Thesis abstract:

«p»«p»The purpose of this study is to provide an in-depth examination of the concept of digital containment and the effectiveness of those mechanisms that have been introduced to counter online disinformation and digital propaganda activities targeting European state interests over the past two decades. In recent years, issues relating to disinformation and fake news have become ubiquitous in debates on both politics and the media. Whilst the material risks these initiatives pose have been the subject of international debate for some time, addressing the practical challenges that accompany online disinformation at a policy level is still a relatively recent phenomenon. A core concern in this context are disinformation campaigns initiated in pursuit of strategic state interests. One of the most pertinent examples is the 2016 US Presidential elections, where online disinformation and fake news generation have been cited as contributing factors in the election of former President Donald Trump (Parkinson, 2016; Timberg, 2016; Faris et al, 2017; Howard et al, 2018, Guess et al, 2018; ). A number of US intelligence agencies subsequently identified Russia as being the architects of a sophisticated online influence campaign in an unabashed “attempt to undermine Western liberalism” (Harris, Paletta & Lee, 2017). The Russian state has a long and intricate history of engaging in what is termed ‘Active Measures’ against states (Rid, 2020), whereby intelligence agencies prioritised political warfare as a means of advancing the foreign policy priorities of the former Soviet regime. In an open and democratic society, individuals and organisations have the right to transmit communications to both domestic and international audiences, which was utilised for the large-scale dissemination of subversive messages (Bittman, 1972: 4). The transition of Russian influence to exploiting new online technologies has revitalised Cold War techniques to serve post-Cold War Russian state interests, specifically honing its newly adapted skills to target regional interests via campaigns against multilateral organisations and individual states (Bjola & Pamment, 2016; European Parliament, 2016; East StratCom Task Force, 2017; European Commission, 2017; Sanovich, 2017; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2018). Over time, online disinformation campaigns contributed to the development of what Sergey Sanovich referred to as a “digital propaganda gap” (Sanovich, 2017: 3). In a similar vein to the alleged Cold War missile gap, the digital propaganda gap denotes a divergence in capacity between Russian and Western states in the use of online tools as a means of exerting influence. A number of European states have attempted to address these strategic deficiencies by developing effective counter-propaganda strategies that will enable them compete against large-scale online disinformation campaigns and their ensuing impact on public attitudes (Holland, 2016). The significance of counter-strategies has increased in recent years as nascent populist groups in Europe have attracted support from Russia-aligned actors, for example the Internet Research Agency, in spreading disinformation to amplify content that supports Russian interests latently or explicitly. In using both the internet and social media tools, disinformation can be easily and widely proliferated without altering its intrinsic message. With the assistance of a network of synergetic media outlets and state-controlled broadcasters, such as is found in the Russian media environment (Freedom House, 2016), coherent messaging is possible. In such systems media no longer informs, but actively spreads disinformation (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). As academics and policy makers continue to address emergent populism in Europe, it is timely to examine those strategies that have been specifically developed to counter mounting external interference and, in turn, bolster liberal democracy. This study is focused on two broadly interrelated themes: how European governments are responding to online disinformation and propaganda; and how effective these strategies are in protecting democracy without compromising the integrity of core democratic principles. To inform this analysis, this study will examine three European states’ efforts to contain disinformation: Poland, the Czech Republic and Ukraine.«/p»«/p»