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China's grand strategy

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Preface

In the era of Hu Jintao, from 2002 to 2012, as China became increasingly economically influential and powerful, there was intensifying frustration amongst foreign governments and analysts that its key leaders did not more clearly spell out what its core strategic objectives were, particularly in terms of foreign policy. Domestic goals such as achieving middle income status by 2020 were all found in government and Communist Party pronouncements. But the international dimensions, and in particular what they implied about China's long term vision of its role in the world, were far more elusive. The State Council issued white papers on specific issues like relations with the EU, or national defence. But it was only in 2009 that tentative suggestions were made about what the country's core interests might be, and where its key foreign policy objectives lay.

As Simon Norton makes clear in this succinct overview of a complex subject, such coyness on the part of Chinese officials about strategic issues should not lull anyone into thinking that they don't play a role in government thinking. In this area, Chinese leaders and their advisors have a strong sense at least in the abstract of long term aims, some of which are spelled out in this paper. They do not articulate these in great detail. One of the significant reasons for this is that might make them a hostage to fortune. But in terms of securing a stable hold on power for the ruling Communist Party, ensuring China achieves great power status and is able to protect its sovereignty and economic interests against external interference, and maintaining a powerful grip in the issues of Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, the strategic focus for several decades has been consistent.

That there is this culture of strategic thinking in Beijing, and that it is so internalised and embedded in the mindsets of the various actors there, is something that we often need reminding about. While many other countries don't see the world in terms of a 'grand strategy' and talk more about thematic interests and changing contexts necessitating changing policy positions, commitment to something that looks like a coherent, overarching grand strategic view of foreign policy and the world outside China is one of the most striking characteristics of the country even today. Attention to this notion of 'grand strategy' is important, not least because it gives clues to an area of Chinese thinking where important things are often implied, but not articulated. Understanding the context of this area is crucial, and this paper offers some useful clues for both how to spot it, how to give greater definition to it, and the real impact it has on the more daily business of foreign policy formulation and its operations.

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Executive summary

As China becomes an increasingly powerful world actor, understanding its intentions is important. A good place to start is to investigate whether China has a grand strategy, because grand strategy offers an interpretative framework to understand a country's behaviour. However, much debate exists as to whether China has a grand strategy.

This policy paper analyses authoritative pronouncements by China's top leadership and argues that China does indeed have a clear and coherent grand strategy. China's political system follows a model in which the state's highest political ends are articulated by its top leadership, from which the state's institutions can then base their own priorities and policies. China's leadership has expressed a set of ideas about the state's highest long-term goals and interests – its 'core interests' – clear recognition of major threats to these interests, and policies and actions geared toward defending its interests and achieving its long-term goals. This analysis also provides a framework to determine future changes in China's grand strategy.

Introduction

Since 'Reform and Opening Up' in the late 1970s, China has experienced remarkable economic growth. This has provided China with the building blocks to increase its economic, military, and political power relative to other states, and in turn increase its capacity to shape and influence the international environment in its favour. How China will use this power is one of the most important questions in international relations today. Will a more powerful China be a status quo or revisionist power, or something in between? Already we are seeing a more assertive China, particularly in its maritime periphery.¹ Yet analysts are divided on whether or not its behaviour is part of a grand strategy.² Understanding China's intentions is therefore very important.³ A good place to start is to investigate whether China has a grand strategy. After all, grand strategy is a coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish and how it should go about doing so,⁴ and it offers an interpretative framework for understanding a country's behaviour.⁵

The purpose of this paper is to answer the question of whether China has a grand strategy and if so what this grand strategy entails. The paper begins by defining the concept of grand strategy. This is followed by a brief discussion on the methodology used to discern a grand strategy. The second section analyses authoritative statements on China's ultimate goals and interests and primary threats, then considers policies China has initiated to achieve its goals and defend its interests. The paper concludes that China does indeed have a coherent grand strategy articulated by its top leadership.

Conceptualising grand strategy

To determine whether China has a grand strategy, and if so what it is, it is important to begin with a clear definition. The term grand strategy is often invoked but not often defined clearly, if at all. And those definitions often demonstrate very different understandings.⁶ Moreover, grand strategy can be easily confused with the concept of strategy in a more narrow sense, either as it is known in international relations, or more colloquially. This paper defines grand strategy as an integrated and coherent set of ideas about a state's ultimate objectives in the international system, and how it should go about achieving them.⁷ A grand strategy must determine what a state's ultimate goals and interests are; the primary threats to those goals and interests; the ways in which a state's finite resources can be used to deal with competing challenges and opportunities; and the policies and initiatives – military, diplomatic, and economic – through which a state interacts with other states and entities.⁸

Some further elaboration of the concept is required. Firstly, grand strategy has long-term horizons. It is about the evolution and integration of policies that should exist for decades.⁹ It links short-term policies and actions to medium and long-term goals. This allows policy makers to prioritise the most important long-term objectives and then apply the scarce resources available to the state to the most important goals, while attempting to balance means and ends, objectives and capabilities. Policy makers can make decisions based on a state's priorities and the best use of limited resources rather than reacting to day-to-day events or handling matters on a case-by-case basis.¹⁰ Moreover, grand strategy is not only concerned with applying its resources, but also to developing them over time.¹¹

Secondly, grand strategy does not have to be formally documented or articulated and labelled as a grand strategy.¹² While some leaders may deliberately go about constructing a grand strategy, statecraft is often developed in a more organic and iterative process.¹³ A state's leaders engage in grand strategic decision making regardless of whether a state lays out a formal grand strategy. Leaders must make decisions about a state's most important goals, most pressing threats, and how resources should be deployed.¹⁴ As strategist Edward Luttwak put it "all states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not".¹⁵ Instead, the criterion for a grand strategy is whether there exists a coherent body of thought and action geared toward the achievement of important long-term goals.¹⁶ Furthermore, as William Martel has argued, a grand strategy must be clear and reducible to a set of guidelines concrete enough to provide real guidance and signal what is expected to implementers.¹⁷

Methodology

One of the problems with analysing China's foreign and security policy is that its decision making is notoriously opaque.¹⁸ Moreover, as leading Chinese academic Wang Jisi has pointed out, "the Chinese government has yet to disclose any document that comprehensively expounds the country's strategic goals and the ways to achieve them".¹⁹ As we have seen, a specific document labelled grand strategy is not necessary for one to exist. But the question arises of how we can determine whether China does have a grand strategy, and if so, what it is.

The first thing to note is that grand strategy can only be made at a specific and high level of government. This is because only at a particular level of government can an appropriate level of knowledge and capacity to determine and direct grand strategy reside.²⁰ Once a coherent statement of the highest political ends is articulated by top leaders, the state's institutions are then directed to set their own priorities based on those ends.²¹

China's political system follows such a model. The Communist Party of China (CPC) sits above and penetrates all significant Chinese government and social institutions.²² However the party's committees and organs issue few policies themselves. Rather, the party exercises its control over policy by issuing strategic guidance.²³ Timothy Heath argues that the most authoritative expressions of the party's strategic guidance are those documents linked to changes in the party's theory that have been endorsed by the Central Committee at a Party Congress. The first document, the CPC Constitution, outlines the desired strategic end state or long-term goals. The second document, the Party Congress Work Report, provides the main guidelines on the policies and instruments to obtain the desired strategic end state.²⁴ The report establishes the party's consensus line on nearly all policy sectors that the party leadership will be addressing in the five years until the next party congress convenes and provides a guideline to base all subsequent major policy decisions.²⁵ To elaborate on these documents, speeches by Politburo Standing Committee members and top foreign policy officials play an important role, and government white papers provide useful summaries.²⁶ Statements from these sources are thus seen as authoritative, and will form the basis of any evidence to discern a Chinese grand strategy.

China's goals and interests

The first question that must be asked in discerning a Chinese grand strategy is: what are China's ultimate goals and interests? These are the state's highest political ends and most vital priorities as articulated by top leadership. A state will have many interests and objectives. But a grand strategy articulates what sits at the top of the hierarchy of what a state's top leaders seek to achieve in foreign policy.²⁷

China's leadership expresses quite clear and explicit goals for the state, along with clear timeframes. The CPC Constitution states that the "realisation of communism is the highest ideal and ultimate goal of the Party." But it also claims that "China is in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for... over a hundred years." It claims that "the principal contradiction in Chinese society is one between the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the low level of production." Therefore, the party must meet these needs through the growth of production and social wealth, with development the "top priority in governing and rejuvenating the country".²⁸

The Constitution goes on to state that the "beginning of the new century marks China's entry into the new stage of development of building a moderately prosperous society." In this new stage, strategic objectives of economic and social development are set as: to "bring China into a moderately prosperous society" by the time of the Party's centenary (in 2021), bring per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) "up to the level of moderately developed countries", and "realize modernization" by the time of the centenary of the People's Republic of China (in 2049).²⁹ The "basic line" of the CPC – which Heath has described as "the definitive statement of its strategic ambition"³⁰ – is "to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country by making economic development the

central task". All other work is subordinated to economic development.³¹ As Hu Jintao put it in his report to the 18th Party Congress: "We must unwaveringly adhere to the strategic thinking that only development counts".³² These objectives should be pursued while upholding the "Four Cardinal Principles" which include keeping to the "socialist road" and upholding "the people's democratic dictatorship" and leadership by the CPC.³³

It is apparent from this that the CPC's overarching objectives are to keep the party in power, and promote rejuvenation of China through economic development, to achieve the "twin centenary goals" of becoming a 'moderately prosperous society' by 2021 and achieving 'modernisation' by 2049.³⁴ This would return China to what it sees as its rightful position as the leading power in Asia following a century of humiliation.³⁵ These goals are encapsulated in Xi Jinping's concept of the 'Chinese Dream'.³⁶

These objectives have both a foreign and domestic element. China's ultimate goals and interests specific to foreign relations are further elaborated by China's articulation of its 'core interests'.³⁷ China usually summarises its core interests as being sovereignty, security, and development.³⁸ But these were further defined in China's 2011 Peaceful Development White Paper, as well as by former state councillor for external relations Dai Bingguo, as (1) China's political system and social stability; (2) ensuring sustainable economic and social development; and (3) state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification.³⁹

China's political system and social stability

As we have seen above, a vital objective of China's leadership is for the party to remain in power. Dai Bingguo defined this core interest as "the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the socialist system and socialism with Chinese characteristics."⁴⁰ Notably, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is not a national army belonging to the state but instead an armed wing of the CPC⁴¹ with the CPC Constitution stating that the Party "persists in its leadership over" the PLA.⁴² Thus, the PLA is one pillar of support for continued CPC rule.

Ensuring sustainable economic and social development

As we have also seen, another vital objective is to promote economic development to achieve the centenary goals. This objective is important in and of itself, and economic development is a common interest of all states. But it is also vital in assisting with the first objective of keeping the party in power. As then Premier Wen Jiabao suggested at the 2011 National People's Congress, ensuring GDP growth of around 8 percent per annum and keeping inflation below four to five percent is important for social stability and regime security.⁴³ Furthermore, a strong economy and economic growth is a key building block of military modernisation to support China's third set of core interests related to security (as discussed below).

State sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification

State sovereignty and territorial integrity are typical interests vital to any state and refer to the ultimate goal of maintaining the survival of the state, defending its territory against attack, and protecting against coercion by adversaries. The PLA, as well as defending CPC rule, is also tasked with "upholding sovereignty and territorial integrity, safeguarding its more than 22,000 km long land boundary and 18,000 km long sea boundary".⁴⁴

National security covers state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The "three forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism referred to in China's 2012 Defense White Paper can also be added to this list.⁴⁵ China particularly experiences these forces in Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan.

National reunification refers to Taiwan.⁴⁶ Hu Jintao has described reunification as "an irresistible historical process" which should be achieved with adherence to the principle of "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems".⁴⁷ Yet China's defence White Paper states that "'Taiwan independence' separatist forces and their activities are still the biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-strait relations."⁴⁸

It is important to note that despite some suggestions by government officials and media outside China, there is no evidence that China's top leaders have called China's territorial disputes in the South China and East China Seas a core interest. Regarding specific sovereignty claims, the government has officially only identified three issues as core interests: Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.⁴⁹ Rather, Chinese officials have characterised the South China Sea as 'related to' China's core interests. This suggests that there exists a hierarchy of core interests. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea relate to the core interests of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. However the disputes in the South China Sea are not deemed as important as Taiwan.⁵⁰

Threats

What do China's top leaders see as the primary threats to China's goals and core interests? Authoritative documents and speeches by key foreign policy figures suggest that the United States (US) and its alliance system are first and foremost. This is not to say that Chinese leaders openly state that the US is its primary threat or consider it a hostile enemy. To achieve many of China's goals and protect its core interests a constructive relationship with the US and its allies is important. Yet China is suspicious of US intentions towards it.

Firstly, there is a perception that the US seeks to undermine CPC rule due to ideological hostility towards socialism and authoritarianism. Secondly, China believes that the US seeks to maintain its hegemony in East Asia.⁵¹ It therefore sees the US and its alliance partners as wanting to contain China, in a manner similar to US containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This fear is exacerbated because many of the US's alliance and security partners are neighbours of China who potentially fear how a more powerful China will behave towards them.

China repeatedly warns against hegemonism, power politics, and Cold War thinking.⁵² This reflects two concerns. Firstly, China seeks to assuage fears held by the US and China's neighbours over the possibility that a more powerful China would seek hegemony in the region itself. Dai Bingguo has addressed this most directly: "We do not seek hegemony and will never compete with other countries for leadership in our region, seek so-called 'joint hegemony' or follow so-called 'Monroe Doctrine'."⁵³ Secondly, China seeks to warn the US and its allies against attempting to contain China to preserve US hegemony. China's Peaceful Development White Paper states that countries "should abandon the Cold War mentality and confrontation between different alliances".⁵⁴ Dai Bingguo has also said: "We hope that what other countries do in Asia is not aimed to keep off, contain or harm China," and has criticised the US by stating "there are those who, out of Cold War mentality and geo-political needs, have continued to sell weapons to Taiwan in disregard of China's firm opposition."⁵⁵

A second threat perceived by China's leadership is disruption to supplies of vital resources necessary for sustainable economic development. For most of its history China has been largely self-sufficient in major resources, but this changed in the 1990s and it is now dependent on foreign countries for resources vital to its economic growth.⁵⁶ China is now the world's largest energy consumer,⁵⁷ its oil self-sufficiency ended in 1993⁵⁸ and it became a net coal importer in 2009.⁵⁹ Around 90 percent of its oil imports are transported to China via tankers passing from the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea via the Strait of Malacca⁶⁰ which is a classic maritime chokepoint⁶¹ susceptible to blockage. Hu Jintao dubbed this threat to China's sea lines of communication (SLOC) as its 'Malacca Dilemma'.⁶² China is concerned about disruption caused by non-state actors such as terrorists and pirates. But Hu also linked this concern to the perceived threat of the US when he stated that "certain powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the strait" and argued that China needed to remain vigilant against foreign attempts to exploit this vulnerability for strategic advantage.⁶³

Policies

What policies and initiatives has China developed to achieve its goals, protect its core interests, and counter perceived threats?

Diplomatic and economic

China's approach to diplomacy is well encapsulated by the concept of peaceful development. China's Peaceful Development White Paper states that "China's overall goal of pursuing peaceful development is to promote development and harmony domestically and pursue cooperation and peace internationally".⁶⁴ China seeks to maintain a stable international environment, especially in its periphery, conducive to its economic development so that it can enhance its wealth and influence, but at the same time reassure its neighbours that it has benign intentions and is not a threat. This could dampen security dilemma dynamics and the potential for balancing or containment of China. This would support domestic stability, and allow its leaders to concentrate on domestic challenges and priorities.⁶⁵ China is also attempting to counter what it perceives as excessive US influence around its periphery so that it can shape its own security environment, while avoiding overt conflict with the US.⁶⁶

An important plank of China's diplomacy is its promotion of 'win-win cooperation', mutual benefit, common development, and opportunities for its friends and neighbours.⁶⁷ While China's exceptional economic growth has made it much more powerful, it reminds its neighbours that they can benefit greatly themselves through trade and investment with China. China has not only used its powerhouse economy as a carrot, but also as a stick, warning other states that infringing on China's vital interests or attempting to contain China would see those countries miss out on the benefits of trade and investment. Dai Bingguo has put this most starkly:

Take China's development as an opportunity and seize it, and one stands to benefit. Doubt China's regional and international strategic intentions and focus on finding fault and making trouble, and one will lose the good opportunity to cooperate with China.⁶⁸

Arguably China's most important policy initiative is the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (or 'Belt and Road') initiative, in which Xi seeks to promote a 'common destiny' by meeting the development needs of China and neighbouring countries along the routes.⁶⁹ The initiative aims to build connectivity between Asia, Europe and Africa via land and sea by aligning and coordinating the development strategies of the countries along the routes. It would improve the region's infrastructure, develop efficient and secure land, sea, and air corridors, increase connectivity, facilitate greater trade and investment, and establish a network of free trade areas, thus creating demand and jobs.⁷⁰ Much of this investment would be funded by China's newly developed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

The Belt and Road initiative and the AIIB would promote China's goals and interests, and help to counter its major threats. Firstly, China is constructing a multilateral architecture in its periphery which it can shape in its favour. For example, the China-dominated AIIB will act as a rival to the western based, US dominated Bretton Woods institutions. Secondly, the initiatives can boost trade and investment in less developed regions within China, creating jobs and boosting domestic growth. For example, China's leadership sees Xinjiang's geographical proximity to China's western neighbours on the Silk Road Economic Belt as an opportunity for making this less developed province a key centre for transportation, communication and trade, with potential for significant investment.⁷¹ Thirdly, many countries on the Belt and Road are relatively poor, and infrastructure investment, improved connectivity, and increased trade can benefit these countries greatly. This is a good example of win-win cooperation, and can make foreign elites look favourably towards China and increase China's influence with its neighbours. Fourthly, the Belt and Road opens up alternative energy sources, and supply and trade routes that can go some way to mitigating the 'Malacca Dilemma' and improving China's energy security.

Military

China has pursued a military modernisation drive to build a national defence and armed forces which "are commensurate with China's international standing" and respond to China's core security needs.⁷² China's leadership has attached great importance to maritime security and informationisation, especially operations in cyberspace, space, and the electro-magnetic

domain.⁷³ This focus supports the military's most important task as espoused by China's top leadership: winning local wars under the conditions of informationisation.⁷⁴ And this reflects the main threats to China's interests discussed in this paper: resource and energy security, sea lane security, maritime territorial disputes, Taiwanese separatism, and the threat of the US and its regional allies.

Because China's defence forces are still inferior to the US, China has focused on asymmetrical warfare capabilities. This has seen great importance placed on information and electronic warfare which involves the use of instruments in cyberspace, space, and the electro-magnetic domains to gain an information advantage over adversaries by disrupting their communication networks.⁷⁵ China has also invested heavily in power projection capabilities, and what US analysts call anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. A2/AD seeks to deter or defeat third-party intervention during a large-scale theatre campaign in China's maritime periphery which includes a Taiwan contingency.⁷⁶ Power projection capabilities serve to attack adversaries in the western Pacific Ocean and enhance China's ability to protect its SLOCs.⁷⁷

Maritime territorial disputes

Debate exists over whether China's increasingly assertive behaviour in its maritime periphery – including the deployment of an oil rig in disputed waters off Vietnam's coast and land reclamation by creating artificial islands that house an airfield and supply bases in the South China Sea – is part of China's grand strategy.⁷⁸ As noted above, maritime territorial disputes relate to the core interests of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. China sees the land features it claims in the South China and East China seas as sovereign territory which must be defended. For the land features it controls, China is demonstrating its authority over these features – a necessary requirement to demonstrate sovereignty under international law.⁷⁹ For features it does not control, China must demonstrate its opposition to a rival states authority in order to strengthen its own claims. In the South China Sea, China is also enhancing its power projection capabilities through its reclamation and construction efforts to support its SLOC security and assert greater maritime control in its near seas.

There is a contradiction between China's interests of promoting peaceful development and a stable periphery, and defending its maritime sovereignty and territorial claims. The more assertive its actions are, the greater the concern in regional capitals about China's intentions. This undermines China's peaceful development rhetoric and draws these capitals closer to the US. Therefore China appears to follow a tactic of undertaking assertive actions to expand control followed by a dialling down of activities to repair diplomatic ties and consolidate gains while avoiding escalation to military conflict.⁸⁰

Conclusion

China has a clear and coherent grand strategy, with strategic guidelines articulated by its top leadership, and actions aimed at defending its interests and achieving important long-term goals. China is clear about its core interests and goals: the CPC remaining in power; ensuring economic and social development to achieve the twin centenary goals; achieving reunification with Taiwan; and defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity. China sees the US and its alliance system and dependence on foreign resources, particularly energy, as the biggest threats to these goals and interests.

As China has become richer and more powerful, its grand strategy has evolved from the approach of Deng Xiaoping which involved keeping a low profile, and hiding its capabilities and biding time. China is demonstrating greater willingness to use its power and enhanced capabilities to influence and shape its external environment.

China is pursuing military modernisation with a focus on informationisation and maritime security to defend its security interests. It is also acting to strengthen its maritime territorial claims. At the same time it has sought to maintain a stable peripheral environment conducive to its development, keeping its assertive behaviour below levels that could escalate into military conflict. Diplomatically, it has attempted to assuage fears that a more powerful China will be

aggressive. It has used its economic growth and trade and investment opportunities to attract and win influence with its neighbours, while also using the threat of missing out as a deterrent to countries thinking of infringing on China's interests. Its primary policy in this regard is the Belt and Road initiative, which also seeks to support domestic growth and open up alternative energy routes that bypass potential threats in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea.

Grand strategies evolve over time. For China, change may be driven in response to reactions of other states, discontinuities in the international order including shifts in balance of power, in response to leadership transitions including post transition power consolidation, and by the personal outlook of individual leaders. Previous generations of leaders have all made their own unique contributions to China's strategic direction. With Xi Jinping still in the early stages of his leadership, we can expect further change during his time in power. Watching for changes in China's grand strategy and analysing the drivers of such change presents a rich opportunity for future scholarship.

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Notes

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² See for example the Lowy Institute for International Policy, 'Debate: China's unpredictable maritime security actors', *The Interpreter*, 2014-2015, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/?d=D%20-%20China%27s%20Unpredictable%20Maritime%20Security%20Actors>, viewed 10 April 2015.

³ Wang, 'China's search for a grand strategy', p. 68.

⁴ Hal Brands, *What good is grand strategy? Power and purpose in American statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014, p. 3.

⁵ Daniel W. Drezner, 'Does Obama have a grand strategy? Why we need doctrines in uncertain times', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 90, no. 4, 2011, p. 58.

⁶ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, pp. 1-3. For a sample of the varying definitions see William C. Martel, *Grand strategy in theory and practice: The need for an effective American foreign policy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015, chapter 3.

⁷ My definition is adapted and paraphrased from two definitions, one provided by Hal Brands and the other by Stephen D. Biddle. See Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, p. 3; Stephen D. Biddle, *American grand strategy after 9/11: An assessment*, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, p. 1, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB603.pdf>.

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¹³ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, p. 6.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Edward Luttwak, *The grand strategy of the Byzantine empire*, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 409.

¹⁶ Brands, *What good is grand strategy?*, p. 6; see also Martel, *Grand Strategy*, p. 33.

¹⁷ Martel, *Grand strategy*, p. 33.

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¹⁹ Wang, 'China's search for a grand strategy', p. 68.

²⁰ Peter Layton, 'The idea of grand strategy', *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 157, no. 4, 2012, p. 58.

²¹ Martel, *Grand strategy*, p. 35.

²² Timothy R. Heath 'What does China want? Discerning the PRC's national strategy,' *Asian Security*, vol. 8, no. 1, 2012, p. 55; Jakobson and Knox, *New foreign policy actors in China*, p. 2.

²³ Heath 'What does China want?', p. 55.

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- ³⁰ Heath 'What does China want?' p. 58.
- ³¹ Constitution of Communist Party of China.
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- ³⁴ Constitution of Communist Party of China. This is reiterated by Hu in his report to the 18th Party Congress. The "twin centenary goals" is a phrase used by Christopher K. Johnson, 'Xi Jinping unveils his foreign policy vision: peace through strength', *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, no. 15, 2014, p. 3. Available at http://csis.org/files/publication/141208_ThoughtsfromtheChairmanDEC2014.pdf
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