGRATION PROCESSES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT MIGRATION POLICIES

This Working Paper was commissioned by the research section in the Department of Immigration and Citizenship's (DIAC's) Policy Innovation, Research and Evaluation Unit (PIREU). It has been prepared by researchers at the University of Sydney and Macquarie University.

The paper examines the ways in which international migration is changing in response to the major social transformations taking place at the global and local levels in the early 21st century. It pays special attention to migration trends in the Asian and Pacific regions, and to changes in migration and settlement processes affecting Australia. The purpose is to explore how Australian policies and the assumptions that underlie them might need to be modified in response to such trends. The authors argue that it is essential to understand the fundamental forces driving migration and settlement, and that migration theory and comparative research can help in this task.

Key Migration Issues
Mobility of people is a key aspect of globalisation and is closely linked to processes of social transformation taking place in both more-developed and less-developed countries. Important features of the new forms of mobility are: the growth and diversification of migration; the growing importance of economic migration at all skill levels; the importance of new modes of transport, communications and media; the shift from permanent settlement to temporary or circular migration; the strong role played by migrant networks based on social capital; the emergence of more complex and changeable identities (especially transnational identities); and growing concerns about security and social cohesion.

Despite the growing importance of migration, global governance and international cooperation is poorly developed. Only 44 nations have ratified the most important international human rights instrument in this field as of late 2010. However, there are some promising trends towards regional and global cooperation, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development, which has met annually since 2007.

The paper provides an overview of recent trends in international migration, as well as statistical appendices based on the latest data from the UN department of Economic and Social Affairs. If migrant populations continue to increase at the same rate as over the last 20 years, the world migrant stock could be as high as 405m persons by 2050 – nearly twice the current level. Migration flows declined during the Global Economic Crisis (GEC) in 2008-9, but migrant stocks remained fairly stable. In the longer term, demand for labour in developed countries is likely to increase for both demographic and economic reasons, while lack of employment in less-developed counties will create powerful incentives to migrate. Migration is an important factor in the economies of origin countries: Remittances in 2009 were estimated at US$414 billion, of which US$316 billion went to less-developed countries.

There were 15.2m refugees worldwide at the end of 2009. There were also 27.1m internally displaced persons (IDPs). The overall number of forced migrants was the highest ever at 43.3m. Eighty per cent of the world’s refugees and virtually all the IDPs are located in less-
developed countries. Australia received about 13,500 refugees in 2008-9. Asylum applications in Australia increased to 8250 in 2010, up 33 per cent from 2009. This is about 1.2 per cent of asylum claims made in industrialised countries.

**Asian and Pacific Migration**

The stock of international migrants in Asia was estimated by the UN at 27.5m in 2010 – just 13 per cent of the global total. India (9.1m emigrants), Bangladesh (6.8m) and China (5.8m) are among the world’s main emigration countries. Pakistan, Philippine, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Indonesia, S. Korea and Nepal are also important origin countries. Oceania is far from being the main destination for Asian migrants: in 2000 it was estimated that 43 per cent of Asian migrants had moved within Asia, compared with 24 per cent to the Americas, 18 per cent to the Middle East, 10 percent to Europe and 3 per cent to Oceania.

Much migration in the Asian region is irregular, with migration agents playing a large part. Although countries like the Philippines seek to regulate such agencies, some recruiters have engaged in the smuggling and trafficking of workers. Asian governments seek to strictly control migration, and migrants’ rights are often very limited. Policymakers encourage temporary labour migration but generally prohibit family reunion and permanent settlement. However, governments often lack the capacity to effectively implement migration rules and to manage migratory flows.

Mobility of Asian professionals, executives, technicians and other highly-skilled personnel is growing. An important trend is the growth of highly-skilled mobility within Asia. Regional migration flows are becoming far more diverse, and India, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Malaysia are all trying hard to attract overseas professional – either on a temporary or permanent basis. Often Asian countries seek to lure back their own diasporas.

Student mobility is often a precursor to skilled migration. Four out of five international students choose to go to the OECD countries. Between 1998 and 2003, 2.6 million Asian students went to study in other countries. The 471 000 Chinese were the largest group, followed by South Koreans (214 000), Indians (207 000) and Japanese (191 000). The most preferred country of destination is still the US. The number of student visas granted by Australia increased from 190 674 in 2005-6 to 320 368 in 2008-9.

The migration of women within the region has grown rapidly, with many migration corridors consisting mainly of women. Some female migrants work on the assembly lines of new manufacturing plants, but most are in service occupations, especially nursing, domestic service and entertainment. These jobs often offer poor pay, conditions and status. Another emerging trend is international marriage migration. Over 90 per cent of international marriages in NE Asia are between a foreign-born woman and a native-born man, and many of the foreign brides are recruited through agents.

The Pacific region (or Oceania) is the world-region with the highest proportion of migrants in its population: 16.8 per cent of the population. The great majority of the over 6m immigrants in the region are in Australia (4.7m in 2010) and New Zealand (962,000 in 2010). The largest single flow is between New Zealand and Australia. However migration to New Zealand has increased sharply in recent years. There is considerable mobility from smaller Pacific islands to both Australia and New Zealand.
Analysis of Asian and Pacific migration shows that Australia cannot always count on attracting migrants with the desired skill-mix. Most Asian migrants choose to go elsewhere, and their opportunities are proliferating as the economies of the region develop. In the past, Australia may have an edge with regard to living standards, lifestyles, security and the environment. Today, Australia has to compete with labour markets offering higher salaries and better opportunities. Other countries may also offer more familiar and congenial lifestyles. Australian policy-makers need to take a long-term view on the skills needs of the future and how to attract the best migrants.

Australia’s changing environmental, economic and demographic situation
Major changes within Australia have important effects on migration patterns and policies. Environmental concerns have led to calls for restriction of population growth, with immigration seen as one of the few variables that can easily be addressed. On the other hand, some environmentalists argue that improvements in infrastructure and urban planning, along with limitation of carbon emissions, could play a bigger role in environmental protection, and that this can more easily be achieved in a growing economy. Attracting high levels of foreign investment, the Australian economy grew for a long period before the GEC and kept growing in the aftermath of the crisis by 1.2 per cent during 2009, which was noted to be the best performance in the OECD, and by 3.3 per cent in 2010. The relations with Asian-Pacific countries played an important role in the economic success. The demand from China, during and after the economic crisis, played an important role in keeping Australia out of a major recession.

The current resources boom has led to significant demand for skilled labour across a wide range of occupations. The corporate sector argues that an open and flexible immigration policy is crucial if the potential benefits of current economic opportunities are to be realised. At the same time, the possible future labour market situation makes it seem probable that there will be labour shortages across the skills spectrum. The total fertility rate in Australia, although higher than in many developed countries, is still below the rate needed to reproduce the population. In recent years the main component of population growth has been due to net overseas migration rather than natural increase.

Australian immigration debates still focus mainly on permanent immigrants, but one of the most significant changes has been the exponential increase in temporary entries. In recent years long-term temporary migrants have grown in numbers, and in 2000-01 outnumbered permanent arrivals for the first time. On the other hand, emigration has also increased steadily. The changes in composition of flows are important to develop a maintainable population strategy to balance the imperatives of economic growth and environmental and social sustainability. Australians will have to make choices concerning economic and demographic growth rates, as well as about investments in education and training. What is clear is that with increased life expectancy and longer average duration of education, the proportion of the population available for employment will diminish. Without immigration, labour force growth would cease within the next decades.

Social and cultural implications of migration processes
Immigration has been a major source of social and cultural change in virtually all developed countries over the last half century. State policies towards immigrants and their relations with other groups in the community can have important effects on society and on the perceptions of a county from the outside. Australia has been good at attracting people into a democratic society and easy access to state services and benefits and to citizenship has been central to this
success. The provision of English language tuition has been another cornerstone of successful immigrant settlement. Since the 1970s, Australian policies have been based on a policy of multiculturalism that combines the principles of equal opportunities for participation in all societal institutions with recognition of the right to maintain distinct cultures and religions.

However, in recent years, there has been increased public concern about the extent to which immigrants are developing a feeling of national belonging within Australia. Since 2001, this concern has been reinforced by issues of national security and especially fears directed towards Muslim communities. The policy response has been to emphasise social cohesion rather than diversity, and to make it more difficult for immigrants to become citizens. However, this could be counterproductive: with increased temporary migration and a longer minimum residence requirement, the problem of national belonging could well be exacerbated. The paper discusses political theories concerned with diversity and multiculturalism, and shows that national identity can be based on political belonging rather than ethnic belonging.

Recent empirical research in Australia has found that many Australians do not support abstract principles of multiculturalism; yet actively embrace diversity in their everyday lives. These issues are particularly important in the context of the growing significance of transnationalism. Today, clear-cut dichotomies of ‘origin’ or ‘destination’ are difficult to sustain in a world in which the lives of immigrants seem increasingly characterised by circulation and simultaneous commitment to two or more societies. However, although Australians of migrant background experience Australia as relatively accepting of difference, many experience various forms of racism. The new emphasis on security and social cohesion reveals not only a contested identity but an unsettled identity as well. This is not new. Since WWII, as the need for immigration has increased, so has Australian national identity become more open-ended.

The framing of information by the media has been important and their effects on national identity need to be scrutinised carefully. From a historical point of view, the media’s conceptualisation of threats to society has constantly changed throughout Australian history. Since the September 11 events, Australian Muslims have been presented on the news to an increasing degree. The media’s framing on events from an ethnic and/or religious angle strengthened the perception of various ethnic and religious groups as monolithic and unitary groups of people with similar socio-political and ideological backgrounds. However, the media can also play positive roles. Local councils have an important proactive role to play in educating the media and linking them to positive events within communities and neighbourhoods. The framing and effects of the new social media deserve further research and examination.

A conceptual framework for understanding migration processes
One result of the many changes in the global, regional and national migration context is that migration processes have become more complex than ever before. The paper briefly summarises some of the main approaches in migration theory. There is an emerging consensus that migration research and policy-making need to include consideration of all the social, cultural, economic, political and personal factors that influence decisions and behaviour. Approaches based on a single discipline are inadequate, because migration embraces all aspects of social experience, making interdisciplinary approaches essential. A new literature on innovative approaches to research on migration is emerging.
In the view of the authors of this paper, theories of migration should start from the processes of rapid social transformation linked to globalisation and the uneven development processes in areas like East and Southeast Asia. Change today is driven by macro-level economic and political forces, but its human effects are always felt at the societal, community and individual levels. It is impossible to understand migration simply as an individual reaction to global economic and political factors. It is always mediated through local historical and cultural factors, as well as through family relations, social class, gender, location and position in the life-cycle. Thus, migration theory not only focuses on the migration process but also includes economic, political and social links between origin and destination countries as well as the effects of settlement and accommodation on the societies concerned.

The paper provides brief descriptions of some of the main conceptual and analytical tools used to understand migration. It argues that the most useful unit of analysis for policy-relevant research is the ‘migration corridor’. This means studying migration flows between a specific origin area and a specific destination area. The use of migration corridors may allow a finer-grained analysis than focusing on the rather heterogeneous migration systems that are meant to embrace whole regions. However, it is important not to separate migration corridors from their wider sub-regional, regional and global contexts.

The conceptual framework suggested here is based on looking at four key dimensions of migration corridors:

- The causes of migration – which include the relationships between origin and destination countries.
- Impacts on countries of origin – which can be in the form of cost-benefit analysis. This may require disaggregation according to impacts on specific social groups (e.g. farmers, businesspeople). Disaggregation by gender, age, region, rural-urban location etc. could also be necessary.
- Impacts on countries of destination - also in the form of cost-benefit analysis, and with consideration of varying group interests.
- Impacts on migrants and their families.

For each dimension, a set of factors needs to be specified. These include:

**Causes of migration**

- Economic asymmetries between origin and destination country
- Social inequalities between origin and destination country
- Other causal factors, including social and cultural linkages between origin and destination countries, migrants’ social aspirations, family issues, location and life-cycle stages.

**Impacts on migrants and their families**

- Economic impacts
- Impacts on working conditions
- Impacts on human rights
- Social and cultural impacts

**Impacts on origin countries**
• Economic impacts of remittances (including reverse remittances – the credit burden undertaken to start the migration process - which is usually neglected in remittance calculations (Khadria, 2008))
• Social costs of reproduction (human capital)
• Demographic impacts
• Impacts of return migration
• Social and cultural impacts
• Political impacts

Impacts on destination countries
• Economic impacts
• Demographic impacts
• Social and cultural impacts
• Impacts on national security
• Impacts on community relations (or social cohesion)

As already pointed out, all these factors may need to be disaggregated according to social class, gender, age, location etc.

It is also important to identify a wide range of possible interactions between these factors.

Finally, for each factor, a number of strategic indicators must be identified, to allow both quantitative and qualitative analysis. For example, for just one factor, ‘economic impacts’ within the dimension ‘impacts on destination countries’, the following indicators are suggested:
• Contributions of migrant workers to GDP overall, GDP growth, GDP per capita, and GDP per capita of non-migrants. It would be valuable to use longitudinal data for these indicators.
• Comparative wage rates of migrants and non-migrants and the way these change.
• Fiscal contributions of migrants (do these outweigh the social benefits they receive?)
• Savings to the destination country in costs for upbringing and training of workers.
• Effects of migrant workers on innovation and technology transfer.
• Displacement of native workers, versus complementarity.
• Effects of migration on income distribution and poverty.

The authors of this Working Paper believe that it would be a useful exercise to apply this conceptual framework to Australia. This would constitute a significant research project, but could contribute to a substantial increase in understanding of the migratory processes affecting Australia and thus provide a valuable tool for policy planning. In view of the complexity of such an exercise, we suggest starting with pilot studies of a few corridors.

Migration policy and program responses
The changing dynamics of international migration processes present a series of challenges for Australian migration policies and programs. These challenges include:

1. The growth and diversification of global migration
2. The growth and diversification of migration in the Asian and Pacific regions
3. The multi-directionality of migration
4. The feminisation of migration
5. Global and regional competition for skills
6. Increases in refugee and asylum movements
7. Bi-lateralism in migration
8. The global governance deficit concerning migration
9. The significance of temporary and circular migration
10. The rise of transnationalism
11. Australia’s changing environmental, economic and demographic situation
12. The changing social and cultural impacts of migration
13. Changing motivations with regard to settlement, multiculturalism and citizenship
14. The politicisation of asylum.

Adopting a new conceptual framework for understanding migration processes, based on an interdisciplinary and holistic approach, could be crucial for successful future policy formation. Only by understanding all the complexity of contemporary migration and settlement processes as well as the societal contexts in which these arise, is it possible to develop long-term strategies for maximising the benefits of migration. Some key aspects of such an approach would be: understanding migration systems, including consideration of the limitations of the concept of ‘an Asia-Pacific migration system’; understanding migration corridors, which are argued to be a valuable unit of analysis for migration research and policy; analysing migration networks and social capital; and thinking through the significance of changing patterns of transnational identities, collective belonging and commitment to nation states. The resulting multi-level conceptual framework would examine key dimensions of migration for various actor groups, using a model based on multiple factors and indicators.

Australian policies have in fact already been responsive to some of the key changes outlined in this Working Paper. Attention is drawn to the shift to a non-discriminatory entry policy, the growing emphasis on skilled migration and economic criteria, the growth of temporary entry programs, the continuing possibility of transition from temporary to permanent status, the successful approach to settlement and multiculturalism, and the significance of policies on citizenship.

However, some of the key challenges to policy-formation listed above have still not been adequately addressed. The Working Paper points to the need for a new approach to migration dynamics. It is especially important to reconsider the relationship between asylum, refugee movements and broader migration in the context of the social transformations taking place in many origin countries. Important future measures could include building bi-lateral relationships with origin countries; working for enhanced global governance of migration; balancing economic demand for migration with environmental, social and political impacts; responding to the diversity in migration motivations evident in increased temporary and circular migration as well as transnationalism; and rethinking the Australian model of multiculturalism and citizenship in the context of the changes taking place.
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1. Introduction

- How are the factors determining international migration changing in response to the major social transformations taking place at the global and local levels in the early 21st century?
- Why do people migrate across international borders?
- What factors help shape their post-migration behaviour and patterns of settlement?
- What can governments do to shape and manage immigration and settlement?
- How do Australian policies and the assumptions that underlie them need to change in response to contemporary trends?

These are some of the key questions that need to be addressed by Australian policy-makers today. This paper starts from the premise that it is essential to understand the fundamental forces driving migration and settlement to answer these questions, and that migration theory and comparative research can help in this task.

This Working Paper begins by presenting a survey of key issues affecting international migration, in the context of current social transformations at various socio-spatial levels. This section includes an examination of changing migration patterns in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as discussion of the social and cultural implications of migration and settlement processes, with special reference to the Australian experience. These analyses serve as the basis for putting forward a conceptual framework for understanding Australian migration and settlement. This in turn helps inform a discussion of Australia’s migration policies and programs.

Clearly a Working Paper of this length and scope can only scratch the surface of a highly complex theme, so it should be seen as a preliminary exercise, which, together with the other Working Papers currently being prepared, will hopefully pave the way for further research and analysis.
2. A survey of key migration topics

2.1. The changing global migration context and order

The transformation of human mobility

Migration is nothing new: human beings have always moved in response to economic, environmental, political, social and religious factors. But, since the 16th century, colonialism, industrialisation and the emergence of international finance and commodity markets have reshaped the world, causing far greater human mobility than in pre-modern times. The colonial period was marked by out-migrations of administrators, soldiers and settlers from Western Europe, and by forced migrations – of slaves, prisoners and indentured labourers – to and between colonies. In the 18th to the early 20th centuries, industrialisation led to free migrations from peripheral regions (like Ireland, Southern and Eastern Europe) to growth areas in Western Europe and North America. After World War II, migration was initially driven by the labour needs of manufacturing in core industrial regions. Often migration was organised by governments. Many receiving countries became more diverse in their religions and cultures. The architects of labour migration programs had seen ethnic pluralism as incompatible with historical national identities, and believed that it could be prevented either through policies of temporary recruitment (e.g. Germany, Switzerland), or through assimilation (e.g. France, Australia). Such policies largely failed, and ethnic communities emerged in nearly all immigration countries.

The acceleration and diversification of migration has become especially marked in the most recent wave of globalisation with the emergence of a new international division of labour since the 1970s (Froebel et al., 1980) and the end of the Cold War around 1990. Today more people migrate, they travel longer distances, forms of migration are more diverse (e.g. temporary labour migration, permanent settlement, marriage migration, educational migration), more countries experience in-, transit or out-migration (and often all of these) and the resulting diversity of receiving areas has become ever-greater (Castles and Miller, 2009).

Today, international migration is both a result and a cause of social transformation. As less-developed countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America are drawn into global economic linkages, powerful processes of change are unleashed. International economic integration may undermine traditional ways of working and living (Stiglitz, 2002). For instance, increased agricultural productivity displaces people from the land. Environmental change compels many people to seek new livelihoods and places to live. People move to the cities, but there are not enough jobs there, and housing and social conditions are often very bad (Davis, 2006). Weak states and impoverishment may lead to violence and violations of human rights. All these factors encourage emigration.

At the same time, globalisation leads to social transformation in the more economically-developed countries. Traditional manufacturing industries decline, hard-earned trade skills and experience lose their value, and employment becomes more flexible and less secure. The new services industries need very different types of labour. But, due to declining fertility, relatively few young nationals enter the labour market. Moreover, these young people have good educational opportunities and are not willing to do low-skilled work. Population ageing leads to increased dependency rates and care needs. Developed countries have high demand for both high- and low-skilled workers (CEC, 2005) and need migrants.
Globalisation also creates the cultural and technical conditions for mobility. Electronic communications provide knowledge of migration routes and work opportunities. Long-distance travel has become cheaper and more accessible. Once migratory flows are established they generate ‘migration networks’: previous migrants help members of their families or communities with information on work, accommodation and official rules (Boyd, 1989; Gold, 2005). Facilitating migration has become a major international business, including travel agents, bankers, lawyers and recruiters – as well as people-smugglers. The more governments try to control borders, the greater the flows of undocumented migrants seem to be (Castles, 2004).

Since the beginning of the 21st century, migration has increasingly been seen as a threat to security. The New York terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 followed by the Bali bombing of 2002 and attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) led to a widespread fear of Muslim immigrants as a potential ‘enemy within’ (Guild, 2009). This is not a new idea: immigrants have for centuries been seen as a threat to state security and national identity (Cohen, 1994). The securitisation of migration and ethnic minorities is based on a perspective that emphasises the security of rich states and their populations, while ignoring the reality that migration and refugee flows are often the result of growing inequality and a fundamental lack of human security in many poorer countries of the Global South. This absence of human security finds its expression in poverty, hunger, violence and lack of human rights. Growing numbers of people flee their homes in search of protection and better livelihoods. The situation was summed up by the Global Commission on International Migration in the statement that international migration is driven by ‘development, demography and democracy’ (GCIM, 2005, 12).

Migration policies too can exacerbate human insecurity. Some governments try to resolve the contradiction between pressing labour needs and public hostility to migration by creating differentiated entry systems that encourage legal entry of highly-skilled workers, while excluding lower-skilled workers. Since labour market demand for the latter is strong, millions of migrants may be pushed into irregularity. For instance the USA recorded 11.1m irregular migrants in 2009 (Passel and Cohn, 2009), while the European Union (EU) was estimated to have 1.8 to 3.3m irregular residents (Clandestino, 2009). Irregular migration is also widespread throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, although accurate data is lacking (Castles, 2010a).

Global governance of migration
In this situation, international cooperation between origin, transit and destination-country governments is crucial. However, migration can be seen as an area of deficit in global governance. Globalisation has led to the establishment of international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for finance, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for trade. Migration, by contrast, has remained a preserve of national sovereignty. The international community has failed to build institutions to ensure orderly migration, protect the human rights of migrants and maximise development benefits (Bhagwati, 2003).

Elements of an international framework already exist in International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions No. 97 of 1949 and No. 143 of 1975, and in the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. However, relatively few countries have ratified these instruments. The most important, the 1990 UN Convention, had only been ratified by 44 nations by 2010 – out of the
192 members of the UN. Emigration countries have been concerned with reducing internal labour surpluses and maximising remittances. Immigration countries have been reluctant to take steps which might increase labour costs.

Some regional bodies seek to cooperate on migration. The European Union has gone furthest by introducing free movement for citizens of member states, and moving towards common policies on asylum and migration from non-member states. Arguably, common policies on migration should become part of regional integration everywhere, and should be linked to policies on international cooperation and development. Bilateral cooperation between states could also bring benefits. Migrants could gain through better protection and social security. Emigration countries could benefit from smoother transfer of remittances and restrictions on agents and recruiters. Immigration countries could gain a more stable and better-trained migrant workforce.

In 2003, the Global Commission on International Migration mandated by the UN Secretary General took up its work. The GCIM Report (GCIM, 2005) put forward proposals for maximizing the benefits of international migration, including measures to limit the ‘brain drain’, to prevent smuggling and trafficking, to encourage the flow of remittances and to enhance the role of diasporas as agents of development. Migration and development was the topic of a High Level Dialogue of ministers and senior officials at the UN General Assembly in September 2006. This led to the establishment of a Global Forum on Migration and Development (GMFD), which met in Brussels (2007), Manila (2008), Athens (2009) and Puerto Vallarta (Mexico) (2010). The 2011 GMFD is being hosted by the Swiss Government.

2. The development of international migration

According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the world total of international migrants (defined as people living outside their country of birth for at least a year) grew from about 100m in 1960 to 155m in 2000 and then to 214m in 2010. This sounds a lot, but is just 3.1 per cent of the world’s 6 billion people (UNDESA, 2005; 2010). The number of international migrants has grown only slightly more rapidly than overall global population since 1960. Most people remain in their countries of birth, and internal migration in some of the world’s population giants like China, India, Brazil and Nigeria is far higher than international migration. It is impossible to know exact numbers of internal migrants, although the UN Development Program estimated some 740m in 2009 (UNDP, 2009). Some migration scholars argue that that internal and international migration are closely linked processes that should be analysed together (King and Skeldon, 2010).

The tables and charts in Appendix I show trends in global and regional migration from 1990 to 2010. UN data for Australia and some other major migrant-destination countries is presented in tables in Appendix II. Useful data and analyses are also to be found in the reports of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2010) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2010).

It is impossible to present a detailed account of global migration trends in the space available in this Working Paper. Key trends at the global level and for all the world’s regions are summarised in the IOM’s World Migration Report (IOM, 2010). Global trends include the following:
Overall growth in migration: if migrant populations continue to increase at the same rate as over the last 20 years, the world migrant stock could be as high as 405m persons by 2050 (IOM, 2010, 3) – nearly twice the current level.

Global migration grew at an estimated average 1.79 per cent annually from 2000 to 2005, and an annual average of 1.83 from 2005 to 2010 (Giovannelli, 2009).

Migration flows declined during the Global Economic Crisis (GEC) in 2008-9, but migrant stocks remained fairly stable. Flows are expected to continue to increase now that the worst effects of the recession are over (IOM, 2010, 122-4).

The labour force in more developed countries (MDCs) is projected to remain at its current level of approximately 600m until 2050, while the labour force in less developed countries (LDCs) is projected to grow from 2.4 billion in 2005 to 3 billion in 2020 and 3.6 billion in 2040 (IOM, 2010, 4). Demand for labour in MDCs is likely to increase for both demographic and economic reasons, while lack of employment in LDCs will create powerful incentives to migrate.

The USA hosts the largest migrant stock of any country (43m in 2010), while six of the top ten destination countries are in Europe: the Russian Federation, Germany, France, UK, Spain and Ukraine. The most important non-European destinations are Saudi Arabia, Canada and India (IOM, 2010, 115).

The share of the foreign-born in total population is highest in Qatar (86.5 per cent), United Arab Emirates (70 per cent) and Kuwait (68.8 per cent). Of the top ten countries in foreign-born population share, eight are in the Middle East. The other two are Singapore (40.7 per cent) and Hong Kong SAR (38.8) (IOM, 2010, 115, 116).

Remittances in 2009 were estimated at US$414 billion, of which US$316 billion went to LDCs. Remittances to LDCs fell by 6 per cent from 2008 to 2009 – the first drop after over 20 years of growth. The top four remittance-receiving countries were India (US$49 billion), China (US$47 billion), Mexico US$22 billion) and Philippines (US$20 billion).

UNHCR estimated that there were 15.2m refugees worldwide at the end of 2009. There were also 27.1m internally displaced persons. The overall number of forced migrants was the highest ever at 43.3m, while the number of voluntary returns of refugees had fallen to its lowest level in 20 years (UNHCR, 2010). Eighty per cent of the world’s refugees and virtually all the IDPs are located in LDCs. Australia received about 13,500 refugees in 2008-9.

The total number of asylum seekers in industrialised nations fell slightly from 2009 (378,000 applications) to 2010 (358,800 applications). UNHCR statistics show that asylum applications in Australia increased to 8250 claims in 2010, up 33 per cent from 2009 (UNHCR, 2011). This is about 1.2 per cent of asylum claims made in industrialised countries.

2.3. The emergence of new Asian and Pacific migration systems and corridors

Key issues in Asian and Pacific migration to Australia
Since the end of the White Australia policy and the first wave of arrivals of Indo-Chinese refugees in the 1970s, migration from Asia to Australia has increased rapidly. At the same time entries from New Zealand and the Pacific Islands have also grown fast. In 2008-9, New Zealand was the top origin country for settler arrivals (33,034), followed by the UK (21,567). The next seven most numerous origin countries were all in Asia. Overall, the number of Asians arriving as settlers increased from about 26,000 in 1998-9 to about 69,000 in 2008-9 (DIAC, 2010d, 17).
Two key issues must be analysed to understand the growth of Asian and Pacific migration to Australia: the factors leading to Australia’s increased openness for such migration, and the forces leading to increased propensity to migrate on the part of individuals and groups in origin areas.

Australia’s opening to non-European immigration was the result of political, geo-political and economic considerations:

- Political: the post-colonial re-ordering of the world and the influence of civil rights movements from the 1960s made continuation of racial selection in immigration impossible.
- Geo-political: Australia’s opening to political and trade relationships with Asia also made racial bias unacceptable.
- Economic: Australia’s growing need for labour (at a time of declining domestic fertility and increased duration of education) made continuing high immigration levels necessary. The reduced incentive of Europeans to migrate in view of high living standards in that region made Asia and Oceania vital sources of migrants.

In this section, however, we are concerned with the second component:

- Why has emigration from Asia increased substantially since the 1970s?
- What are the factors that pattern such emigration – that is the factors leading to specific sub-regional migration systems and to corridors linking specific origin areas to destinations in Australia?

The development of Asian migration

Asia is over half the world, with up to 60 per cent of global population (depending on how Asia is defined). Its sub-regions are highly diverse with differing economic and social systems, and many cultures and religions. Rather than speaking of an Asian (or even Asia-Pacific) migration system\(^1\), it is more useful to look at the migration patterns of sub-regions – South Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania – and to examine the principal migration corridors\(^2\) that have developed within and between sub-regions and with the rest of the world.

Population movements within Asia go back throughout human history (Wang Gungwu, 1997). In the Middle Ages, westward movements from Central Asia helped shape European history, while Chinese migration was important in Southeast Asia. In the 19th century, hundreds of thousands migrated from China and Japan to the United States, Canada, and Australia. In all three destination countries, discriminatory legislation was enacted to prevent these movements. Migration out of Asia was low in the early part of the 20th century, but movements within Asia continued, often connected with political struggles (Skeldon, 2006, 23). In the mass population transfers following Indian independence in 1947, about 5m Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India, and about 6m Muslims moved into Pakistan from India.

\(^1\) The migration systems approach means taking groups of countries linked by migratory flows as the unit of analysis, and examining both ends of a migratory flow and all the linkages between the places concerned. A main focus is on regional migration systems. The term will be explained in more detail in Section bii below.

\(^2\) Migration corridors refer to migration flows between a specific origin area and a specific destination area. The term will be explained in more detail in Section bii below.
Movement to the West started to grow in the 1950s. Many lower-skilled South Asians migrated to Britain, while flows of engineers, doctors and other professionals to the USA, Canada and Britain became so significant that the term ‘brain drain’ was applied in India. Discriminatory rules against Asian entries were repealed in the 1960s and 1970s in Canada, the United States, and Australia. Increased foreign investment and trade helped create the communicative networks needed for migration. The Vietnam War caused large-scale refugee movements. The openness of the United States, Canada and Australia to family migration meant that primary movements from Indo-China gave rise to further entries of permanent settlers.

Labour migration was stimulated by the economic boom in OPEC countries after 1973. The huge construction projects in the Gulf caused mass recruitment of temporary contract workers, especially from South Asia. By the 1980s, women migrants for domestic work, nursing and other services were following. At the same time rapid economic growth in several Asian countries led to intra-Asian movements of both highly skilled and unskilled workers, especially from the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to NE Asia, Malaysia and Singapore.

**Asian migration today**
The UN Population Division estimated the stock of international migrants in Asia at 27.5m in 2010 – just 13 per cent of the total global figure (UNDESA, 2009). Far more people emigrate from Asia to other regions than the other way round. India (9.1m emigrants), Bangladesh (6.8m) and China (5.8m) are among the world’s main emigration countries. Pakistan, Philippine, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Indonesia, S. Korea and Nepal are also important origin countries. In 2000 it was estimated that 43 per cent of Asian migrants had moved within Asia, compared with 24 per cent to the Americas, 18 per cent to the Middle East, 10 percent to Europe and 3 per cent to Oceania. Top receiving countries for Asian migrants in 2000 were the USA (7.9m), India (6.1m), Saudi Arabia (2.1m), Pakistan (2.8m), Hong Kong SAR (2.5m), Iran (1.9m), Canada (1.9m) and Malaysia (1.7m) (IOM, 2010, 166-7).

These figures show Oceania is far from being the main destination for Asian migrants. They also reveal that many Asian nations are both origin and destination countries. Their labour markets and internal dynamics have changed extensively over the years. However, it is still possible to differentiate between mainly destination countries (Brunei, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan), countries with both significant immigration and emigration (Malaysia and Thailand), and mainly source countries (Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam) (Hugo, 2005, 8). In any case, official data significantly underreport movements, because they leave out much temporary and undocumented migration, and many countries fail to collect data on stocks and flows of migrants (Hugo, 2010, 6).

Irregular migration plays a major part in Asia. For example labour flows from Indonesia to Malaysia have been largely undocumented, Thai workers move irregularly to Malaysia and other countries for work, while Thailand itself hosted up to 1.7 million undocumented workers, mainly from Burma around 2005 (IOM, 2005, 110-12). With the Bangladesh-India corridor alone having around 17 million people involved, Asia’s undocumented migration flows are estimated to be among the largest contemporary flows (Hugo, 2010, 7). Hugo points to the complexity of irregular migration, arguing that there is a continuum from voluntary individual movement, through use of middlemen, to trafficking and bonded labour (Hugo, 2010, 29). The growth of irregular migration is linked to the unwillingness of governments to
effectively manage migration and to the desire of employers for easily available and exploitable workers.

Migration agents and labour brokers organise most recruitment of Asian migrant workers both to the Gulf and within Asia. At least a million Indonesian workers are estimated to work in Malaysia and a million Burmese in Thailand (Martin, 2008, 13). Although countries like the Philippines seek to regulate such agencies, some recruiters have engaged in the smuggling and trafficking of workers. Asian governments seek to strictly control migration, and migrants’ rights are often very limited. Policymakers encourage temporary labour migration but generally prohibit family reunion and permanent settlement. However, governments often lack the capacity to effectively implement migration rules and to manage migration. While most migration in the region is temporary, trends toward long-term stay are becoming evident in some places.

Mobility of Asian professionals, executives, technicians and other highly-skilled personnel is growing. Country studies show substantial skill losses for Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s. India, Philippines and Pakistan are listed among the top ten countries from which physicians have emigrated (World Bank, 2011, 10). In the case of the Philippines, 40 per cent of permanent emigrants had a college education, and 30 per cent of IT workers and 60 per cent of physicians emigrated. For Sri Lanka, academically-qualified professionals comprised up to one-third of outflows (Lowell and Findlay, 2002). The opposite side of the coin is reliance on immigrant professionals in highly-developed countries. The 2000 US Census showed that 4.3 million foreign-born persons were college graduates, making up 13 per cent of all college graduates in the USA. Half of the graduates who arrived in the 1990s were from Asia, with India and China as the largest sources. Almost one third worked in natural and social sciences, engineering and computer-related occupations (Batalova, 2005). Indian and Chinese IT experts played a key role in the rise of Silicon Valley. In the past, it was mainly the classical immigration countries of North America and Oceania that relied on immigrant professionals. Today, European countries like the UK, Germany and France are making strong efforts to attract them as well. Japan and Korea are also determined to attract more highly skilled workers. In the past ten years, highly-skilled immigration has increased by 40 per cent in Japan and more than ten-fold in Korea (Dumont and Lemaître, 2005, 16).

Student mobility is often a precursor to skilled migration. More and more students pursue their higher-level education in countries other than their own. Four out of five international students choose to go to the OECD countries. For the OECD countries, Asia is the biggest source area for students, accounting for almost 47 per cent of their total international students (OECD, 2009, 26). Between 1998 and 2003, 2.6 million Asian students went to study in other countries. The 471 000 Chinese were the largest group, followed by South Koreans (214 000), Indians (207 000) and Japanese (191 000) (Hugo, 2005, 12). The number of student visas granted by Australia increased from 190 674 in 2005-6 to 320 368 in 2008-9 (Phillips et al., 2010, 14) – China, India and Korea have been the main sources (DIAC, 2010c). On the other hand, students from China (441 186) choose to go first to the US (110 246), then Japan (77 916), then to Australia (57 596). Indian students (170 256) prefer to go mainly to the US (94 664), then to Australia (26 520) and the U.K. (25 901). For South Korean students, Australia is the third option: they choose to go first to the US (69 198), then to Japan (23 290) and Australia (6 270) (see for further UNESCO, 2010, 172-181). There is considerable competition among developed countries to attract fee-paying students.
Many former students stay on in developed countries upon graduation, especially those with PhDs. What is different today is that Japan, China and Korea are also competing for foreign students. Fewer Chinese students are going abroad, while foreign student inflows (especially from Thailand) are increasing. Japan has had substantial growth in foreign students: by 2010, 126,568 were enrolled (UNESCO, 2010, 172). North America, Oceania and Europe are beginning to lose their dominant position within the international education industry.

An important emerging trend is the growth of highly-skilled mobility within Asia. Regional migration flows are becoming far more diverse, and India, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Malaysia are all trying hard to attract overseas professional – either on a temporary or permanent basis. Like older immigration countries, they have introduced privileged immigration and residence regimes for this category.

Often Asian countries are seeking to lure back their own diasporas. Many of the most skilled people from some countries live abroad and governments do their best to reach and keep in contact with them (Kuznetsov, 2006). Taiwan has been especially successful in maintaining contacts with expatriates and drawing them back as industrialisation progressed (Hugo, 2005, 35-7), and other countries are now trying to follow this example. The Chinese diaspora has been a crucial source of capital and expertise in the Chinese economic take-off. Since the early 2000s, China has changed its policy concerning its emigrants from ‘permanent migration’ to ‘flexible mobility’. The Chinese diaspora is not expected anymore to return permanently, but rather is encouraged to maintain close contact with their counterparts in China. The Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), established in 1980, has also attempted to attract Filipinos overseas to establish businesses in the Philippines. As a symbol of recognition and appreciation for Filipinos overseas, the Filipino President himself welcomes them at Christmas in a Pamaskong Handog sa OFWs (Welcome Home Overseas Foreign Workers) ceremony at Manila airport (Martin, 2008, 17). Recently similar institutions maintaining close contacts with diasporas have been established in other countries as well. India and Mali have both created separate ministries whose explicit purpose is to address the needs of diaspora populations. The newly created Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion also attempts to reach out to Sri Lankan migrant workers abroad. One major constraint for most diaspora institutions is obtaining adequate funding (Aguinas, 2010, 6).

A key recent development is the feminisation of migration (IOM, 2005, 109-10). There was little female labour migration in Asia before the late 1970s. Then demand for female domestic workers surged, first in the Middle East, and, from the 1990s, within Asia. The share of women international migrants varies in different parts of Asia. Today the figures are lowest in Western Asia (at around 39 per cent) and the second highest among all regions of the world in Central and Eastern Asia (both at around 55 per cent) (United Nations, 2010, 13). In 2004, 81 per cent of registered new migrant workers leaving Indonesia were women (ILO, 2007). The female share among first-time migrant workers from the Philippines rose from 50 per cent in 1992 (Go, 2002, 66) to 72 per cent of by 2006 (ILO, 2007). Most migrant women are concentrated in jobs regarded as ‘typically female’: at best nurses, but more commonly domestic workers, entertainers, restaurant and hotel staff and assembly-line workers in clothing and electronics. These jobs often offer poor pay, conditions and status. Demand for care-givers is likely to be a major factor in the future, due to population ageing in many destination countries. The increase in domestic service reflects the growth of dual career professional households in Asia’s new industrial countries. With more women migrating, ‘global care drain’ is arising as a threat to origin countries (Lee Hyekyung, 2010).
Another form of female migration is for marriage. Asian women moved as brides of US servicemen from the 1940s – first from Japan, then Korea and then Vietnam. From the 1980s, a new phenomenon emerged: so-called ‘mail order’ brides to Europe and Australia (Cahill, 1990). Since the 1990s, foreign brides have been sought by farmers in rural areas of Japan, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, due to the exodus of local women to more attractive urban settings. By the early 21st century, marriage migration to East Asian countries was increasing and was becoming significant in urban areas as well. This had led to changes in perceptions of ethnic homogeneity in some of these countries.

The Chinese one-child policy and the preference for male children in India had led to large male surpluses in those countries, and brides were being recruited for Indians in Bangladesh and for Chinese farmers in Vietnam, Laos and Burma (IOM, 2005, 112). According to Poston and Glover (2005, 179), it is estimated that over 23.5 million Chinese males will be looking for wives between the years of 2000 and 2021 (quoted in Lee Hyekyung, 2010, 13).

Over 90 per cent of international marriages in NE Asia are between a foreign-born woman and a native-born man, and many of the foreign brides are recruited through agents. In 2008 Taiwan received 413,000 marriage migrants, while S. Korea received 150,000 marriage migrants in 2008 (11-13 per cent of all marriages in the 2003-8 period). In Japan some 5-6 per cent of all marriages involved foreign partners (Lee Hyekyung, 2010). Many women migrating for marriage come from SE Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Philippines), although many foreign brides for Taiwan come from Mainland China. The receiving countries all have very low total fertility rates (Taiwan 1.12 in 2005; S. Korea, 1.24 and Japan 1.29 in 2005) (Lee Hyekyung, 2010). This has important cultural implications: the countryside is frequently seen as the cradle of traditional values, and the high proportion of foreign mothers is regarded by some as a threat to national identity. Social and educational problems have also arisen, and both the S. Korean and Taiwanese governments have carried out major surveys to help understand the consequences of marriage migration (Bélanger et al., 2010).

Sending governments’ policies also affect women’s decisions to migrate. For some time in Bangladesh for instance, only married women were allowed to migrate. For a limited time, Nepal imposed a ban on labour migration of women to the Gulf. In other places such as in Sri Lanka, unmarried women were encouraged to migrate in the late 1970s (Siddiqui, 2008, 6).

Pacific migration

The Pacific region (or Oceania) is the world-region with the highest proportion of migrants in its population: 16.8 per cent of the population. The great majority of the over 6m immigrants in the region are in Australia (4.7m in 2010) and New Zealand (962,000 in 2010) (IOM, 2010, 219-21). The complex patterns of migration in the region cannot be explored here. New Zealand has experienced very rapid growth in immigration in recent years, with many settlers coming from the UK, China and India. Flows from the Pacific Islands are also significant, with many migrants coming on a temporary basis or through special bilateral agreements. The recently adopted Pacific Plan is an attempt to manage these flows.

The most significant migrant flow in the Pacific region is that between New Zealand and Australia. Although the special agreement -the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement- between the two countries allows flows in both directions, migration from New Zealand to Australia exceeds that in the opposite direction by 25-30,000 persons per year. New Zealand-Australia migration is Australia’s largest migration corridor (see below). Australia also receives migrants from Pacific Islands like Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. In some cases persons originating
in Pacific Islands come via New Zealand, and have been there long enough to have acquired New Zealand citizenship. The main reason for the attractiveness of Australia for migrants from New Zealand and other Pacific origin areas has been high wages and good employment opportunities in recent years.

**Understanding Asian and Pacific migration**

The early 21st century has been a period of growing diversity in Asian and Pacific migration. Economic migrants can be found at all skill levels: the lower-skilled still migrate out of the region but increasingly also within it; many highly-skilled people move to highly-developed countries, but increasing numbers go to Asian countries, while expatriates from other world regions are attracted to areas of economic growth. Feminisation of migration is highly significant. Increased length of stay of economic migrants appears to be leading to family reunion and formation. Refugee and other forced migrant populations still remain large and vulnerable.

One way of understanding the situation is to move away from the idea of the Asia-Pacific as a single world-region – it is much too large and diverse to be seen in this way. Looking at sub-regions can be more useful, and we can identify significant sub-regional migration systems such that of Southeast Asia, which includes migration from Burma to Thailand, Indonesia to Malaysia and movements from several sub-regional countries to Singapore. Another example is South Asia, which includes migration from Bangladesh and Nepal to India and from Afghanistan to Pakistan. However, the problem with this analytical perspective is that system theory tends to imply the notion of self-sustaining and relatively closed-off sets of interactions, while the mobility patterns are in fact volatile and multi-directional. Migratory flows frequently cross boundaries between Asian sub-regions or even between Asia and other world-regions. Examples of important flows between Asia-Pacific sub-regions include, among many others: Bangladesh to Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh to Singapore, Vietnam to Korea, and Philippines to Japan. Flows between Asia and other world regions include South and Southeast Asia to the Gulf oil countries, Philippines to the USA, and India and China to Australia. The point is that such flows are so varied in their characteristics and so diverse in their driving factors that the concept of migration systems seems to be of little use.

Migration scholars have therefore recently started using the notion of the migration corridor as a main analytical category. That means studying the characteristics and the drivers of migration flows between specific origin-areas and destination areas. In principle, the unit of analysis does not need to be the nation-state: the flow of migrants from Kerala to the Gulf is an example of a flow that can be usefully studied with a sub-national origin point and a supra-national destination. However, since migration data is generally presented on a national basis, there is a tendency to look at migration corridors linking specific nations.

Today four of the world’s ten top long-term migration corridors include Asian countries (figures for migrant stocks in 2005 from the World Bank) (IOM, 2010, 167; Ratha and Zhimei, 2008):

- Bangladesh → India (3.5m)
- India → United Arab Emirates (2.2m)
- Philippines → USA (1.6m)
- Afghanistan → Iran (1.6m).
Flow figures for the main current Asian and Pacific migration corridors to Australia (with 2008 settler arrival figures) are (DIAC, 2010d):

- New Zealand → Australia (33,034)
- India → Australia (16,909)
- China (excludes ARS and Taiwan) → Australia (14,935)
- Philippines → Australia (5619)
- Iraq → Australia (4008)
- Sri Lanka → Australia (3918)
- Malaysia → Australia (3261)
- Burma → Australia (2931)

The growth and contraction of migration corridors is linked to a wide range of factors: political, social, demographic and economic transformations in origin and destination areas; laws and policies; implementation practices and capacities; meso-factors like social networks and the migration industry; transport and communications possibilities and costs; and opportunity structures in both origin and destination areas. All these factors and their interactions need to be part of a conceptual framework for the analysis of migration (see below).

Moreover, the use of migration corridors as a unit of analysis does not imply that a movement from one place to another can be seen in isolation from more general national, regional and global trends. Human mobility is a crucial part of the broader processes through which societies change and relate to each other. The take-off of Asian migration has been closely connected to the major transformations in the region: from the 1950s to the 1970s, anti-colonial struggles, Cold War conflicts and disputes over post-colonial state-formation precipitated mass refugee movements. More recently, even greater movements have been connected with economic transformations, and especially with the uneven development of industry in the region. Similarly, the opening up of Australia to Asian migration is part of Australia’s change process in its historical journey from being a white outpost of the British Empire to being an independent, multicultural Asia-Pacific country.

One thing that becomes very obvious from studying Asia-Pacific migration is that Australia cannot always count on attracting migrants with the desired skill-mix. Most Asian migrants choose to go elsewhere, and their opportunities are proliferating as the economies of the region develop. In the past, Australia may have an edge with regard to living standards, lifestyles, security and the environment. Today, Australia has to compete with labour markets offering higher salaries and better opportunities. Other countries may also offer more familiar and congenial lifestyles. Australian policy-makers need to take a long-term view on the skills needs of the future and how to attract the best migrants.

2. 4. The impact of Australia’s changing environmental, demographic and economic situation

Major changes within Australia have important effects on migration patterns and policies. This section will explain the environmental, economic and demographic changes in relation to their impact on immigration-related issues.

*Environmental changes*
Environmental concerns have led to calls for restriction of population growth, with immigration seen as one of the few variables that can easily be addressed. Environmentalists opposed to immigration claim that Australia has a limited ‘carrying capacity’ due to lack of water and thin and nutrient-poor soils. Problems of waste assimilation, loss of bio-diversity and degradation of natural resources and amenities are also put forward (Jones, 2001, 50-51). On the other hand, some environmentalists argue that improvements in infrastructure and urban planning, along with limitation of carbon emissions, could play a bigger role in environmental protection, and that this can more easily be achieved in a growing economy. Compared to other countries, Australia has abundant and diverse natural resources including coal, iron ore, copper, gold, natural gas and various renewable energy sources. Indeed, the current Australian government has signalled the need for more skilled migrants to deal with a new resources boom on the horizon.

**Economic changes**
Attracting high levels of foreign investment, the Australian economy grew for a long period before the Global Economic Crisis and quickly resumed growth in 2009 and 2010. Trade relations with Asian and Pacific countries played an important role in economic success. Australia has an advantageous position being close to fast-growing economies. Today Australia is engaged in the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks and ongoing trade agreement negotiations with China, Japan, and Korea. The current resources boom – in particular the export of minerals to China and Japan – has led to significant demand for skilled labour across a wide range of occupations. The corporate sector argues that an open and flexible immigration policy is crucial if the potential benefits of current economic opportunities are to be realised. Its seem probable that there will be labour shortages across the skills spectrum in the future.

**Demographic changes**
The main demographic challenge is with regard to ageing and long-term population decline. The total fertility rate in Australia, although higher than in many developed countries, is still below the rate needed to reproduce the population. In recent years the main component of population growth has been net overseas migration rather than natural increase. Whereas in 1988 the median age of the Australian population was 31.6 years, in 2008 the median age reached 39.9 years (ABS, 2010, 192). The total fertility rate reached a low of 1.73 babies per woman in 2001 and has increased since then to 1.92 babies per woman in 2007, the highest since 1985 (ABS, 2010, 204), but still below the reproduction rate of 2.1. As a result of declining fertility, more Australians are expected to retire from the labour force after 2036 than join it (DIAC, 2010b). Immigrants have a lower average age-profile than existing Australian residents, and therefore make a positive contribution to fertility.

**Changes in composition of flows**
All these changes have an important impact on composition of migratory flows. Today, many employers see continued and indeed increased immigration as essential for providing labour to sustain the economic growth. With the changing characteristics of the economy, however, the types of migrants they call for have also changed. Now the stress is on attracting skills that are in short supply in the domestic labour force. The introduction of the points-based system has helped make the average level of qualification of recent immigrants to be higher than that of the Australian workforce as a whole.

Through the new migratory flows, the composition of Australia’s population has changed considerably. The 1947 Census counted 7.6m people, of whom 90 per cent had been born in
Australia, while most of the overseas-born came from the United Kingdom and Ireland. In 1971, 85 per cent of the immigrant population were from Europe, of whom half were from the UK. By June 2009, an estimated 73.5 per cent of the total population were born in Australia followed by Europe (11 per cent), Asia (8.5 per cent) Oceania (3 per cent), Middle East and North Africa (1.5 per cent), Sub-Saharan Africa (1.3 per cent) and the Americas (1.1 per cent). As for specific countries of origin, by 2009 the share of persons born in the United Kingdom had declined, but continued to be the largest single category, accounting for 5.4 per cent of Australia’s total population. Persons born in New Zealand accounted for 2.4 per cent, followed by persons born in China (1.6 per cent), India (1.4 per cent) and Italy (1 per cent) (ABS, 2010).

Despite these shifts in the composition of flows and stocks, Australia has no predominant minority groups. The Australian people today consist of an Anglo-Australian majority and a large number of relatively small ethnic groups. However, diversity continues to increase, and some city neighbourhoods have majority populations of recent immigrants and their descendants. An analysis of the 2006 Census indicated that 31.4 per cent of the population of Sydney and 27.9 per cent of the population of Melbourne spoke a language other than English at home. The most common non-English languages spoken were Arabic and Cantonese in Sydney and Italian and Greek in Melbourne (Markus et al., 2009, 7).

It is important to realise that permanent and long-term emigration from Australia has also increased steadily in recent years, rising from around 88,000 in 1981-82 to roughly 326,000 in 2008-09 (Productivity Commission, 2010, 36). It has become an important part of professional or personal experience to live and work abroad. Many Australians go to the UK, the USA and New Zealand, but numbers in newer business centres like Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai and Mumbai are also growing. The decision to leave Australia is usually based on a complex and varied set of reasons (Hugo, 2006). Of the 86,277 people who departed permanently in 2009-10, 50.7 per cent were born overseas (DIAC, 2010a). For Australia-born people, the decision to leave permanently is usually based on economic reasons, particularly employment. This trend is likely to continue as a result of the increasing internationalisation of labour markets. On the other hand, due to the global economic crisis and Australia’s relatively stronger economy, many Australians have decided to return to their homeland.

Understanding these changes in composition of migrant flows is important to developing a sustainable population strategy to balance the imperatives of economic growth and environmental and social sustainability. Australians will have to make choices concerning economic and demographic growth rates, as well as about investments in education and training. What is clear is that with increased life expectancy and longer average duration of education, the proportion of the population available for employment will diminish. Without immigration, labour force growth would cease within the next decades.

2.5 Social and cultural implications of migration processes

Australian approaches and global debates

Australia’s immigration policy, along with Canada’s, is generally seen to be one of the most successful policies in the post-war years. Both countries are held up to be the showpieces of multiculturalism which, in reality, is a policy of immigrant inclusion. Australia has been good at attracting people into a democratic society and since the inception of the large post-war
migration programme, citizenship has been central to the success. Later in the 1970s, as multiculturalism was developed, English language tuition became the other cornerstone of successful immigrant settlement. Settlement policy has been non-negotiable in the sense that it is a basic right for newcomers to receive assistance to settle into the labour market, find housing and educate their children. Through a policy that promoted accessible citizenship, and through inclusive settlement policies, immigrants have been able to settle in Australia as full citizens in a short period of time.

Australian multiculturalism has been based on two main principles. The first refers to equality, to ensure immigrant participation in all societal institutions. The second refers to the principle that migrants have the right to pursue their own religion and languages, and to establish communities. In recent years, multiculturalism has changed, based on a desire to highlight the notion of ‘unity in diversity’ where immigrants are entreated to integrate into ‘core cultural values’, ‘all derived from a core of values of the anglo-celtic cultural heritage’ (Jayasuriya, 2005).

As migratory patterns have become more complex and multi-directional, Australia’s reactions have become similar to those in European immigration countries. No immigration country has yet embraced the idea of a transnational model of immigrant incorporation. Castles and Miller suggest that the ‘social and cultural identities of transnational communities transcend national boundaries, leading to multiple and differentiated forms of belonging…a great deal of political and economic power is shifting to transnational corporations and international agencies which are not currently open to democratic control…[Democracy] also means ensuring citizen participation in new locations of power, whether supranational or sub-national, public or private’ (Castles and Miller, 2009). Politicians and the public are finding it hard to come to terms with global changes, as the disproportionate reaction to the growth in asylum seeker arrivals reveals. The fears of loss of sovereignty and identity have also spilled over into the social policy area, leading to a questioning of multiculturalism.

Many Australians are concerned that immigrants are not integrating well; they are not making the effort ‘to become as Australian as possible’. Since 9/11, much of this concern is directed at Muslim Australians (Jupp, 2007). This perceived lack of integration creates fears about whether newcomers are developing a shared sense of belonging, because without this common sense of belonging to national identity it is feared that social cohesion and indeed the very basis of liberal democracy is under threat. Australia moved to multiculturalism as a way of recognizing diversity and preventing social exclusion. The Howard government reluctantly endorsed multiculturalism – though with a new emphasis on social cohesion. Yet the multicultural society of today is very different from that of 1973 or even 1989: diversity of origins, class, religion and culture is much greater; aspirations have changed; and many people have life-orientations that include strong linkages across borders. Today’s concern with diversity and multiculturalism has become more discerning. Australians may be strongly nationalist while calmly embracing some of the benefits of diversity. Furthermore, they embrace diversity and multiculturalism through their relationship with individuals rather than with the ethnic group (Brett and Moran, 2011).

At the same time, employers and authorities of industrial countries are increasingly concerned about shortages of labour and skills (see above). Migration policies now emphasise securing marketable skills, while multicultural policies are being challenged by – often poorly defined – principles of social cohesion. International competition to attract skilled immigrants has become more and more intense. In addition, while a policy of temporary migration was
rejected in the 1980 and 1990s, particularly by trade unions, Australia’s immigration policy now embraces temporary migrants to fill gaps in the labour market.

This situation raises a number of important questions for Australians who expect long-term migrants to integrate into Australia’s perceived core values.

- How can we remain attractive to the skilled people we are competing for and the temporary workers we need and still retain a successful migration policy?
- How can we retain a successful policy of settlement and inclusion with the growing number of temporary migrants? In other words, multiculturalism may have created the right mix, the right conditions for long-settled immigrants, but is it able to create similar conditions for temporary migrants?
- If Australians are concerned that immigrants are not integrating adequately, if they are questioning multiculturalism in that light, then how do we expect temporary immigrants to integrate or settle within the period of their temporary visa?
- Furthermore, what exactly is expected of temporary migrants at the socio-cultural level?

**Multiculturalism and social cohesion**

Today a multicultural model is needed that is open not only to varying and flexible ethnic identities but also to transnational relationships and, indeed, to multi-level attachments. How can Australia re-adapt a new model of immigration that has moved from a mainly family reunion model to a mainly economic and skills-based model and still retain the desired cohesion of the society? Issues about sovereignty and loyalty in an era of multiple and complex attachments need to be rethought. One of the fears of the earlier opponents of temporary immigrant workers was that they would be exposed to exploitation, and already we have evidence that this is an increasing problem in Australia (Bachelard, 6 September 2006; MacDermott and Opeskin, 2010; Mares, 2007). But our understanding of notions of sense of belonging and the range of attachments that come with the new migrations is still minimal and requires closer examination.

Belonging is multi-faceted - people can have a sense of belonging as individuals as well as collective belonging; they can belong to a community, a locality or a nation; or they can have a transnational sense of belonging. Some people have a sense of belonging to more than one polity, conduct their politics in transnational locations, or they may have emotional or symbolic attachments to two or more spheres of life. Three theoretical positions can help us understand the relationship between belonging, national identity and social cohesion.

The first, often referred to as *liberal nationalism*, is based on an assumed solidarity of the people of a nation who need to see themselves as members of a territorially bound and overarching community. For the proper functioning of the state - to ensure social justice, commitment to the common good and to avoid alienation – its citizens need to have a shared sense of belonging to each other (Miller, 2000, 32-33).

A second theoretical approach focuses on *national identity as the identity of a multicultural political community*. It is based on the idea that national identity is territorially bound and that an optimal position would be where its citizens can be bound to the rest by a common sense of belonging, where they share common interests as well as rights and obligations (Parekh, 2008, 87). This approach provides an expanded notion of national identity that nonetheless requires a common sense of belonging to the nation – it requires an emotional pull. But what if the emotional pull is not there?
A third approach provides some answers to this question. While sympathetic to diversity and multiculturalism, this perspective deviates in so far as it distinguishes between what Mason calls a ‘sense of belonging together’ and a ‘sense of belonging to a polity’ (Mason, 2000, 127). In this approach, the citizens of a state might in principle have a sense of belonging to a polity without having a sense of belonging together, to what is usually a perceived homogenous national culture.

These three theoretical perspectives are concerned with citizens, and immigrant citizens in particular, of nation-states. But the liberal nationalists are concerned that unless we have a sense of belonging to each other, then social cohesion will diminish. In contrast to liberal nationalism, recent research reveals that immigrants can have a sense of belonging to the polity only. Research conducted in London shows that some immigrants may not have a sense of belonging or even loyalty to the national identity but do have a sense of commitment to their multi-ethnic neighbourhood and to the common good (Vasta, 2010). Other research shows that itinerant populations can have a sense of belonging to multiple ‘homes’. In research among Camorran traders, for example, Walker found they often have multiple geographical sites that they call ‘home’ (Walker, 2008).

Transnationalism also raises fear in terms of people’s commitments to more than one nation-state. The fear is that divided loyalties may arise and hence impact on integration and solidarity. Within the assimilationist or social cohesion model, it was thought that immigrants would shed one national identity for another, especially if they become citizens (Guarnizo et al., 2003). At the same time, they would progressively disengage from loyalties and attachments of their home countries. However, such views have been contested by a wealth of empirical evidence showing that immigrants have become increasingly transnational in their orientations and can thus be simultaneously involved in two or more societies at the same time. There is evidence this does not necessarily impede integration, and these processes can even be positively related (De Haas, 2005).

The trend towards transnationalism is also exemplified in the fact that many immigrants prefer to hold dual citizenship. The implication is that clear-cut dichotomies of ‘origin’ or ‘destination’ are increasingly difficult to sustain in a world in which the lives of immigrants seem increasingly characterised by circulation and simultaneous commitment to two or more societies. Research reveals that patterns of integration and attachment vary. Some research shows that ‘highly skilled migrants can occupy social spaces of inclusion and exclusion that are mediated by intersecting axes of identity such as class, ethnicity/race, nationality and gender (Ho, 2011). On the other hand, research in Singapore confirms that temporary British migrants set up expatriate clubs leading to very little interaction between themselves and local Singaporean communities, although they do mix with expatriates of other nationalities (Beaverstock, 2011). Here they have set up a distinctive expatriate space which Beaverstock calls ‘cosmopolitan’ (2011), though in years gone by it would have been called a ‘ghetto’.

The crucial questions are about commitment: level and strength of commitment or attachment. We might also ask - commitment or attachment to what? Hammar (1990) has suggested the term denizen for people who are foreign citizens with legal or permanent resident status. Others call it ‘transnational citizenship’ (Bauböck, 1994) or ‘post-national personhood’ (Soysal, 1994). Castles suggests that ‘the long-term question is whether democratic nation-states can successfully operate with a population differentiated into full citizens, quasi-citizens and foreigners’ (Castles and Miller, 2009). Thus, how relevant are the
various models of immigrant inclusion of the late 20th century in the new millennium? How relevant is the multicultural model or the transnational model for immigration countries with large sections of their population becoming more and more temporary and transitory? At a time when large sections of the Australian population call for social cohesion and respect for western democratic values, what kinds of policy would be appropriate for temporary migrants? Ultimately, in Australia these questions need to be answered by systematic research, leading to new policy strategies.

Social cohesion and racism

Australians have always been concerned about the composition of its migrants. Policies to manage this include the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, the White Australia Policy and the Dictation Test, preference for British and Northern European as opposed to Southern European immigrants in the early post-war years, and exclusion of Asian migrants until the 1960s. However, the largest intake in recent years has come from Asia. While there is still some concern that the Asian intake is too high, in the past decade, Muslim Australians have borne the brunt of Australian fears and racism. This has led to a widespread backlash against multiculturalism, especially since the events of 11 September 2001 in the USA and the Bali Bombing of 2002 when attacks by the Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah killed 202 people, of whom 88 were Australians. Security concerns often focus on the situation of Muslim migrant communities.

Discussions about ‘Australian values’ and questions surrounding commitment and loyalty on the part of Australians of immigrant background, particularly in the context of concerns about terrorism and the integration of Muslim Australians, have taken on a new importance (Klapdor et al., 2009; Koleth, 2010). Furthermore, disaffection with multiculturalism was increased by the fears and insecurities emanating from the aftermath of 9/11, the Bali bombings and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In a climate of fear and suspicion, a major study undertaken by HREOC in 2004 revealed that Arab and Muslim Australians (as well as members of some other religious and cultural communities) were experiencing heightened levels of discrimination and vilification (HREOC, 2004).

Issues of racism again came to the fore through the Cronulla riots of 2005, when groups of white ‘surfer’ youths attacked young people ‘of Middle Eastern appearance’. The political fall-out isolated Australia’s Lebanese Muslims – a community that has high rates of unemployment and considerable experience of racial discrimination. Tilbury argues that the Citizenship test focuses on homogeneity, and suggests the test is mainly targeted at Muslims ‘who are seen to have values diametrically opposite to those of ‘Australia’” (Tilbury, 2007). Recent trends in global integration, changes in migration patterns, as well as circumstances at home, have led to fears of loss of sovereignty and identity. Politicians and the public are finding it hard to come to terms with such changes.

In sum, currently there are several issues that challenge Australia’s national identity. These include the population debate which questions how many people Australia can afford to accommodate socially, financially and environmentally; the ethnic composition of required workers; the disproportionate reaction to the growth in asylum seeker arrivals revealed in the phenomenon of the ‘boat people’ who are stereotyped as ‘queue jumpers’; and the reactions against Muslims who are now the latest group accused of not assimilating into Australian values. Jupp argues that those who claim that social cohesion is crumbling tend to highlight worst-case scenarios. He suggests that Australia enjoys a large measure of social cohesion and that there are other social divisions that create clashes, such as the conflicts between
generations, religious and secular Australians, and those with differing levels of education and class position (Jupp, 2007, 16-18). This is supported empirically by recent research on social cohesion carried out by Markus who found that Australia is in fact a highly cohesive society. This research reported extremely high levels of financial satisfaction, future expectations, sense of belonging, and views of economic opportunity (Markus, 2010). However, although Australians of migrant background experience Australia as relatively accepting of difference, many experience various forms of racism (Forrest and Dunn, 2007). The new emphasis on security and social cohesion reveals not only a contested identity but an unsettled identity as well. This is not new. Since WW11, as the need for immigration has increased, so has Australian national identity become more open-ended.

2.6 The role of media in framing perceptions about various ethnic and religious groups

The media offer most of the information that is available to the members of a society, especially on issues with which they are not confronted in their daily lives. Over the past decades, much of the debates on the Australian media focused on certain main concepts about migration and ethnic and religious groups. The framing of information by the media has been important and their effects need to be scrutinised carefully. Whereas the news in the 1980s discussed multiculturalism as part of the government policy, the news in the 1990s emphasised indigenous peoples, their rights and reconciliation issues, as well as the debates around migrants from Asian countries. In the same period, a discourse of ‘tolerance’ was slowly replaced by a discourse of ‘harmony’ and ‘integration’. From a historical point of view, we can see that the media’s conceptualisation of threats to society has constantly changed throughout Australian history.

Since the September 11 events, the fear of an ‘Asian invasion’ has been replaced by negative reports about Muslims and ‘Islamophobia’, which some argue is a heritage of Western antipathy to Islam (Dunn et al., 2007). Australian Muslims have been presented on the news to an increasing degree, albeit at most times in the background of the news with hijabs (or ‘Islamic headscarves’) and long beards (IWWCV, 2005). These make them appear as either oppressed, abused victims or as objects of threat to security. Similar descriptions continued during the discussions of ‘race rapes’ in Sydney, asylum seekers arriving by boat, London and Bali bombings (Dunn et al., 2007; HREOC, 2004; Poynting and Noble, 2004). In the past Muslims and their integration in Australia had not attracted much media attention, and when it did, such immigrants were depicted in terms of national origins rather than religion. But since September 11, journalists have emphasised the religious angle, when reporting on ‘Muslim Australians’. This created an ‘Islamic World’ perceived as a monolithic and unitary group of people, with similar socio-political and theological backgrounds.

The same sort of a categorisation can be seen regarding international students, ‘Africans’, and indigenous peoples. Similar to Muslims in general, ‘Asian students’, particularly Indian and Chinese students, are depicted as either victims in their previous homelands or perpetrators of crime in Australia (Richards et al., 2007). Among African immigrants, increasingly the Sudanese have been subject to similar monolithic presentations or at times even misrepresentations. Similar to Muslims and Asian students, ironically the Sudanese are framed as a source of criminality but also under the framework of the constant ‘difficulties in their home country’. In this case ‘the difficulties in Sudan’ theme placing them within the context of war, genocide and child soldiers, simultaneously create negative stereotypes (Marjoribanks et al., 2010, 11) and make them vulnerable to be perceived as a violent and
problematic group. Indigenous peoples suffer from such conflicting discourses as well, ranging from being the criminal to being weak or being resistant to change (Simmons and Lecouteur, 2008).

The media’s framing of these groups display them either as victims in need of liberation (such as in the case of Muslim women) or as a threat to society in general (such as in the case of ‘race rapes’). In all instances, ‘symbolic’ or ‘modern’ racism manifests itself in more subtle ways than before. Hence, the media can play both positive and negative roles. They can play an important role in framing perceptions about various ethnic and religious groups, about youth and about certain neighbourhoods. Some research reveals that the mainstream media often portrays Islam as a religion whose values and traditions are in conflict with those of western cultures, thus contributing to the construction of negative stereotypes of Muslims (Pedersen et al., 2009). Local councils have an important proactive role to play in educating the media and linking them to positive events within communities and neighbourhoods.

Within the last couple of years, the emergence of ‘social media’ has created new sources of information and their framing of issues and effects on the public perceptions deserve further empirical research. The social media works in the circulation of information, attitudes, and actions. How they create a crowd, which has been clearly visible in recent events such as the Cronulla riots of 2005 and the ongoing revolutions in the Middle East, is yet unclear. The new social media such as texting, blogging, Facebook and other forms can either facilitate or hamper social cohesion. We need to understand some of the complexities and nuances of this media and how it is adopted by certain groups. For example, in the Cronulla riots, was there an interplay of discrimination, lack of opportunity, lack of recognition? How do the new social media work for temporary immigrants, particularly in terms of facilitating community cohesion?

### 3. A conceptual framework for understanding migration processes

#### 3.1. Key discussions in migration theory

One result of all the changes in the global, regional and national migration context described in the previous sections is that migration processes have become more complex than ever before. In the Introduction, we posed some questions that are crucial for migration policymakers in Australia and elsewhere. Migration theory tries to provide answers to these questions. Early migration theory put forward simple and rather mechanistic push-pull models to explain movements (Ravenstein, 1885; 1889). Such approaches have been taken up more recently in development economics (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Todaro, 1976) and more generally in neo-classical economic approaches to understanding migration (Borjas, 1994; Chiswick, 1999; Wooden, 1994). The neo-classical model emphasises the individual decision to migrate, based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining at home or moving. Neo-classical theory assumes that potential migrants have full knowledge of wage levels and employment opportunities in destination regions, and that their migration decisions are overwhelmingly based on these economic factors.

An alternative way of understanding international migration developed in the 1970s and 1980s out of critical political economy. According to world systems theories (Amin, 1974; Wallerstein, 1984), migration was a way of mobilising cheap labour from countries underdeveloped by colonialism, to work in the manufacturing industries of core industrial
nations. Migration perpetuated uneven development by exploiting the resources of poor
countries to make the rich even richer. Migration reinforced the effects of military hegemony
and control of world trade and investment in keeping the Third World dependent on the First.
This approach was applied to migration to Western Europe and the USA through the

However, this analysis was questioned by some migration scholars: if the logic of capital and
the interests of Western states were so dominant, how could the frequent breakdown of
migration policies be explained, such as the unplanned shift from labour migration to
permanent settlement in certain countries? Both neo-classical and historical-structural
perspectives seemed too one-sided to analyse adequately the great complexity of
contemporary migrations. The neo-classical approach neglected historical causes of
movements, and downplayed the role of the state, while the historical-functional approach
emphasised economic and social structure, and often saw the interests of capital as all-
determining, while paying inadequate attention to human agency (the motivations and actions
of the individuals and groups involved).

A critique from within the economics profession was provided by the theorists of the ‘new
economics of labour migration’ (NELM). This approach recognised that migration decisions
are not purely individual, but are often made by families and communities, and are shaped by
long-term considerations connected with investment and security (Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1999).
Yet the focus remained on economic factors.

Today, there is an emerging consensus that migration research and policy-making need to
include consideration of all the social, cultural, economic, political and personal factors that
influence decisions and behaviour. Approaches based on a single discipline, like economics or
sociology, are inadequate, because migration embraces all aspects of social experience,
making interdisciplinary approaches essential. A new literature on innovative approaches to
research on migration is emerging, which cannot be discussed in detail here (see Brettell and
Hollifield, 2007; De Haas, 2010b; Faist, 2000; Massey et al., 1998; Portes and DeWind, 2007;
Schuerkens, 2005).

In the view of the authors of this paper, theories of migration should start from the processes
of rapid social transformation linked to globalisation and the rapid uneven development
processes occurring in regions like East and Southeast Asia. Migration has to be understood
as an integral part of such processes, rather than something separate that can be studied in
isolation. Change today may be driven by macro-level economic and political forces, but its
human effects are always felt at the societal, community and individual levels. It is impossible
to understand migration simply as an individual reaction to global economic and political
factors. It is always mediated through local historical and cultural factors, as well as through
varying constellations of family relations, social class, gender, location and position in the
life-cycle (Castles, 2010b). Thus, migration theory not only focuses on the migration process
but includes economic, political and social links between origin and destination countries as
well as the effects of settlement and accommodation on the societies concerned.

3.2. Main conceptual and analytical tools used to understand the changing
characteristics of global and regional migration.
Migration research has grown rapidly since 1945 and especially since the 1980s. The key concepts of the emerging approaches include:

*Transitional theories.* According to Zelinsky (1971) at the beginning of a process of modernisation and industrialisation, there is frequently an increase in emigration, due to population growth, a decline in rural employment and low wage levels. As industrialisation proceeds, labour supply declines and domestic wage levels rise; as a result emigration falls and labour immigration begins to take its place. This process parallels the ‘fertility transition’ through which populations grow fast as public health and hygiene improves, and then stabilise as fertility falls in industrial countries. Thus industrialising countries tend to move through an initial stage of emigration, followed by a stage of both in- and outflows, until finally there is a transition to being predominantly a country of immigration (Martin *et al.*, 1996, 171-2). A more recent concept used to describe this pattern is the ‘migration hump’: a chart of emigration shows a rising line as economic growth takes off, then a flattening curve, followed in the long run by a decline, as a mature industrial economy emerges (Martin and Taylor, 2001). Although useful, this approach is very much at the macro-level, and tends to be deterministic, failing to capture the varying experience of different origin and destination areas.

*Multi-level analysis:* the principle that studies that focus on just the macro-level (e.g. international and national economic and political factors) or micro-level (attitudes and action of individuals and groups) cannot provide an adequate understanding of migration processes. The mediations between the levels (e.g. individual and community responses to or resistance against macro-factors) are crucially important. Sometimes these give rise to meso-level structures that connect individuals and groups with broader structures.

*Migration networks and social and cultural capital.* Migration networks (Boyd, 1989) are examples of meso-structures, through which migrants create organisational forms that mediate between the macro- and the micro-levels. Characteristic of such networks is the accumulation of social capital – that is bonds with people who can facilitate migration and settlement processes – and cultural capital – that is knowledge of migration routes, employment opportunities and livelihood strategies. Migrant social and cultural capital can prove more powerful than government policies and laws in some cases.

*Cumulative causation.* This approach, developed especially by US sociologist Doug Massey (Massey, 1990) is based on analysis of social capital and migrant networks, and argues that as these develop, migration processes become self-sustaining. In other words, once a pioneer migrant group gets established, it tends to generate further migration and an expanding immigrant population. The problem, however, is that empirical study shows that this does not always happen, and that some migrant groups decline over time (De Haas, 2010a). This leads to the research task of establishing why some migrant groups continue to grow (often despite government efforts) while others do not.

*Migration systems* – a term first developed by the Nigerian geographer A.L. Mabogunje for the analysis of rural-urban migration (Mabogunje, 1970), but since applied to international migration. The migration systems approach means taking groups of countries linked by migratory flows as the unit of analysis, and examining both ends of a migratory flow and studying all the linkages between the places concerned. These include ‘state-to-state relations and comparisons, mass culture connections and family and social networks’ (Fawcett and Arnold, 1987, 456-7). A main focus is on regional migration systems, such as the South
Pacific, West Africa or the Southern Cone of Latin America (Kritz et al., 1992). However, distant regions may be interlinked, such as the migration system embracing the Caribbean, Western Europe and North America. The strength of the migrations systems approach is that it implies interdisciplinarity, multi-level analysis and the need to include all relevant factors in the conceptual model. However, its weakness is the difficulty in specifying the limits of a given system, and how it can be separated from other systems (as we discussed for Asia above).

Migration corridors. Migration analysts have recently begun using this concept, which means studying migration flows between a specific origin area and a specific destination area. Similar to migration systems theory, the idea is to look at all relevant linkages, such as past colonisation (e.g. the Algeria-France corridor) military intervention (the S. Korea-USA case); economic dependence (Mexico-USA); labour recruitment (Turkey-Germany); educational marketing (India-Australia) and so on. A migration corridor does not necessarily mean using the nation-state as the unit of analysis – sub-national linkages may prove significant such as Kerala to the Gulf since the 1970s, or Sicily to Northern Queensland in the 1920s. The use of migration corridors may allow a finer-grained analysis than focusing on the rather heterogeneous migration systems that are meant to embrace whole regions. However, it is important not to separate migration corridors from their wider sub-regional, regional and global contexts.

Transnational identities. Both settled and temporary migrants become involved in the shifting boundaries of identity construction. How they frame their identity depends on many contextual issues, including class, ethnicity, gender, nationality and religion. Transnational and cosmopolitan identities are considered to be more flexible identities that transcend particularistic and national identities. In new countries of work, the idea of migrant cosmopolitan identities’ generally premised on the ‘sense of belonging to humanity’, is now strongly challenged by some scholars, who argue that transnationalism does not necessarily lead to the more positive claims of cosmopolitanism (Ho, 2006). Migrant workers, not least the highly skilled, experience culture shock generally and more particularly in the workplace (see Ho, 2011). Hence, with changes in migration patterns, theories of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism in relation to identity, belonging and nation require updated analysis.

3. 3. Towards a conceptual framework for the study of international migration

A conceptual framework in the social sciences has the task of guiding research on a given theme. In turn that research should provide an assessment of the state of knowledge on the theme concerned, and, more specifically, should seek to provide the best available answers to questions that arise in public understanding and policy-formulation on matters of socio-political importance. A conceptual framework should include the following steps:

1. State the unit of analysis for a research (e.g. a migration corridor between country A and country B).
2. Specify the main dimensions to be studied (e.g. causes of migration, or costs and benefits to the various parties involved).
3. List the main factors to be considered in seeking to understand each dimension.
4. Specify the most important interactions (e.g. causality, interdependence, feedback) between the factors.
5. Suggest strategic indicators for factors and interactions.
6. Suggest *weightings* for the significance of the various factors, interactions and indicators.

The analytical task is made much more difficult by the fact that many important factors in social behaviour and action are not quantifiable, because they are qualitative in their nature. Migration decisions by individuals or families for instance can neither be measured nor predicted, for they demand on a wide range of factors, including personal preferences, family relationships and so on. Social science often has to work with indicators of *probability* that a certain factor or event will lead people to behave in certain way. Overall, migration behaviour cannot be predicted over long periods – one has only to think back say 30 years and ask whether anyone in 1981 would have predicted today’s global migration landscape to understand this.

A conceptual framework for studying international migration must therefore include both quantitative indicators (e.g. numbers of migrants in a specific category) and qualitative indicators (e.g. variations in social identity formation). The methodological difficulties of integrating such disparate types of knowledge in a single model are considerable. Here we will present some ideas on each of the steps mentioned above.

*The unit of analysis*

We suggest that the unit of analysis should be the migration corridor. This concept has already been defined and discussed above. That would mean focusing Australian migration research on the characteristics of the most important migration corridors, e.g. New Zealand → Australia, UK → Australia, China → Australia, India → Australia. The criteria for choosing which corridors to focus on need not be merely related to the size of flows; other criteria could be growth or decline of flows, high levels of irregularity, perceptions of settlement issues and so on. However, it is important to remember not only the strengths but also the weaknesses of the corridor approach. Migration corridors arise in specific circumstances, and few countries belong to just one (the main exception being the Mexico-USA corridor, which is the by far the largest flow for both countries concerned). It is also important not to separate migration corridors from their wider sub-regional, regional and global contexts.

*The dimensions to be studied*

To fully understand a migration corridor it is useful to analyse four dimensions of the relationship between the two countries concerned:

- The causes of migration – which include factors in the relationships between origin and destination countries.
- Impacts on countries of origin – which can be in the form of cost-benefit analysis. This may require disaggregation according to impacts on specific social groups (e.g. farmers, businesspeople). Disaggregation by gender, age, region, rural-urban location etc. could also be necessary.
- Impacts on countries of destination - also in the form of cost-benefit analysis, and with consideration of varying group interests.
- Impacts on migrants and their families.

The diagram below (from Puentes *et al.*, 2010) helps summarise the dimensions.

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3 This section is partly based on a paper prepared for the meetings of the People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights, Mexico City 2010, which was a preparatory meeting for the 2010 Global Forum on Migration and Development, Puerto Vallarta (Mexico): (Puentes *et al.*, 2010).
The suggested method of analysis is to work out indices for each dimension (based on the factors, interactions and indicators described below). These could then be represented graphically to provide an overall impression of the ‘winners and losers’ in a specific migration corridor, as in Figure 2 (from Puentes et al., 2010).
Figure 2  Example of indices for the four dimensions applied to a fictitious migration corridor
The diagram shows a situation in a migration corridor where there are slight net negative impacts on countries of origin, moderately positive impacts on countries of destination, but the impacts on migrants and their families are quite negative and the root causes of migration are not addressed adequately (Puentes et al., 2010).

Figure 3  Example of comparative analysis of two migration corridors
This diagram portrays a much better condition for Corridor B, with a more balanced cost / benefit ratio between the sending and the receiving country. Corridor B also depicts a better situation for the migrants and their families. The condition of migrants and their families in Corridor A is unsatisfactory (Puentes et al., 2010).

The main factors to be considered
For each of the dimensions of a specific migration corridor, a set of factors needs to be specified. These include the following (although no claim is made that this list is exhaustive).
Causes of migration

- Economic asymmetries between origin and destination country
- Social inequalities between origin and destination country
- Other causal factors, including social and cultural linkages between origin and destination countries, migrants’ social aspirations, family issues, location and lifecycle stages.

Impacts on migrants and their families

- Economic impacts
- Impacts on working conditions
- Impacts on human rights
- Social and cultural impacts

Impacts on origin countries

- Economic impacts of remittances (including reverse remittances – the credit burden undertaken to start the migration process - which is usually neglected in remittance calculations (Khadria, 2008))
- Social costs of reproduction (human capital)
- Demographic impacts
- Impacts of return migration
- Social and cultural impacts
- Political impacts

As already pointed out, all these factors may need to be disaggregated according to social class, gender, age, location etc.

Impacts on destination countries

- Economic impacts
- Demographic impacts
- Social and cultural impacts
- Impacts on national security
- Impacts on community relations (or social cohesion)

Interactions between the factors

The complexity of the factors involved in migration processes is enormous, and the potential interaction between various factors is even more multi-faceted. No attempt will be made to list the possible permutations here. In practice the only solution is for researchers to come to judgments on which interactions seem most significant. For example, if economic asymmetry between an origin and a destination country is an important cause of migration, then it would be useful to explore to what extent economic remittances are conducive to reducing the asymmetry, or whether the social and cultural impacts of migration lead to or alternatively undermine endogenous development. Such impacts on an economy or society could in turn be linked to impacts on migrants and their families – for instance with regard to poverty reduction – or to impacts on the economies of destination countries – for instance with regard to the effects of immigration on wage levels.

Strategic indicators

For each factor, a range of indicators is needed. This makes the complexity of the analysis even greater.
For just one dimension – ‘Impacts on Countries of Origin’ – there are six factors with several indicators in each. The situation is similar for the other three dimensions (Puentes et al., 2010).

An important aspect of an overall model for analysis of migration corridors would be coefficients for the weighting of data for the various indicators and factors. The difficulty of this task in view of the complexity of the indicators and factors already demonstrated makes it impossible to attempt here. It would be necessary to think through each of the indicators and to provide quantitative data and qualitative material for them before weightings can be envisaged. It is clear that new approaches would first be necessary in defining and providing data.

3.4. Applying the conceptual framework to Australian migration

The conceptual framework and approaches suggested in the previous section have been developed at the theoretical level. An attempt has already been made to apply them to Latin American (and particularly Mexican) migration to the USA. The availability of data for this migration corridor is probably better than for most migration corridors affecting Australia. This has made it possible to present tentative quantitative findings for some indicators. Figure 5 provides an example.
4. Migration policy and program responses

4.1. Introduction

In this section, we examine the challenges for Australian migration and settlement policies that arise from the changing dynamics of international migration processes. Then we discuss the need to reconceptualise migration and settlement in the context of the rapidly changing and highly complex migratory patterns that have emerged in recent times. We go on to look at
some of the main shifts that have taken place in policies and programs and discuss the extent
to which they have adequately met the challenges of rapidly-changing migration patterns,
motivations and experiences. Finally we highlight issues that need to be taken into
consideration in the formulation of Australia’s future policies and programs on migration and
settlement. These accounts are necessarily brief and preliminary and need to be deepened
through further research and debate.

4. 2. Key challenges

This sub-section summarises main messages from Section 2, A survey of key migration issues
of this Working Paper. Here we will briefly mention key challenges and their possible policy
impacts as numbered points. For more detail, we refer readers to the detailed text above.

1. The growth and diversification of global migration. Rapid growth in human mobility
is linked to social transformations arising from the economic, technological, social and
cultural changes associated with the accelerated globalisation of recent decades. This
trend forms the general context in which Australian policies need to be reconsidered.

2. The growth and diversification of migration in the Asian and Pacific regions. The
enormous expansion in migration within and from the various sub-regions of Asia and
the Pacific has important consequences for Australia, including the marked growth in
flows from these areas to Australia since the 1970s. Diversification refers to increased
participation from a wide range of origin areas, as well as diversity in social,
educational, cultural and religious backgrounds of migrants.

3. The multi-directionality of migration. Older classifications of countries as immigration
or emigration areas need to be questioned. Some countries have made rapid transitions
from mainly emigration to mainly immigration, while most countries now experience
more varied and flexible flows. Australian too has increasing emigration, and policy-
makers need to be aware of the size and potential of the ‘Australian diaspora’.

4. The feminisation of migration. Increased primary and labour migration by women
challenges older assumptions that women mainly move as dependents through family
reunion.

5. Global and regional competition for skills. Australian immigration policies emphasise
skills in demand, but many other countries, both older industrial countries and
emerging economies are now competing for scarce skills.

6. Increases in refugee and asylum movements. Increased levels of forced migration
since the 1980s have been closely linked to processes of political and economic
change in many areas of the world. At the same time, new forms of transport and
communication make movement easier. These factors are a challenge to Australians’
belief in the controllability of borders and to longstanding refugee and asylum
policies.

7. Bi-lateralism in migration. Migration policies are generally focussed on fairly short-
term consideration of the costs and benefits for the country concerned. Although this
applies to origin countries as well as destination countries, the market power of the
latter is often stronger. Bi-lateral partnerships, designed to maximise the benefits of all stakeholders are likely to be more beneficial and sustainable in the long run.

8. *The global governance deficit concerning migration.* Although the 1951 Refugee Convention sets principles for refugee admission and treatment, there is still a lack of agreed international norms and institutions in the broader migration field.

9. *The significance of temporary and circular migration.* Patterns of migration and the motivations of migrants are changing as mobility becomes easier. This leads to more flexible forms of temporary and circular migration, and to a declining emphasis on permanent settlement. These are furthered by migration programs that favour temporary intake. The resulting growth in temporary and circular migration challenges traditional Australian assumptions on the mainly one-way and permanent character of migration.

10. *The rise of transnationalism.* New forms of transport and communication allow migrants to maintain close and many-faceted relationships with their home areas and with culturally-close groups elsewhere. This undermines older ideas of migrant integration, belonging and attachment.

11. *Australia’s changing environmental, economic and demographic situation.* Migration policies and programs cannot be developed in isolation from the broader societal context. Environmental concerns have led many to question the merits of building a larger population, while others argue that infrastructure and public goods are more significant than population size. The current mining boom has led to strong demand for skilled labour, but critics argue that the emphasis on mining may undermine Australia’s broader skills base and manufacturing capacities. Population ageing and fertility decline are advanced as reasons for increased migration, but it is not clear that migration is a viable solution to such issues.

12. *The changing social and cultural impacts of migration.* Temporary and circular migration, feminisation of flows and transnationalism can all have important impacts on the way migrations take place and how they affect both origin and destination societies. Ideas of national belonging and identity are changing in complex ways.

13. *Changing motivations with regard to settlement, multiculturalism and citizenship.* Many of the factors already mentioned can lead to major shifts in settlement strategies, attitudes towards life in a multicultural society and towards becoming citizens of destination countries.

14. *The politicisation of asylum.* All these changes and challenges have helped fuel the politicisation of migration in many destination countries, including Australia. Unfortunately, though, such debates often get sidetracked by emotive issues, like fears of invasion and loss of sovereignty in the case of the small inflows of asylum seekers to Australia. The much larger changes to overall migration programs – particularly the growing emphasis on particular skills and the rise of temporary migration – often go virtually unnoticed and undebated.
4. 3. Conceptualising Australian migration and settlement for the 21st century

In Section 3, *A conceptual framework for understanding migration processes*, we argued for an interdisciplinary and holistic approach to understanding migration. We see analysis of current rapid processes of social transformation connected with globalisation as the starting point for understanding migration. The approach is important for research, but we believe that it is also crucial for policy formation: only by understanding the complexity of contemporary migration and settlement processes as well as the societal contexts in which these arise, is it possible to develop long-term strategies for maximising the benefits of migration. The following points summarise this approach.

1. *Understanding migration systems.* The migration systems approach is conceptually important, because it stresses the need to understand all dimensions of migration relationships, and to examine these in the context of other elements of international relationships (such as trade, past colonial links, military interventions and cultural links). However, at the same time, the approach is problematic because of the assumptions of closure and sustainability intrinsic to systems approaches.

2. *Is there an ‘Asia-Pacific migration system’?* With the rapid increase in flows of migrants within and from Asia, it is often suggested that an Asia-Pacific (or just Asian) migration system has emerged. We argue above that this concept is not very helpful, since Asia embraces 60 per cent of the world’s population and in fact consists of a number of highly diverse sub-regions. Consideration of a regional or a number of sub-regional migration systems indeed shows the limitations of the systems concept: Many Asian migrations take place across sub-regional and regional boundaries. Moreover, the volumes and characteristics of flows are evolving rapidly, so that notions of closure and sustainability seem misplaced.

3. *Understanding migration corridors.* We therefore argue for the use of the migration corridor – the migration relationship between a specific origin area and a specific destination area – as the main unit of analysis in migration research. The migration corridor could also serve as a valuable basis for policy formation, specifically for the development of bilateral agreements designed to recognise the needs and interests of the various stakeholders in migration processes in both origin and destination areas. However, the notion of migration corridors can also be problematic, if it blocks consideration of the embeddedness of specific migration relationships in broader social fields. Analysis of a specific migration corridor should always include examination of its political, economic, social and cultural context.

4. *Migration networks and social capital.* Informal relationships between migrants as well as the growth of businesses devoted to facilitating migration (the ‘migration industry’) play an increasing role in shaping migratory flows and settlement patterns. The development of migrant social capital is not a new phenomenon, but is increasingly important. With emerging modes of communication, migrants can transfer their newly acquired social capital to their family members in their home and other countries with more ease and speed. Migration networks can prove more powerful than official policies, but can also help to improve migration and settlement processes.
5. *Transnational identities, collective belonging and commitment to nation states.* As migration flows and processes change, so do identities and forms of attachment. These changes will require a review of models of immigrant incorporation, including citizenship law. More flexible ideas about national and transnational identities, belonging and attachment as they relate to social cohesion need to be debated for the changed migration conditions and contexts of the early 21st century.

6. *A multi-level conceptual framework.* Our suggested framework for analysis of migration and its social and cultural impacts is based on a multi-level model, which starts from a specific migration corridor as the unit of analysis. For each migration corridor, four dimensions should be examined: causes of migration; impacts of migration on countries of origin; impacts on countries of destination; and impacts on migrants and their families. For each dimension, a number of key factors should be specified, and for each factor a set of strategic indicators should be investigated. Such indicators may be either quantitative or qualitative. Use of this multi-level model would facilitate analysis of relative costs and benefits of migration for the various stakeholder groups, as well as providing a basis for comparative study of migration corridors.

4. **Australian policy responses**

Our aim in this sub-section is *not* to provide a comprehensive overview of Australian migration policies and programs. Rather we want to consider the extent to which such policies and programs have been adapted over the years in response to the challenges listed above. Although a planned migration intake has been a constant for Australia for over 60 years, policies in this area have been far from static. The migration program that started in 1947 was concerned with building up the population for both economic and strategic reasons. There was a strong preference for British migrants, and failing that for Europeans. Non-Europeans were excluded by the White Australia Policy. Non-British migrants were expected to take the worst jobs – at least for an initial period. They were also expected to stay permanently and to be socially and culturally assimilated into the predominantly Anglo-Australian population. All these principles have been long since been changed.

1. **Non-discriminatory entry policy.** The White Australia Policy began to be weakened in the 1960s, and by the early 1970s a non-discriminatory entry policy had been proclaimed. However, the opening to large-scale migration from Asia really got under way with the acceptance of Indo-Chinese boat people by the Fraser Coalition Government of the late 1970s. The result was that the population of Australia became one of the most diverse in the world, in terms of ethnicity, culture and religion. This process of change can be seen as part of a crucial re-definition of Australia’s position in the post-colonial world.

2. **Emphasis on skilled migration and economic criteria.** Since the Keating ALP Government of the early 1990s, the emphasis of the migration program has shifted from population-building to import of skills in demand, and to ensuring that immigration is economically beneficial to Australia. This priority became even stronger in the period of the Howard Coalition Government from 1996-2007, and is continues today as a reflection of the resources boom. Achieving these objectives can be difficult. First, it is not always possible to predict skill needs in advance, and the
time-lags inherent in the visa allocation process can lead to delays. Second, there can be a contradiction between recruiting people with needed skills and ensuring successful settlement in Australia. The principle of family settlement has always been seen as a key to good community relations, and this has been maintained, despite greater selectivity on skill criteria. Over half of those who enter in the Skill category are actually accompanying family members, and many of them enter the labour market sooner or later without selection on the basis of skills. If one adds those who come through the Family and Humanitarian categories, a considerable majority of permanent immigrants are still not selected on economic criteria. This is not necessarily a bad thing – but it does go against the dominant political rhetoric.

3. **The growth of temporary entry programs.** In recent years, temporary migration programs, including the 457 Temporary Business visas, international student visas and Working Holidaymakers, have grown rapidly. Such entries now far exceed annual permanent immigration. All these categories are important for the economy. Subclass 457 visas make a crucial contribution to skilled labour needs throughout the economy, but especially in the resources sector (although the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union have criticised 457 visas on the grounds that they allow employers to obtain foreign workers without any labour-market testing). International students are allowed to work 20 hours a week and most of them do, providing a flexible labour force particularly in the services. Working Holiday Makers make an important contribution to seasonal work in agriculture and casual employment in the services. The increased allocation of temporary visas reflects the global trends to temporary and circular migration. On the other hand, it may be argued that Australia has taken a significant step away from the traditional priority of permanent settlement migration and towards temporary labour migration without any real public discussion or even understanding of the change.

4. **Transition to permanent status.** Australia has moved quite a long way down the road to temporary labour recruitment – but it has not adopted guest worker systems in the form used in the past by some Western European countries and at present by some Asian and Middle Eastern countries. Such systems are typically designed to prevent family reunion and transition to permanent status – although they do not always succeed in doing this. Australian policies do allow transition from 457 visas to permanent settlement under certain circumstances. Students who obtain Australian qualifications are also able to obtain permanent residence status if they meet certain occupational criteria. Again, assessments of the merits of allowing transition of status vary. On the one hand it may be seen as recognition of the human rights of migrants. On the other hand, it can mean that temporary migration becomes a new gateway to permanency without full public discussion of the change, and without the safeguards built into the selection process for permanent immigrants.

5. **Settlement and multiculturalism.** The Australian immigration approach has been historically based on the principle of permanent settlement. Since the 1970s, multiculturalism was developed as a dual perspective of social rights based on the duty of the state to prevent discrimination, combat racism and ensure equal access to government services; and on recognition of the right of ethnic groups to maintain their own cultures, languages and religions, as long as they confirm to Australian laws and certain key principles. The shift to temporary migration – driven as we have seen both by the changing motivations of migrants and by shifts in Australian priorities and rules
has the potential to undermine multiculturalism. Permanent settlement implies a
strong commitment to Australia. In the multicultural model, this commitment is seen
as consistent with cultural pluralism, as long as migrants enjoy equal rights and
opportunities and do not become disadvantaged minorities. The key issue for policy
here – one that appears not to have been addressed in political and public debates – is
how cohesive and inclusive communities can be maintained if a significant proportion
of the population have transnational identities or where others might see themselves
just as temporary sojourners.

6. Citizenship. Becoming an Australian citizen has long been seen as part of the process
developing a feeling of belonging and building community cohesion. Since the
introduction of Australian citizenship in 1949 there has been a trend towards greater
inclusiveness. A key aspect has been the successive reduction of the waiting period for
citizenship from initially five years to three in 1973 and then to two in 1984. This
citizenship model is now under pressure from two sides. On the one hand, the growth
of temporary migration and transnationalism may reduce migrants’ motivations to
change their affiliation. On the other, the Australian Citizenship Act of 2007 has
enacted important changes to citizenship law including the extension of the requisite
period of residency from two to four years, and the introduction of a citizenship test.
In our view, these changes risk undermining the citizenship model of immigration and
multiculturalism. Rather than making it harder for immigrants to become citizens, it
might be more desirable for policy-makers to find ways of encouraging temporary
migrants to participate in political and social life. Easier access to citizenship as well
as continued acceptance of dual citizenship would be important ways of achieving
this.

4. 5. Issues for future policies and programs

Here we return to the challenges listed under 4.2 and ask which of them has not yet been met
with an adequate policy response.

The need for a new approach to migration dynamics. Points 1. – 4. above drew attention to
important changes in migration dynamics both globally and in the Asian and Pacific regions.
One important aspect of change is the growth of female migration, while another is the multi-
directionality of flows, and the growth of new forms of migration (including temporary and
circular migration, in which Australia is not only a destination but also an origin area).
Migration policy planning needs to be based on a new conceptual framework, using migration
corridors as the main unit of analysis, while at the same time taking account of the
embeddedness of migration in broader processes of social, economic, political and cultural
transformation.

Succeeding in the global competition for skills (point 5 above). The intensification of global
and regional competition for skills means that Australia may find it harder to attract human
capital in future, especially as other countries often offer higher salaries. We suggest three key
issues that need to be addressed. First, people migrate to Australian not only for economic
rewards, but also because of perceptions of lifestyle, environment, democracy and human
rights – migration strategies should build on these. Second, skilled migration policies that
deprive poorer countries of human capital crucial to development may not be sustainable in
future – skilled migration policies should focus on mutual benefit, through measures for
return of skills, training and economic cooperation. Finally, it is important to co-ordinate migration policies with the need for improved vocational training for the existing population.

**Re-thinking the relationship between asylum, refugee movements and broader migration (points 6 and 14).** The current polarised debate over asylum has done considerable harm to public perceptions of refugee movements and migration more generally. It is important that official policies should be based on an understanding of the close linkages between economic and forced migration in the context of rapid social transformation. Policy-makers and officials should do everything possible to provide full information to the public about the balance between the various arrival categories: off-shore and on-shore Humanitarian arrivals, Skill and Family settlers, and temporary migrants.

**Building bi-lateral partnerships based on migration corridors (point 7).** Making the migration corridor the unit of analysis for both research and policy-formation would encourage bi-lateral intergovernmental partnerships and agreements, designed to recognise and maximise the benefits of migration for all stakeholders, including sending and receiving communities and the migrants themselves.

**Working for enhanced global governance (point 8).** Ending the global governance deficit with regard to migration is crucial for achieving fair and sustainable international migration relationships. Australia should adhere to relevant international human rights instruments and support the formation of global institutions designed to set standards for migration and monitor their implementation.

**Balancing economic demand with environmental, social and political impacts (points 9 and 11).** The shift to emphasis on skills in demand for permanent immigration as well as the growth of temporary entry programs may be seen as a prioritisation of economic demand over other crucial issues for Australian society. There is a need for long-term analysis and discussion of the balance between goals; to ensure that migration policies and programs correspond with other programs concerning economy, society and environment.

**Responding to diversity in migration motivations (points 9, 10 and 11).** The growth in temporary and circular migration and the rise of transnationalism mean that the assumption of predominantly permanent migration and settlement needs to be revisited. There is a need for research on the motivations (especially on who wants to be temporary and who prefers to stay), livelihood strategies and social relationships of different categories of migrants, and on the effects of changed migratory patterns on community relations. Future policies on migrant selection, visa categories and transfers between them, and settlement measures need to be based on evidence on changing attitudes and behaviour.

**Multiculturalism and citizenship (point 12).** The success of Australian immigration has been based on multiculturalism and easy access to citizenship. Both of these principles have been questioned in recent years. Changes in migratory patterns and motivations certainly require changes in previous approaches, but moving away from principles that have in the past secured high levels of social cohesion and strong feelings of belonging – despite differences in culture, experience and religion – should not be done lightly. Multiculturalism and citizenship need to be rethought for a more mobile world. That is an important task that needs to be undertaken with imagination and commitment.
Appendices

Note: The tables and charts in Appendix 1 show trends in global and regional migration from 1990 to 2010. UN data for Australia and some other major migrant-destination countries is presented in tables in Appendix 2. Useful data and analyses are also to be found in the reports of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2010) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2010).

Appendix I

Chart 1: Estimated number of international migrants by major area, 1990-2010 (thousands)*
Chart 2: Estimated number of international migrants by major African regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)
Chart 3: Estimated number of international migrants by major Asian regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)
Chart 4: Estimated number of international migrants by major Latin American and Caribbean regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)
Chart 5: Estimated number of international migrants by major European regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)
Chart 6: Estimated number of international migrants by major Oceanian regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)
Chart 7: Estimated number of refugees by major area, 1990-2010*
Chart 8: International migrants as a percentage of the population by major area, 1990-2010
Chart 9: International migrants as a percentage of the population by major Asian regions, 1990-2010

Appendix II

Chart 10: Estimated number of international migrants by country, 1990-2010 (thousands)
Chart 11: Estimated number of refugees by country, 1990-2010
Chart 12: International migrants as a percentage of the population by country, 1990-2010

Appendix III

Table 1: Permanent migrants: migration and humanitarian program visa grants since 1985
Table 2: Temporary migrants: overseas student and business long stay (subclass 457) visa grants since 1996
Appendix I

Chart 1: Estimated number of international migrants by major area, 1990-2010 (thousands)*

Source: UNDESA, 2009

* ‘Estimated number of international migrants’ in a country, area or region are indicated as of mid-year for each of the years indicated. The estimates refer to both sexes combined. The number of international migrants generally represents the number of persons born in a country other than that in which they live.

** The region of Africa includes Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, Northern Africa, Southern Africa and Western Africa. The region of Asia includes Central Asia, Eastern Asia, South-Eastern Asia, Southern Asia and Western Asia. The region of Europe includes Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe and Western Europe. The region of Latin America and the Caribbean includes Caribbean, Central America, South America and Northern America. The region of Oceania includes Australia/New Zealand, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia.
Chart 2: Estimated number of international migrants by major African regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)

Source: UNDESA, 2009

Chart 3: Estimated number of international migrants by major Asian regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)

Source: UNDESA, 2009
Chart 4: Estimated number of international migrants by major Latin American and Caribbean regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)

Source: UNDESA, 2009

Chart 5: Estimated number of international migrants by major European regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)

Source: UNDESA, 2009
Chart 6: Estimated number of international migrants by major Oceanian regions, 1990-2010 (thousands)

Source: UNDESA, 2009

Chart 7: Estimated number of refugees by major area, 1990-2010*

Source: UNDESA, 2009

* ‘Estimated number of refugees’ is estimated refugee population as of mid-year of each of the years indicated. The estimates are based on data obtained from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
Chart 8: International migrants as a percentage of the population by major area, 1990-2010

Chart 9: International migrants as a percentage of the population by major Asian regions, 1990-2010
Appendix II

Chart 10: Estimated number of international migrants by country, 1990-2010 (thousands)

Source: UNDESA, 2009

Chart 11: Estimated number of refugees by country, 1990-2010

Source: UNDESA, 2009
Chart 12: International migrants as a percentage of the population by country, 1990-2010
### Table 1: Permanent migrants: migration and humanitarian program visa grants since 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Migration Program</th>
<th>Humanitarian Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td>44 200</td>
<td>10 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>63 400</td>
<td>16 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-87</td>
<td>72 600</td>
<td>28 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>79 500</td>
<td>42 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>72 700</td>
<td>51 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>66 600</td>
<td>52 700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>61 300</td>
<td>49 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>55 900</td>
<td>41 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>43 500</td>
<td>21 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>43 200</td>
<td>18 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>44 500</td>
<td>30 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>56 700</td>
<td>24 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>44 580</td>
<td>27 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>31 310</td>
<td>34 670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>32 040</td>
<td>35 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>32 000</td>
<td>35 330</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>33 470</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>38 090</td>
<td>53 520</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
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<td>66 050</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>42 230</td>
<td>71 240</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>41 740</td>
<td>77 880</td>
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<td>2005-06</td>
<td>45 290</td>
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<td>2006-07</td>
<td>50 080</td>
<td>97 920</td>
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<td>2007-08</td>
<td>49 870</td>
<td>108 540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>56 366</td>
<td>114 777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-10</td>
<td>60 254</td>
<td>107 868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-11 (planned)</td>
<td>54 550</td>
<td>113 850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** (Phillips et al., 2010, where detailed sources are provided).
Table 2: Temporary migrants: overseas student and business long stay (subclass 457) visa grants since 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Overseas students</th>
<th>Temporary business (long stay) 457 visas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>113 000</td>
<td>25 786</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>108 827</td>
<td>30 880</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>110 894</td>
<td>29 320</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999-00</td>
<td>119 806</td>
<td>31 070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-01</td>
<td>146 577</td>
<td>36 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-02</td>
<td>151 894</td>
<td>33 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-03</td>
<td>162 575</td>
<td>36 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>171 616</td>
<td>39 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>174 786</td>
<td>49 590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>190 674</td>
<td>71 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-07</td>
<td>228 592</td>
<td>87 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-08</td>
<td>278 180</td>
<td>110 570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>320 368</td>
<td>101 280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Phillips et al., 2010, where detailed sources are given).
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