2024

• Nielsen, M., Stewart, R. (2024). New possibilities for fair algorithms. Philosophy and Technology.
• Nielsen, M., Stewart, R. (2024). New Possibilities for Fair Algorithms. Philosophy & Technology (Dordrecht, 1988), 37(4), 116. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M. (2024). Only CDT values knowledge. Analysis, 84(1), 67-82. [More Information]
• Greene, P., Latham, A., Miller, K., Nielsen, M. (2024). The implicit decision theory of non-philosophers. Synthese, 203(2), 61. [More Information]

2023

• Nielsen, M. (2023). Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains. Mind, 132(526), 402-427. [More Information]

2022

• Nielsen, M. (2022). A harder dilemma for partial subjunctive supposition. Analysis, 82(4), 585-592. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M. (2022). A harder dilemma for partial subjunctive supposition (forthcoming). Analysis.
• Nielsen, M. (2022). Accuracy and probabilism in infinite domains (forthcoming). Mind.
• Nielsen, M., Stewart, R. (2022). Distention for sets of probabilities (forthcoming). Philosophy of Science.
• Nielsen, M. (2022). On the best accuracy arguments for probabilism (forthcoming). Philosophy of Science.
• Nielsen, M. (2022). Regular conditional probabilities and strictly proper loss functions. Statistics and Probability Letters, 185, 109412. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M., Eric, W. (2022). Speed-optimal induction and dynamic coherence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 73(2), 439-455. [More Information]

2021

• Nielsen, M. (2021). A New Argument For Kolmogorov Conditionalization. Review of Symbolic Logic, 14(4), 930-945. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M. (2021). Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization. Philosophical Studies, 178(10), 3217-3236. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M., Stewart, R. (2021). Conglomerability, disintegrability, and the comparative principle. Analysis, 81(3), 479-488. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M. (2021). Convergence to the truth without countable additivity. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 50, 395-414. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M., Stewart, R. (2021). Persistent disagreement and polarization in a Bayesian setting. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(1), 51-78. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M. (2021). The strength of de Finetti's coherence theorem. Synthese, 198, 11713-11724. [More Information]

2020

• Nielsen, M. (2020). A new justification of induction (book note on Hume's Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction by Gerhard Schurz). Metascience, 29. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M. (2020). Deterministic convergence and strong regularity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(4), 1461-1491. [More Information]
• Huttegger, S., Nielsen, M. (2020). Generalized learning and conditional expectation. Philosophy of Science, 87(5), 868-883. [More Information]
• Stewart, R., Nielsen, M. (2020). On the Possibility of Testimonial Justice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(4), 732-746. [More Information]

2019

• Stewart, R., Nielsen, M. (2019). Another approach to consensus and maximally informed opinions with increasing evidence. Philosophy of Science, 86(2), 236-254. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M., Stewart, R. (2019). Counterexamples to Some Characterizations of Dilation. Erkenntnis, 86(5), 1107-1118. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M., Stewart, R. (2019). Obligation, permission, and Bayesian orgulity. Ergo, 6(3), 58-70. [More Information]
• Nielsen, M. (2019). On linear aggregation of infinitely many finitely additive probability measures. Theory and Decision: an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences, 86(3-4), 421-436. [More Information]

2015

• Scarantino, A., Nielsen, M. (2015). Voodoo dolls and angry lions: how emotions explain arational actions. Philosophical Studies, 172(11), 2975-2998. [More Information]